O'Neill v. Pfau, 18 N.E.3d 377 (NY 2014). · Go Syfert
O'Neill v. Pfau, 18 N.E.3d 377 (NY 2014). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Congregation Machne Ger v. Berliner
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · confidence medium
The parties agree that the applicable limitations period for an action or proceeding brought against corporate officers, such as the instant case, is four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding ( see CPLR 217; Matter of O'Neill v Pfau , 23 NY3d 993, 995 [2014]; Matter of [*4]Duffy v Town of Guilderland , 186 AD3d 1856, 1857 [2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 905 [2021]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Turner v. New York Division of State Police (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
If, as petitioner claims, respondent failed to pay him overtime due for that time period, it was incumbent upon petitioner to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding within four months after the receipt of his last paycheck inasmuch as his claim for overtime back pay continuously accrued upon his receipt of each paycheck between 2008 and 2012 (see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of O’Neill v Pfau, 23 NY3d 993, 995 [2014]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Turner v. New York Division of State Police (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
If, as petitioner claims, respondent failed to pay him overtime due for that time period, it was incumbent upon petitioner to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding within four months after the receipt of his last paycheck inasmuch as his claim for overtime back pay continuously accrued upon his receipt of each paycheck between 2008 and 2012 (see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of O’Neill v Pfau, 23 NY3d 993, 995 [2014]).
discussed Cited "see" Matter of Karam v. County of Rensselaer
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
Initially, "[a]n administrative determination regarding payment of salary or pay adjustments is final and binding, and a challenge thereto accrues, when the petitioner receives a check or salary payment reflecting the administrative determination" ( Matter of Salomon v Town of Wallkill , 174 AD3d 720 , 721 [2d Dept 2019]; see Matter of O'Neill v Pfau , 23 NY3d 993, 995 [2014]; Matter of Imandt v New York State Unified Ct. Sys. , 168 AD3d 1051 , 1052 [2d Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 907 [2019]; Matter of Maurer v State Emergency Mgt.
discussed Cited "see" Rock v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
Conservation , 125 AD3d 974, 977 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of O'Neill v Pfau , 23 NY3d 993, 996 ; Matter of Teichmann v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. , 178 AD3d at 408).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Thomas P. O'Neill, Appellants-Respondents
v.
Ann Pfau, as Chief Administrative Judge of the Office of Court Administration, State of New York—Unified Court System
New York Court of Appeals.
Jun 12, 2014.
18 N.E.3d 377
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Law Offices of David Schlachter, Uniondale (David Schlachter of counsel), for appellants-respondents., John W. McConnell, New York State Office of Court Administration, New York City (Lee Alan Adlerstein and Pedro Morales of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
Abdussalaam, Graffeo, Lippman, Pigott, Read, Rivera, Smith.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs, and the certified question answered in the affirmative.

In this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, petitioners challenge certain administrative orders of the Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York (CAJ) dated January 8, 2004 (AO/072/04) and December 22, 2004 (AO/534/04), and seek[*995] to compel the CAJ to pay New York State Court Officers employed in Suffolk County a salary increment reflecting a continuous service credit, in accordance with those orders. The January 2004 order abolished the position of Court Officer (a salary grade of JG-16) and replaced it with the new position of New York State (NYS) Court Officer (a salary grade of JG-17). The CAJ treated the new title as a reclassification pursuant to Judiciary Law § 37 (5), rather than pursuant to section 37 (3) (c), or a reallocation pursuant to section 37 (11). As a result, petitioners did not receive the continuous service credit they would have received if the new title had been treated as a reallocation. The December 2004 order increased the salary grade of NYS Court Officer from JG-17 to JG-18, retroactive to January 8, 2004.

Petitioners allege that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 37, both orders should have been treated as reallocations, not reclassifications. They claim that the January 2004 order denied them continuous service credit towards longevity increments for time worked in their former title, and that the December 2004 order adjusting their salary grade to JG-18, which was retroactive to January 8, 2004 rather than prospective, deprived them of salary increases to which they were entitled.

Petitioners’ challenge to the January 2004 order is time-barred. On April 7, 2004, employees whose title changed from Court Officer to NYS Court Officer received their first paychecks reflecting the increase to JG-17, without continuous service credit. The order impacted petitioners on that date, and thus they were aggrieved on that date (see generally Matter of Edmead v McGuire, 67 NY2d 714, 716 [1986]; see also Matter of Maurer v State Emergency Mgt. Off., 196 Misc 2d 750 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2003], affd 13 AD3d 751 [3d Dept 2004] [receipt of paycheck without overtime pay starts running of the statute of limitations for an article 78 proceeding to challenge failure to pay overtime]). Petitioners did not commence this proceeding until July 2005, more than one year after receiving their paychecks. Therefore, their claim regarding the January 2004 order is untimely (see CPLR 217).

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the December 2004 order did not extend the four-month limitations period in which they were required to challenge the earlier order. The January 2004 order involved the CAJ’s decision to eliminate the distinctions between officers in lower courts and superior courts, merge the titles of Court Officer and Senior Court Officer into the new[*996] title of NYS Court Officer, and create a new entry-level position. In contrast, the December 2004 order simply assigned a JG-18 grade for the new title of NYS Court Officer and thus “did not involve the sort of fresh, complete and unlimited examination into the merits as is necessary to extend the four-month limitations period” (Matter of Chisholm v Martinez, 277 AD2d 166, 167 [1st Dept 2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Finally, we agree with the Appellate Division that because the record contains no explanation or rationale for the retroactive application of the December 2004 order, petitioners have demonstrated their entitlement to the relief sought as to that order.

Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott, Rivera and AbdusSalaam concur; Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.

Order affirmed, without costs, and certified question answered in the affirmative, in a memorandum.