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“s the restatement makes clear, a single act may be done with the purpose of benefiting two masters and both may then be liable for the servant's negligence”
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Vargo v. Sauer
s the restatement makes clear, a single act may be done with the purpose of benefiting two masters and both may then be liable for the servant's negligence
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Martins v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
See Standard Oil, 212 U.S. at 218-19 , 29 S.Ct. 252 ; Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 902-03 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that the doctrine requires another employer to “assume[] complete control of the servant”) (internal citation omitted); In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 285 (5th Cir. 1974).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Aldridge v. Hartford Hospital
The fact that he was also working for the benefit of Hartford Hospital does not preclude such a finding: “[I]f a servant’s work is of mutual interest — service to one does not involve abandonment of service to the other ...” Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 903 (11th Cir.1991) (citing 57 C.J.S.
cited
Cited "see"
Bradley v. Southern Baptist Hosp.
See Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 902 (11th Cir.App.1991) (applying Florida law and citing Postal Telegraph & Cable Co. v. Doyle, 123 Fla. 695 , 167 So. 358 (1936)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
ALIESETTE RUSSO VS. CREATIONS BY STEFANO, INC. (L-1757-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
The two masters need not be "joint employers" for a person to be a servant of both, "if the act is within the scope of his employment for both." Ibid.; see also Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 903 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that "a single act may be done with the purpose of benefiting two masters and both may then be liable for the 10 Notably, Russo does not contend — at least explicitly — that Realty, as a limited liability company — was a sham or alter ego of Simone, justifying the court to engage in "reverse veil piercing" and hold the LLC liable for the actions of its managing…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services
Under long-accepted agency principles, “[a] person may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other.” Id. § 226; see also Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 903 (11th Cir.1991) (citing Restatement for the prop osition that “a single act may be done with the purpose of benefiting two masters and both may then be liable for the servant’s negligence”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ester Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services
This would not further the purposes or policy of the Warsaw Convention. 15 Under long-accepted agency principles, "[a] person may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other." Id. § 226; see also Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 903 (11th Cir.1991) (citing Restatement for the proposition that "a single act may be done with the purpose of benefiting two masters and both may then be liable for the servant's negligence").
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services
Under long-accepted agency principles, “[a] person may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other.” Id. § 226; see also Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 903 (11th Cir.1991) (citing Restatement for the proposition that “a single act may be done with the purpose of benefiting two masters and both may then be liable for the servant’s negligence”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ester Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services
But there is no reason why this should be so, as it does not further the purposes or policy of the Warsaw Convention. 33 Under long-accepted agency principles, "[a] person may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other." Id.§ 226; see also Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 903 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement for the proposition that "a single act may be done with the purpose of benefiting two masters and both may then be liable for the servant's negligence").
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Buddy NICHOLS, Petitioner-Appellee Cross-Appellant,
v.
Mac Sim BUTLER, Sheriff; Don Siegelman, Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Respondents-Appellants Cross-Appellees
v.
Mac Sim BUTLER, Sheriff; Don Siegelman, Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Respondents-Appellants Cross-Appellees
90-7101.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
May 17, 1991.
Robert E. Lusk, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., for respondents-appellants cross-appellees., Dennis N. Balske, Montgomery, Ala., for petitioner-appellee cross-appellant.
, Anderson, Birch, Clark, Cox, Edmondson, Fay, Hatchett, Johnson, Kravitch, Tjoflat.
Cited by 2 opinions | Published
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, FAY, KRAVITCH, JOHNSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, CLARK, EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT:A member of this court in active service having requested a poll on the application for rehearing en banc and a majority of the judges in this court in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that the above cause shall be reheard by this court en banc. The previous panel’s opinion is hereby VACATED.