Great Canal Realty Corp. v. Seneca Ins., 833 N.E.2d 1196 (NY 2005). · Go Syfert
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Great Canal Realty Corp. v. Seneca Ins., 833 N.E.2d 1196 (NY 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the insured's failure to satisfy the notice requirement constitutes 'a failure to comply with a condition precedent which, as a matter of law, vitiates the contract.”
35 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gelfman v. Capitol Indemnity Corp. (nyed, 2014-08-14)
Treatment trajectory · 2006 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2006 2016 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Gelfman v. Capitol Indemnity Corp.
E.D.N.Y · 2014 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the insured's failure to satisfy the notice requirement constitutes 'a failure to comply with a condition precedent which, as a matter of law, vitiates the contract.
cited Cited as authority (rule) 13 State Street LLC v. Acadia Insurance Company
N.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
Co., 800 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (2005)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mt. Hawley Insurance v. Abraham Little Neck Development Group, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 2011 · confidence medium
Co., Inc., 5 N.Y.3d 742, 743 , 800 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522, 522 , 833 N.E.2d 1196 (2005) (holding that an insured’s failure to satisfy the notice requirement constitutes “a failure to comply with a condition precedent which, as a matter of law, vitiates the contract.”); accord Lobosco v. Best Buy, Inc., 80 A.D.3d 728, 731 , 915 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308-09 (2d Dep’t 2011).
cited Cited "see" Charter Oak Fire Insurance v. Fleet Building Maintenance, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Great Canal, 5 N.Y.3d at 743-44 , 800 N.Y.S.2d 521 , 833 N.E.2d 1196 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eastern Baby Stores, Inc. v. Central Mutual Insurance
2d Cir. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
Notwithstanding the notice requirement, “New York courts have held that an insured’s good faith belief in non-liability may excuse delay in notifying its insurer of the occurrence.” State of N.Y. v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 795 (2d Cir.1994); see also Great Canal, 5 N.Y.3d at 744 , 800 N.Y.S.2d 521 , 833 N.E.2d 1196 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eastern Baby Stores, Inc. v. Central Mutual Insurance
2d Cir. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
Notwithstanding the notice requirement, “New York courts have held that an insured’s good faith belief in non-liability may excuse delay in notifying its insurer of the occurrence.” State of N.Y. v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 795 (2d Cir.1994); see also Great Canal, 5 N.Y.3d at 744 , 800 N.Y.S.2d 521 , 833 N.E.2d 1196 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Great Canal Realty Corp.
v.
Seneca Insurance Company, Inc.
New York Court of Appeals.
Jun 16, 2005.
833 N.E.2d 1196
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Tese & Milner, New York City (Michael M. Milner of counsel), for appellant., Alexander J. Wulwick, New York City, for respondent.
Cited by 155 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 58%
Citer courts: E.D. New York (1)

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted and judgment granted declaring that defendant Seneca Insurance Company is not required to defend and indemnify Great Canal Realty Corp. in the underlying action. The certified question should be answered in the negative.

Where a policy of liability insurance requires that notice of an occurrence be given “as soon as practicable,” such notice must be accorded the carrier within a reasonable period of time (see Security Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 NY2d 436, 441 [1972]). The insured’s failure to satisfy the notice requirement constitutes “a failure to comply with a condition precedent which, as a matter of law, vitiates the contract” (Argo Corp. v Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 4 NY3d 332, 339 [2005]). Hence, the carrier need not show prejudice before disclaiming based on the insured’s failure to timely notify it of an occurrence (see id.).

We have recognized that there may be circumstances that excuse a failure to give timely notice, such as where the insured has “a good-faith belief of nonliability,” provided that belief is reasonable (Security Mut. Ins. Co., 31 NY2d at 441). But we[*744] have further explained that “the insured’s belief must be reasonable under all the circumstances, and it may be relevant on the issue of reasonableness, whether and to what extent, the insured has inquired into the circumstances of the accident or occurrence” (id.; see also White v City of New York, 81 NY2d 955, 958 [1993] [stating that, “where a reasonable person could envision liability, that person has a duty to make some inquiry”]). Additionally, the insured bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the proffered excuse. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether its delay in giving notice was reasonably founded upon a good-faith belief of nonliability.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith, Ciparick, Rosenblatt, Graffeo, Read and R.S. Smith concur in memorandum.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order reversed, etc.