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Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lynne Price v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
As a result, “a pro se attorney may not recover fees for the value of his own services, as lost opportunity costs are not fees paid or incurred . . . within the meaning of section 7430.” Minahan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 88 T.C. 516, 519 (1987); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tax Div. v. Hudson, 626 F.3d 36 , 38–39 (2d Cir. 2010); McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 1989).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Purdue v. NaphCare
“A difference of opinion does not amount to 23 deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 24 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hale v. Shinn
"A difference of opinion does not amount to 23 deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff's] serious medical needs." Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 24 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Loring v. Daly
“A difference of opinion does not amount to 23 deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 24 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States Department of Justice, Tax Division v. Hudson
Finding no reason to depart from our reasoning in Pietrangelo or Hawkins, and joining our sister Circuits that have considered this provision of the IRC, see McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989) and United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir. 1988), we hold that lawyers appearing pro se who prevail in administrative or court proceedings against the United States are ineligible for attorneys’ fees under IRC § 7430.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
US DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TAX DIV. v. Hudson
Finding no reason to depart from our reasoning in Pietrangelo or Hawkins, and joining our sister Circuits that have considered this provision of the IRC, see McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989) and United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir. 1988), we hold that lawyers appearing pro se who prevail in administrative or court proceedings against the United States are ineligible for attorneys' fees under IRC § 7430.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Claro
Relying on decisions interpreting similar fee-shifting statutes, our court held: “Because § 7430 limits attor *460 ney’s fees to those actually incurred, [plaintiff] is entitled only to the amount owed under the contingency-fee agreement plus costs, to the extent reasonable.” Id. at 828-29 (citing with approval United States v. 122.00 Acres of Land, 856 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir.1988), and stating that “the Eighth Circuit held that a party ‘actually incurs’ only the amount owed under a contingency fee agreement”) (emphasis added); United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1164 (4th Ci…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sorrentino v. United States
Individuals who represent themselves pro se may not recover attorney fees or other compensation for their time under this provision because they have not paid or incurred fees for these efforts. *1079 See McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Payne v. United States
Marre [94-2 ustc ¶ 50,-615], 38 F.3d at 829 . 24. “[A]n attorney who represents himself in civil tax litigation does ‘not pay any fees for legal services nor incur any debts’ for the same.” McCormack [90-1 ustc ¶ 50,315], 891 F.2d at 25 (quotingMcPAer son [88-1 ustc ¶ 9194], 840 F.2d at 245 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Overton v. United States
See Corrigan v. United States, 27 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir.) (stating that pro se litigant may not recover attorney fees under Internal Revenue Code), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1063 , 115 S.Ct. 679 , 130 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994); McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989) (same); Frisch v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 838, 847 , 1986 WL 22038 (1986) (holding that pro se plaintiff could not recover fees for time he spent litigating his own case). 8 Finally, Plaintiff's claim for fees is not revived by his argument that his fees should be treated as fees for the services of an attorney under 26 U.…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marré v. United States
See United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1164 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that party entitled to full indemnification of attorney’s fees by her employer did not “incur” any expenses under EAJA); McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989) (rejecting pro se attorney’s argument that he “paid” for his services by forgoing other opportunities on basis that taxpayer had not “paid” for services of an attorney or “incurred” any debt under § 7430); United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir.1988) (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marre v. United States
See United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1164 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that party entitled to full indemnification of attorney's fees by her employer did not "incur" any expenses under EAJA); McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989) (rejecting pro se attorney's argument that he "paid" for his services by forgoing other opportunities on basis that taxpayer had not "paid" for services of an attorney or "incurred" any debt under Sec. 7430); United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir.1988) (same). 40 By contrast, the fee-shifting provision of the civil rights statu…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
John L. Corrigan v. United States of America, John L. Corrigan v. United States
United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir.1988) (pro se attorney unable to collect attorney fees under § 7430 because attorney fees were not paid or incurred); McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989) (applying the 1986 version and following McPherson).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Richard L. MARRÉ, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, Agritech Enterprises v. UNITED STATES of America
Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1152 (5th Cir.1987). attorney's fees by her employer did not "incur" any expenses under EAJA); McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1989) (rejecting pro se attorney's argument that he "paid" for his services by forgoing other opportunities on basis that taxpayer had not "paid" for services of an attorney or "incurred" any debt under § 7430); United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir.1988) (same).
cited
Cited "see"
Aguilar v. Gutierrez
See Sanchez, 891 F.2d 24 at 242 ; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 .
discussed
Cited "see"
In Re Hudson
See McCormack v. United States, 891 F.2d 24 (1st Cir.1989) (relying on Aronson v. United States Dep’t of HUD, supra) (FOIA claim); *484 United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244 (4th Cir.1988)(relying on White v. Arlen Realty & Development Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.1980)) (TILA claim).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Williams-McAuliffe v. United State of America, Department of the Treasur
Corrigan v. United [sic], 27 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1994); see also McCormack v. U.S., 891 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 1989) and U.S. v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir. 1988). 16 The McPherson court goes further, with the analogy of an accountant who in his own tax challenge “devotes his time to his own defense rather than profitably working for others.” 840 F.2d at 245 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mark A. McCORMACK, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee
20-1022.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Dec 12, 1989.
Mark A. McCormack pro se., Linda E. Mosakowski, Atty., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, with whom Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Atty., and Gary R. Allen and Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Attys., Tax Div., were on brief, for U.S.
Bownes, Breyer, Per Curiam, Selya.
Cited by 17 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant Mark A. McCormack, a member of the bar who represented himself in tax refund proceedings, seeks a counsel fee award under 26 U.S.C. § 7430. [1][*25] The district court denied the request. We believe that McCormack’s case, as a practical matter, is controlled by our decision in Aronson v. United States Dep’t of HUD, 866 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1989), wherein we ruled that an attorney-plaintiff was not entitled to fees for the time which he spent in successfully prosecuting a Freedom of Information Act claim. Id. at 4-6. The reasons undergirding Aronson seem equally valid in the case at bar, especially in light of section 7430’s limitation of awards to legal fees “paid or incurred” by an eligible taxpayer. As the Fourth Circuit has tellingly observed, an attorney who represents himself in civil tax litigation does “not pay any fees for legal services nor incur any debts” for the same. United States v. McPherson, 840 F.2d 244, 245 (4th Cir.1988).
The judgment of the district court denying appellant’s fee petition is, therefore,
Affirmed.
1
. In substance, section 7430 authorizes an award of reasonable fees "paid or incurred for the services of attorneys” in connection with certain civil tax litigation in which the government's position is determined to be unreasonable.