United States v. Stanford Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1991). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Stanford Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we read the statute to mean what it says: a previously deported alien who reenters the united states does so at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the legality of that act is irrelevant.”
35 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Daniel Rodriguez (ca2, 2005-07-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Daniel Rodriguez (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
2d Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
o prove a violation of section 1326 ... need prove only that the previously deported alien intended to reenter the united states.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Danny Eklain Barnes (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
2d Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
we read the statute to mean what it says: a previously deported alien who reenters the united states does so at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the legality of that act is irrelevant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Elmowsky
2d Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
See Staples, 511 U.S. at 604, 609, 619 (requiring only knowledge of the characteristics of one’s weapon that make it a firearm as defined by section 5845(a)(4)); id. at 622 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens 7 rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption . . . that, ordinarily, ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that “good faith or m…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Project on Government Oversight (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Appx. 34 (4th Cir.2005) (holding that a "good faith" belief that the defendants were participating in a lawful investor program was not a defense to a charge of knowingly passing false mortgage instruments); United States v. Preciado-Hernandez, No. 91-10086, 1992 WL 46682, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 1992) (noting "that good faith [i]s not a defense to a general intent crime"); United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that because "the government need not show that a defendant specifically intended to disobey the law in order to prove a violation" of 8 U.S.C. § 1326—…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Croitoru
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
As to Croitoru’s claim that he believed he could return to the United States after five years, he testified at trial that an immigration judge informed him that he could never return and, in any event, this Court has held that “[a] previously deported alien who reenters the United States does so at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the legality of that act is irrelevant.” United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir.1991) (holding there is not a good faith or mistake defense to § 1326).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Croitoru
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
As to Croitoru’s claim that he believed he could return to the United States after five years, he testified at trial that an immigration judge informed him that he could never return and, in any event, this Court has held that “[a] previously deported alien who reenters the United States does so at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the legality of that act is irrelevant.” United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir.1991) (holding there is not a good faith or mistake defense to § 1326).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Johnson
2d Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
United States v. Champegnie expressly held that “a good faith or mistake defense does not exist under Section 1326.” 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Morales-Tovar
W.D. Tex. · 1999 · confidence medium
The Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. Trevino-Martinez held that specific intent was not a required element of the offense of illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 . 86 F.3d 65, 68-69 (5th Cir.1996) (citing U.S. v. Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir.1994) (affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss charge of illegal reentry following deportation); U.S. v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir.1991) (affirming conviction for illegally reentering United States after deportation and making false statement to Immigration and Naturalization Service); U.S. v. Espino…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nwene
D.N.J. · 1998 · confidence medium
See e.g., Gonzalez-Chavez, 122 F.3d 15, 18 (8th Cir.1997); Henry 111 F.3d at 114 ; United *720 States v. Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d 65, 69 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1109 , 137 L.Ed.2d 310 (1997); United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Istvan Martus, AKA Jozsef Sztojka
2d Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Id. at 55-56 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Manuel Antonio Torres-Echavarria, A/K/A Manuel Baez
2d Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
The district judge was under no obligation to undertake such an inquiry, however, because “a good faith or mistake defense does not exist under Section 1326.” United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.1991); see also United States v. Newton, 677 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that the Government need not show that a defendant specifically intended to disobey the law in order to prove a violation of section 1326), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 , 103 S.Ct. 111 , 74 L.Ed.2d 98 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ramon Gonzalez-Chavez
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Henry, 111 F.3d at 114 (determining that defendant’s “alleged good faith belief that he had the Attorney General’s express permission to reenter the United States is irrelevant”); Soto, 106 F.3d at 1041 (holding that good faith belief that visa constituted the required permission of Attorney General is not a defense to prosecution under § 1326); Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d at 69 (concluding “that § 1326 does not require the government to prove specific intent nor does it provide an alien who reenters this country illegally with a defense of reasonable mistake”); United States v…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. R. Gonzalez-Chavez
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Henry, 111 F.3d at 114 (determining that defendant's "alleged good faith belief that he had the Attorney General's express permission to reenter the United States is irrelevant"); Soto, 106 F.3d at 1041 (holding that good faith belief that visa constituted the required permission of Attorney General is not a defense to prosecution under § 1326); Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d at 69 (concluding "that § 1326 does not require the government to prove specific intent nor does it provide an alien who reenters this country illegally with a defense of reasonable mistake"); United States v. Champegnie…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Aston St. Patrick Wallace
2d Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam) (no good faith or mistake defense to section 1326 offense). 13 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Pedro Enrique Perez-Rodriguez
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
In United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir.1991), we held that a "previously deported alien who reenters the United States does so at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the legality of that act is irrelevant." Appellant's further argument that the jury should have been instructed that they could consider that the "actions of the INS [airport officials] constituted 'express permission of the Attorney General' through his delegated official" is similarly without merit. 9 Finally, Perez-Rodriguez claims that the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 401 b…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Stanley Caming
2d Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Caming’s allegations that he wished further to explore the Bank’s alleged bias by calling the Bank’s lawyer fall far short of showing that “ ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that [Schwab’s] testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.’ ” United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873-74 , 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3450 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Vasquez Macias (2×)
2d Cir. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.1991) (observing that § 1326 “contains no language requiring proof of a particular mental state”).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Julio Amezquito Acevedo, Also Known as Ramon Rodriguez, Also Known as Victor Gelarza
2d Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 697 (2d Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.1991)).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Victor Edward Kiendra
2d Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam) ("A previously deported alien who reenters the United States does so at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the legality of that act is irrelevant."). 12 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 13 Kiendra's attorney, after filing the brief on this appeal, moved to be relieved as Kiendra's counsel on the ground that Kiendra wished to have new counsel appointed for him in order to make arguments that his present attorney found not worthy of pursuit.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Julio Adolfo Renteria-Ortiz
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Gay, 7 F.3d 200 (11th Cir.1993), United States v. Smith, No. 92-1665, 1993 WL 464380 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1993), United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.1991), and United States v. Gallegos-Torres, 841 F.2d 240 (8th Cir.1988). 12 As Renteria-Ortiz implicitly recognized, the prosecutor could have charged him under 18 U.S.C.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Stanford CHAMPEGNIE, Defendant-Appellant
665, Docket 90-1419.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jan 29, 1991.
925 F.2d 54
Michael L. Hanuszczak, Syracuse, N.Y., for defendant-appellant., Thomas E. Booth, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., U.S. Atty. N.D.N.Y., Craig A. Benedict, Asst. U.S. Atty., Syracuse, N.Y., of counsel), for appellee.
Winter, Altimari, Wexler.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 87%
Citer courts: Second Circuit (1)
PER CURIAM:

