People v. Cecil Z., 442 N.E.2d 1264 (NY 1982). · Go Syfert
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People v. Cecil Z., 442 N.E.2d 1264 (NY 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Ali (nyappdiv, 2025-09-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ali (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
In determining his eligibility, defendant's status at the time of entry of the conviction controlled ( see People v Middlebrooks , 25 NY3d 516, 524-525 [2015]; People v Cecil Z. , 57 NY2d 899, 901-902 [1982]; People v Zepada , 87 AD2d 747, 748 [1st Dept 1982], affd 57 NY2d 899 [1982]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Carter
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
Although the failure to make an on-the-record determination regarding entitlement to youthful offender status is an issue that survives a valid appeal waiver ( see People v Pacherille , 25 NY3d 1021, 1023 [2015]; People v Rudolph , 21 NY3d 497, 499, 501 [2013]), County Court was not obligated to make such a determination here because defendant did not qualify as an eligible youth, having already been adjudicated a youthful offender in November 2017 in connection with her felony drug possession conviction ( see CPL 720.10 [2] [c]; Penal Law § 220.16; People v Cecil Z. , 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]…
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Dancy
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
“This restriction, relating to the eligible youth determination, is applicable at the time of conviction” (People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ramirez
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
The defendant’s eligibility was not affected by a prior conviction of robbery in the second degree, as eligibility for youthful offender status is met at the time of conviction, not at the time of sentencing (see People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]), and, on the date the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the second degree, he had not been “convicted and sentenced for a felony” so as to disqualify him pursuant to CPL 720.10 (2) (b) (see People v Mosley, 88 AD2d 520 [1982]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ramirez
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
The defendant’s eligibility was not affected by a prior conviction of robbery in the second degree, as eligibility for youthful offender status is met at the time of conviction, not at the time of sentencing (see People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]), and, on the date the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the second degree, he had not been “convicted and sentenced for a felony” so as to disqualify him pursuant to CPL 720.10 (2) (b) (see People v Mosley, 88 AD2d 520 [1982]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Shaquille Mc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Therefore, the sentencing court was authorized in its discretion to determine that the defendant was a youthful offender with respect to either or both convictions (see People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 902 [1982]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Shaquille Mc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Therefore, the sentencing court was authorized in its discretion to determine that the defendant was a youthful offender with respect to either or both convictions (see People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 902 [1982]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Christopher D.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
“This restriction, relating to the eligible youth determination, is applicable at the time of conviction” (People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Joseph R.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
“This restriction, relating to the eligible youth determination, is applicable at the time of conviction” (People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Jarvis
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Nonetheless, "[w]hen determining whether a defendant is an eligible youth, the defendant's status at the time of the conviction—in this case at the time of his plea of guilty—is controlling" ( People v Brooks , 160 AD3d 762 , 764 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1115 [2018]; see People v Cecil Z. , 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]; People v Michael A.C. [appeal No. 2], 128 AD3d 1359, 1360 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1168 [2015]).
discussed Cited "see" C., MICHAEL A., PEOPLE v
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
Defendant contends in appeal No. 2 that Supreme Court was required to determine his eligibility for youthful offender status with respect to his conviction of assault in the second degree and erred in failing to do so. “[Eligibility for youthful offender status is met at the time of conviction, not at the time of sentencing” (People v Ramirez, 115 AD3d 992, 993 [2014]; see People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899, 901 [1982]) and, because defendant had not yet been adjudicated a youthful offender on the robbery charge at the time of his guilty plea to the assault charge, he was an eligible youth wit…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Negron
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
Every youth is so eligible unless * * * such youth has previously been convicted and sentenced for a felony, or * * * such youth has previously been adjudicated a youthful offender following conviction of a felony or has been adjudicated * * * a juvenile delinquent who committed a designated felony act as defined in the family court act.” (CPL 720.10 [1], [2] [a], [b], [c]; see also, People v Cecil Z., 57 NY2d 899 .) It is undisputed that, at the time of his conviction in this case, defendant had not "previously been convicted and sentenced for a felony” in New York, and had not "previousl…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York
v.
Cecil Z.
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 19, 1982.
442 N.E.2d 1264
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Mario Merola, District Attorney (.Richard E. Haftel of counsel), for appellant., Henriette D. Hoffman and William E. Hellerstein for respondent.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

That court properly interpreted and applied the youthful offender statute in this instance. CPL 720.20 (subd 1) provides in pertinent part: “Upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court must order a presentence investigation of the defendant. After receipt of a written report of the investigation and at the time of pronouncing sentence the court must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful offender.”

This subdivision contemplates a two-determination procedure. First, as envisioned by the first sentence of the subdivision, there must be a determination at the time of conviction as to whether the defendant is an “eligible youth” (as defined in CPL 720.10, subd 2), and if he is found to be an eligible youth the court must order a presentence investigation. Second, in accordance with the prescription of the second sentence, “at the time of pronouncing sentence the court must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful offender”, making that determination in accordance with the criteria set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision 1.

CPL 720.10 (subd 2, par [c]), the operative statutory provision for present purposes, as part of its definition of “eligible” youth, provides that a defendant, otherwise qualified, shall be an eligible youth unless “such youth has previously been adjudicated a youthful offender following conviction of a felony”. This restriction, relating to the eligible youth determination, is applicable at the time of conviction.

We turn, then, to consideration of the facts of the present case in the light of this statutory scheme: On February 11, 1980 in consequence of his double plea defendant stood convicted of two crimes, a weapons charge and burglary. The court was required to determine whether he was an “eligible youth” and if so, to order a presentence investigation report. Thus, his status as an eligible youth was deter[*902] mined at that time, and of course, he had not then previously been adjudicated a youthful offender. Accordingly, the restriction in CPL 720.10 (subd 2, par [c]) did not apply. On June 12, 1980 at sentencing the court was called on to make a determination as to whether defendant was a youthful offender. Paragraph (c) was not then relevant inasmuch as it imposed a restriction only on the eligible youth determination and not the youthful offender determination. The sentencing court was therefore authorized in its discretion to determine that defendant was a youthful offender with respect to either or both convictions.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to rule 500.2 (b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.2 [g]), order affirmed in a memorandum.