Barnum v. Srogi, 429 N.E.2d 421 (NY 1981). · Go Syfert
Barnum v. Srogi, 429 N.E.2d 421 (NY 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Airey v. State of New York
unknown court · 2025 · confidence medium
Respondents contend that RECs and ITCs should not be considered because only income directly attributable to the property itself, like rent, constitutes income, and not income derived from a business conducted on the property ( see Matter of Barnum v Srogi , 54 NY2d 896, 898 [1981]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joy Builders, Inc. v. Conklin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Div.] v Unmack, 92 NY2d 179, 188 [1998]; Matter of Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v Town of Goshen, 93 AD3d 786, 791 [2012]), and the burden is on the petitioner to establish, by substantial evidence, that the property was overvalued (see Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 899 [1981]; Matter of Alexander’s Dept.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joy Builders, Inc. v. Conklin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Div.] v Unmack, 92 NY2d 179, 188 [1998]; Matter of Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v Town of Goshen, 93 AD3d 786, 791 [2012]), and the burden is on the petitioner to establish, by substantial evidence, that the property was overvalued (see Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 899 [1981]; Matter of Alexander’s Dept.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saturn Club v. City of Buffalo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
We agree with respondent, however, that the income capitalization approach used by petitioner’s appraiser was flawed because it relied on the equivalent of income resulting from the business conducted on the premises (see Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 898 [1981]; Matter of Farone & Son v Srogi, 96 AD2d 711 [1983], lv denied 60 NY2d 556 [1983]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Erie Boulevard Hydropower, L.P. v. Town of Ephratah Board of Assessors
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 898 [1981]; Matter of Avis Rent A Car Sys. v Town of Rye, 131 AD2d 568, 568 [1987]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Town of Moreau Assessor
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
While traditional sales occurring at the location of a business — with its accompanying attributes such as goodwill — are not proper in computing value under the income approach (see Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 898 [1981]), revenue generated from the premises may be an appropriate consideration when the revenue is — like rent — inextricably tied to a specific parcel of real estate (see id.; cf. Matter of Saratoga Harness Racing v Williams, supra', Matter of Saratoga Water Servs. v Saratoga County Water Auth., supra', Matter of NYCO Mins. v Town of Lewis, 296 AD2d 748 [2002],…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hempstead Country Club v. Board of Assessors
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Home Assn. v Assessor of City of Rye, 80 AD3d 118, 142 [2010]; see 13 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 132.10 [5th ed]; see also Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 898 [1981]; Matter of Farone & Son v Srogi, 96 AD2d 711, 711 [1983]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hempstead Country Club v. Board of Assessors
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Home Assn. v Assessor of City of Rye, 80 AD3d 118, 142 [2010]; see 13 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 132.10 [5th ed]; see also Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 898 [1981]; Matter of Farone & Son v Srogi, 96 AD2d 711, 711 [1983]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Ass'n v. Assessor of City of Rye
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
In a tax certiorari valuation, the income stream subject to capitalization measures the rental value of the property, exclusive of the business conducted on the property (see 13 War ren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 132.10 [5th ed] [“Incomes Compared”]; see also Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 54 NY2d 896, 898 [1981]; Matter of Farone & Son v Srogi, 96 AD2d 711 [1983]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Virginia S. Barnum, as of T. Crouse Barnum
v.
Robert Z. Srogi, as Commissioner of Assessment of the City of Syracuse
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 15, 1981.
429 N.E.2d 421
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Franklin J. Schwarzer for appellants., David M. Garber, Corporation Counsel, and Donald A. Marshall, Special Counsel, for respondent.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

The only issue properly before us on this appeal is whether the Appellate Division erred in increasing the “full value” of the property leased to K-Mart (and thus reducing the judgment for tax overpayments to which petitioners are entitled) to reflect the excess of the rents paid to K-Mart by its sublessees over the rents paid by K-Mart to petitioners for the subleased space.

Special Term used income capitalization as the basis for computation of full value. What is capitalized in such a computation is, of course, the rental income of the property, not the sales resulting from business conducted on the property (People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v Chambers, 298 NY 372, 375). However, in determining rental income both the fixed rent and the overage are to be included. Since petitioners’ lease with K-Mart required K-Mart to include in the overage base “gross rent received by Tenant from any part of the premises sublet to others”, it was proper to include (as the record shows was done) the sublessees’ rents paid to K-Mart in determining the overage which was part of the total rent received by petitioners.

That, however, does not end the inquiry. Matter of Merrick Holding Corp. v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau (45 NY2d 538) recognizes that full value requires consideration of the interests of both landlord and tenant and, in an appropriate case, the addition of a leasehold bonus to the owner’s rental income in order to arrive at an appropriate base for capitalization. Special Term,[*899] though it used the subtenants’ rentals in computing overage pursuant to petitioners’ lease with K-Mart, added nothing for leasehold bonus. The Appellate Division properly concluded, the K-Mart lease with petitioners having been made in 1947 and containing no escalation provision, that the principle of the Merrick case warranted addition of a leasehold bonus to arrive at the capitalization base.

What bonus should be added in a particular case is a matter for expert testimony, predicated upon, among other things, the relationship between the space covered by the subleases and the entire space covered by the overlease, as well as the rentals required by, and other operative provisions of, each. The bonus finally adopted by the trier of fact may be less than, the same as or greater than the excess of a subtenant’s rents over overlease rents for the same space.

It was, however, petitioners’ burden to establish that the property was overvalued (Matter of Trinity Place Co. v Finance Administrator of City of N. Y., 74 AD2d 274, affd 51 NY2d 890; Matter of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v Tax Comm, of City of N. Y., 31 AD2d 606, affd 28 NY2d 514). Petitioners introduced no evidence concerning what an appropriate bonus would be. Respondent’s expert, using one of K-Mart’s subleases as a comparable rent, testified to an adjusted rental price of $4.18 per square foot for the over-all space. Neither Special Term nor the Appellate Division accepted that proposed rental, but the Appellate Division did accept the concept that the subleases required an upward adjustment of the actual rental income received by petitioners, under the Merrick principle.

Whether as a matter of real estate appraisal the proper bonus to be added in valuing petitioners’ property is the entire excess of the sublease rentals over the rents for the same space paid petitioners by K-Mart is not the issue before us. The Appellate Division having increased Special Term’s finding of value, our function is to ascertain which value is in accord with the weight of the evidence (Grant Co. v Srogi, 52 NY2d 496, 511). We cannot say, on the record before us, that it was an error of law for the Appellate Division to have concluded, as it did, that the excess[*900] rent for the subleased space was an appropriate measure of the addition necessary to arrive at full value of the property (Matter of Trinity Place Co. v Finance Administrator of City of N. Y., 51 NY2d 890, supra).

The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be affirmed.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer concur.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.