Humphrey v. State, 457 N.E.2d 767 (NY 1983). · Go Syfert
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Humphrey v. State, 457 N.E.2d 767 (NY 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2002 · 2 courts · …the fact that decedent's ability to drive was impaired does not exonerate the state from liability on the ground that its negligence was not one of the proximate causes of the accident ✓
91 citation events (40 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Rodriguez v. Williams (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
N.M. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the fact that the plaintiffs ability to drive was impaired does not exonerate the defendant from liability.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Protect the Adirondacks! Inc v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
NY · 2021 · confidence medium
To the extent the majority suggests that snowmobile trails are akin to state highways, rather than hiking trails (see id. at 10 n 8), such a determination would be contrary to the affirmed findings of fact of the courts below, which we are “without power to review . . . if such findings are supported by evidence in the record” (Congel v Malfitano, 31 NY3d 272, 294 [2018], quoting Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742, 743 [1983]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Desroches v. Heritage Bldrs. Group, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Auth. , 6 NY3d 487, 492-493 [2006]; Humphrey v State of New York , 60 NY2d 742, 744 [1983]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Granger v. Misercola
NY · 2013 · confidence medium
However, the factual findings underpinning the lower courts’ best interests determinations in this case—that travel to and from the prison would not harm the child and that petitioner sought to maintain a relationship with the child— constitute affirmed findings of fact that we lack the “power to review . . . if . . . supported by evidence in the record” (Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742, 743 [1983]; see e.g.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Petty v. Dumont
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 315 [1980]), a municipality’s negligence in failing to provide adequate warning of a known roadway hazard has been held to be a concurrent cause, not superseded by the negligence of a careless driver (see Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742, 744 [1983]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beckwith v. State
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Accepting the Court of Claims’ determination that the patrol car bumped the ATV off the road, and considering claimant’s actions in attempting to flee from the police, the court did not err in holding that defendant was 90% liable because Conboy’s negligence was a concurrent proximate cause of the accident (see Humphrey v State of New York, 90 AD2d 901, 902 [1982], affd 60 NY2d 742, 744 [1983]; see also Ernest v Red Cr.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cisse v. S.F.J. Realty Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 1998 · confidence medium
Ctr., 67 NY2d 743, 744-745 ; Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742, 744; Wragge v Lizza Asphalt Constr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leyva v. Levy (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 1986 · confidence medium
We have examined the cases cited by appellants Mrs. Leyva and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil, such as Humphrey v State of New York ( 60 N.Y.2d 742, 744 [1983]), which, in substance, hold that the decedent driver's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident could not be viewed as the intervening cause as a matter of law, and we find those cases to be inapplicable to the facts herein.
discussed Cited "see" Stiggins v. Town of North Dansville (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
Although defendant presented evidence that Benedict was intoxicated and driving “at high speed,” we conclude that its submissions did not establish as a matter of law that Benedict’s manner of driving “would have been the same” if the safety measures proposed by plaintiffs had been in place (Trent v Town of Riverhead, 262 AD2d 260, 261 [2d Dept 1999]; see Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742, 744 [1983]; Land v County of Erie, 138 AD3d 1462, 1463 [4th Dept 2016]; Torelli v City of New York, 176 AD2d 119, 122-123 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 754 [1992]), particularly in vie…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Denio v. State of New York (2×)
NY · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence medium
When we are presented "with affirmed findings of fact, tending to show that the rate of interest was not unreasonable, and [where] these findings are supported by substantial evidence, we are jurisdictionally precluded from reviewing the same" ( City of Buffalo v Clement Co., 28 NY2d 241, 266 [1971]; see also Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742, 743-744 [1983]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Carla Humphrey, as Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel J. Humphrey
v.
State of New York
Claim No. 61839.
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 18, 1983.
457 N.E.2d 767
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Michael S. Buskus and Peter H. Schiff of counsel), for appellant., Robert Miller and Gerald A. Keene for respondent.
Cited by 69 opinions  |  Published

[*743] OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Decedent died instantly in an unwitnessed one-vehicle accident on a dead-end segment of old Route 7 in Broome County just after midnight on November 2, 1977. The Court of Claims found that the State was negligent in failing to give adequate, unambiguous warnings of conditions on that highway, and that the State’s negligence contributed to decedent’s fatal accident. Liability was assigned 60% to the State and 40% to decedent. That judgment was affirmed on appeal.

In a case such as this, with affirmed findings of fact, our scope of review is narrow. This court is without power to review findings of fact if such findings are supported by evidence in the record.

There is ample evidence in the record that the State was negligent in several respects, including (1) failing to cover a “Route 7” sign after the Route 7 turnoff, (2) failing to remove the double line from the center of the dead-end segment on which decedent’s accident occurred, and (3) improperly constructing and marking the barrier at the end of that dead-end segment.

While there was evidence that decedent had a .17% blood alcohol level at the time of his death and that this alcohol impairment played a role in decedent’s failure to respond to warning signs, the Court of Claims found that the State’s negligence was a proximate cause of decedent’s accident, and this finding was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

In view of the lower burden of proof imposed on claimants in wrongful death cases (Noseworthy v City of New York, 298 NY 76) and the fact that the evidence as to both negligence and proximate cause must be viewed in a light favorable to claimant (Wragge v Lizza Asphalt Constr. Co., 17 NY2d 313), there is plainly evidence in this record to support the findings of the courts below. Findings of fact as to negligence and proximate cause were affirmed by the Appellate Division and supported by the record, and thus[*744] are conclusive in this court. (Le Roux v State of New York, 307 NY 397.)

The State’s argument that decedent’s blood alcohol level at the time of his accident is a supervening cause as a matter of law must be rejected. Claimant need not exclude all other possible causes of the accident. The fact that decedent’s ability to drive was impaired does not exonerate the State from liability on the ground that its negligence was not one of the proximate causes of the accident. (See Hulett v State of New York, 4 AD2d 806.)

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.