Stanford Champegnie appeals from a conviction by a jury for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which makes it a felony for an alien who has been previously arrested and deported to reenter the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General. Champegnie also was found guilty of willfully making a false statement to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

The principal issue on appeal is whether Champegnie was entitled to an instruction that a good faith belief that he had permission to reenter the country constitutes a defense to a charge of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In United States v. Newton, 677 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850, 103 S.Ct. 111, 74 L.Ed.2d 98 (1982), we deferred a decision on that issue. We now hold that a good faith or mistake defense does not exist under Section 1326.

In Newton we followed the Ninth Circuit in holding that the government need not show that a defendant specifically intended to disobey the law in order to prove a violation of Section 1326. Rather, we held that it need prove only that the previously deported alien intended to reenter the United States. See Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 789-90 (9th Cir.1968); see also United States v. Hussein, 675 F.2d 114, 116 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 869, 103 S.Ct. 154, 74 L.Ed.2d 129 (1982); but see United States v. Anton, 683 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.1982) (requiring specific intent). It is a short and logical step from that holding to the conclusion that good faith or mistaken belief on such an alien’s part that he or she could reenter lawfully is not a defense. See United States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 3257, 106 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989); United States v. Miranda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d 1211, 1212 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 836, 109 S.Ct. 100, 102 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988). The statute contains no language requiring proof of a particular mental state. It simply states that a previously deported alien may not reenter the United States without the express consent, obtained in advance, of the Attorney General. We read the statute to mean what it says: A previously deported alien who reenters the United States does so at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the[*56] legality of that act is irrelevant. See Anton, 683 F.2d at 1019 (Posner, J., dissenting).

Champegnie also claims that he was denied due process because two possibly favorable eyewitnesses had been “deported and therefore were unavailable to testify at his trial. However, Champegnie failed to make a “plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense” and that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873-74, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). The witnesses were Champegnie’s companions, and he was in the best position to know the probable content of their testimony. His failure to make a showing as to a need for their testimony thus completely undercuts his claim of an unfair trial.

We have considered Champegnie’s other arguments and have concluded they are baseless. The judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed.