Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Town of Watertown, 843 N.E.2d 1138 (NY 2005). · Go Syfert
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Town of Watertown, 843 N.E.2d 1138 (NY 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Assessor (nyappdiv, 2014-06-20) · Strongest negative: Angelis v. Town of New Baltimore (nyappdiv, 2006-06-29)
Treatment trajectory · 2006 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2006 2016 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Angelis v. Town of New Baltimore
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
Supreme Court properly dismissed those causes of action seeking declaratory judgments inasmuch as an article 78 proceeding is the exclusive means by which to review this action, undertaken pursuant to Town Law article 12, challenging the process by which the Town created the water district (see Town Law § 195 [2]; Herzog v Town of Thompson, 251 AD2d 917, 919 [1998], lv dismissed and denied 92 NY2d 943 [1998]; but cf. Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744, 748 [2005] [holding Town Law § 195 (2) does not bar a plenary action attacking a Town’s authority or juri…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Assessor
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
If petitioner owns the land, it must pay the sewer taxes regardless of whether the properties currently produce sewage inasmuch as it is theoretically possible that the properties could be “ ‘developed in a manner that will result in the generation of [sewage]’ ” (Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744, 748 [2005], quoting Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Tonawanda Assessor, 17 AD3d 1090, 1092 [2005]), and it is immaterial that the Town taxes the land separately from the improvements thereon and that petitioner challenges only the tax on the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Assessor
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
If petitioner owns the land, it must pay the sewer taxes regardless of whether the properties currently produce sewage inasmuch as it is theoretically possible that the properties could be “ ‘developed in a manner that will result in the generation of [sewage]’ ” (Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744, 748 [2005], quoting Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Tonawanda Assessor, 17 AD3d 1090, 1092 [2005]), and it is immaterial that the Town taxes the land separately from the improvements thereon and that petitioner challenges only the tax on the …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Keyspan Gas East Corp. v. Supervisor of Town
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Co. v Office of Supervisor of Town of N. Hempstead, 233 AD2d 300 [1996]; cf. Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744, 748 [2005]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) New York Telephone Co. v. Supervisor of Town of Hempstead
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Co. v Supervisor of Town of N. Hempstead, 76 AD3d 517 [2010]; cf. Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744, 748 [2005]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Long Island Water Corp. v. Supervisor of Town of Hempstead
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court properly determined that the subject “mass” properties, consisting of water mains, pipes, and hydrants located on or under public and private land not owned by the plaintiff, do not and cannot benefit from garbage and refuse collection services (cf. Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744, 748 [2005]).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Long Island Power Authority v. Anderson
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506 [1993]; Hall Enters., Inc. v Liberty Mgt. & Constr., Ltd., 37 AD3d 658 [2007]; see also Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown, 6 NY3d 744 [2005]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Abele v. Dimitriadis
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
Their due process claim is unavailing; petitioners had an opportunity to challenge their assessments by filing a complaint with the board of assessment review (see RPTL 524, 525), commencing a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7 (see RPTL 700, 724; see also Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Bethlehem, 16 AD3d 888, 890 [2005], affd 6 NY3d 744 [2005]), or through a CPLR article 78 proceeding such as the present one.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
v.
Town of Watertown, Respondents In the Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation v. Town of Bethlehem, Respondents In the Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation v. Town of Tonawanda Assessor
New York Court of Appeals.
Dec 22, 2005.
843 N.E.2d 1138
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, Albany (Mark D. Lansing of counsel), for appellant in the first and second above-entitled proceedings., Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, Buffalo (Mark R. McNamara and Mark D. Lansing of counsel), for appellant in the third above-entitled proceeding., Menter, Rudin & Trivelpeice, PC., Syracuse (Julian B. Modesti of counsel), for respondents in the first above-entitled proceeding., Hacker & Murphy, LLP, Latham (Patrick L. Seely, Jr. of counsel), for respondents in the second above-entitled proceeding., Brown & Kelly, LLP, Buffalo (Lisa T. Sofferin and Karen Cook Serrotte of counsel), for respondents in the third above-entitled proceeding., Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Albany, for Association of Towns of the State of New York, Albany, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled proceeding.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The orders in Matter of Niagara Mohawk v Town of Bethlehem and Matter of Niagara Mohawk v Town of Tonawanda Assessor should be affirmed, with costs; and the order in Matter of Niagara Mohawk v Town of Watertown should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, an energy resources company, owns mass property such as poles, wires, insulators and pipelines for transporting and distributing electricity and natural gas to its residential and commercial customers. In these proceedings, Niagara Mohawk challenges the imposition[*747] of special ad valorem levies* in 2003 on its transmission and distribution facilities by the Towns of Bethlehem, Tonawanda and Watertown to fund a water, garbage and sewer district respectively. Niagara Mohawk takes the position that its transmission and distribution facilities, whether or not situated on or under land that it owns, are not real property benefited by the improvements, and therefore are not properly subject to special ad valorem levies.

In both Bethlehem and Watertown, the trial courts and the Appellate Division concluded that Niagara Mohawk’s challenges were time-barred by Town Law § 195 (2), and so never reached the merits. Section 195 (2) specifies that any interested person aggrieved by a town’s final determination or order establishing or extending an improvement district must seek judicial review within 30 days thereafter, accompanied by an undertaking. In Tonawanda, however, the trial court reached the merits, concluding that Niagara Mohawk’s real property was benefited by the Town’s garbage district. The Appellate Division affirmed on this basis.

Each of these appeals calls upon us to apply our recent decision in New York Tel. Co. v Supervisor of Town of Oyster Bay (4 NY3d 387 [2005]), which we handed down after the Appellate Division’s decisions in Bethlehem and Watertown, but before the Appellate Division’s decision in Tonawanda. In New York Tel. Co., we considered whether mass property owned by New York Telephone Company (NYTC) (specifically, telephone lines, wires, cables, poles, supports and enclosures for electrical conductors) constituted “benefited” property upon which the Town of Oyster Bay could impose a special ad valorem levy for garbage collection. We held that “for real property to be ‘benefited,’ it must be capable of receiving the service funded by the special ad valorem levy” (4 NY3d at 393). To determine whether property is “capable of receiving the municipal service” funded by the tax, “we look to the innate features and legally permissible uses of the property, not the particularities of its owners or occupants or the state of the property at a fixed point in time” (id. at 394). Thus, we concluded that NYTC’s real property—consisting solely of equipment situated on or under public and private[*748] land not owned by NYTC—was not and could never be benefited by the garbage district because “telephone poles can never produce or require municipal garbage collection” (id.).

As an initial matter, Town Law § 195 (2) does not preclude Niagara Mohawk’s actions against the Towns of Bethlehem and Watertown. As we explained in New York Tel. Co., section 195

(2) does not bar a plenary action attacking a town’s authority or jurisdiction to impose a special ad valorem levy on real property for a special district (id. at 395 n 7). This is what Niagara Mohawk has, in fact, contested here, although couched in CPLR article 78 terms.

Turning to the merits, as we concluded in New York Tel. Co., real property is “benefited” only if it is “capable of receiving the municipal service” at issue, based on “innate features and legally permissible uses” (id. at 394). Thus, special ad valorem levies are unauthorized where the “inherent characteristics of the subject properties preclude them from receiving [the particular municipal] services” at issue (id. at 393).

Here, Niagara Mohawk’s transmission and distribution facilities in the Town of Bethlehem benefit from the Town’s water district, which maintains a system of mains, pipes and hydrants available for purposes of firefighting. Indeed, the Town’s longtime fire chief attested that he had responded to calls involving gas leaks and, on numerous occasions, fires at Niagara Mohawk’s transmission and distribution facilities, caused by such events as downed wires or arcing related to power surges or inclement weather.

Similarly, Niagara Mohawk’s “otherwise vacant or undeveloped lands improved by electric and gas transmission fixtures and appurtenances” in the Town of Tonawanda benefit from the Town’s garbage district (17 AD3d 1090, 1092 [4th Dept 2005]). As the Appellate Division pointed out, “there is a sufficient theoretical potential of the properties to be developed in a manner that will result in the generation of garbage,” which, in fact, these properties already produce in the form of landscaping debris (grass clippings, tree clippings and brush) (id.).

With respect to Niagara Mohawk’s real property in the Town of Watertown, the record is inadequate for us to determine whether any of the properties at issue benefit from the Town’s sewer district within the meaning of New York Tel. Co. Specifically, there are questions of fact as to whether Niagara Mohawk owns the land on or under which the transmission and distribu[*749] tion facilities are situated, and as to whether, even if Niagara Mohawk does not own the land, the sewer district encompasses storm sewers that actually or might potentially safeguard Niagara Mohawk’s transmission and distribution facilities from flooding.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith, Ciparick, Rosenblatt, Graffeo, Read and R.S. Smith concur.

In Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Watertown: Order reversed, with costs, and matter remitted to Supreme Court, Jefferson County, for further proceedings in accordance with the memorandum herein.

In Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Bethlehem: Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.

In Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Tonawanda Assessor: On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.

RPTL 102 (14) defines a “[s]pecial ad valorem levy” as “a charge imposed upon benefited real property in the same manner and at the same time as taxes for municipal purposes to defray the cost ... of a special district improvement or service, but not including any charge imposed by or on behalf of a city or village.”