Bliss v. State, 742 N.E.2d 106 (NY 2000). · Go Syfert
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Bliss v. State, 742 N.E.2d 106 (NY 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (31 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rascelles v. State of New York (nyappdiv, 2020-10-14)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rascelles v. State of New York (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
The claimant failed to establish that the DOT workers acted in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probably that harm would follow ( see Bliss v State of New York , 95 NY2d at 913; Matsch v Chemung County Dept. of Pub.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freitag v. Village of Potsdam
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Given Henderson’s acknowledgment that the Village had a safety zone policy in place that called for the establishment of work zones when heavy machinery was being operated in parking lots during the daytime and chose not to implement it during nighttime operations, Crump’s candid testimony that a flagperson would have been helpful and may have been able to stop plaintiff before she crossed behind the loader and the lack of any admissible expert opinion dispositive of defendants’ claim that it did not act with recklessness, 2 defendants failed to establish their entitlement to summary jud…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aoki v. Aoki
NY · 2016 · confidence medium
While the majority aptly notes the suspect nature of that affidavit — and the same can arguably be said about some of the other evidence — it is beyond cavil that courts are not at liberty to make credibility determinations or weigh evidence on a summary judgment motion (see Vega, 18 NY3d at 505 ; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 315 [2004]; Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dejean v. Lawton
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
The record reflects that, given the plaintiff’s presence on the shoulder and the heavy traffic in the traffic circle, a factfinder could conclude that Lawton should have stopped and that his failure to do so constituted reckless conduct (see Deleon v New York City Sanitation Dept., 25 NY3d at 1107; Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]; Faria v City of Yonkers, 84 AD3d 1306, 1307 [2011]; Haist v Town of Newstead, 27 AD3d 1133, 1134 [2006]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) James v. Town of Babylon
N.Y. App. Term. · 2013 · confidence medium
Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]; Faria v City of Yonkers, 84 AD3d 1306 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Primeau v. Town of Amherst (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
A person acts recklessly when he acts in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow (see Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]; Riley, 95 NY2d at 466 ; Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Levine v. GBE Contracting Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
Thus, liability will attach only if the defendants acted in conscious “ ‘disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow’ ” (Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994], quoting Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 34, at 213 [5th ed]; see Riley v County of Broome, supra at 465-466; Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]).
discussed Cited "see" Qosaj v. Village of Sleepy Hollow
N.Y. App. Div. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
This "exemption turns on the nature of the work being performed" ( Riley v County of Broome , 95 NY2d at 464 ), and is limited to vehicles performing "'construction, repair, maintenance or similar work'" ( Guzman v Bowen , 38 AD3d 837, 837 , quoting Riley v County of Broome , 95 NY2d at 464 ; see Bliss v State of New York , 95 NY2d 911, 913 ).
discussed Cited "see" Kaffash v. Village of Great Neck Estates
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
"This requires a showing that the operator acted in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow" ( Joya v Baratta , 164 AD3d at 773 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bliss v State of New York , 95 NY2d 911, 913 ; Rockland Coaches, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown , 49 AD3d at 706 ).
discussed Cited "see" Ventura v. County of Nassau
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
"This requires a showing that the operator acted in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow" ( Joya v Baratta , 164 AD3d at 773 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bliss v State of New York , 95 NY2d 911, 913 ; Rockland Coaches, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown , 49 AD3d at 706 ).
discussed Cited "see" Chase v. Marsh
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
The operator of a snowplow acts with such "reckless disregard" when he or she " acts in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow' " ( Haist v Town of Newstead , 27 AD3d 1133, 1134 [4th Dept 2006]; see Bliss v State of New York , 95 NY2d 911 , 913 [2000]; Rockland Coaches, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown , 49 AD3d 705, 706 [2d Dept 2008]).
discussed Cited "see" Harris v. Hanssen
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
Recklessness is the "disregard of a known or obvious risk so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and done with conscious indifference to the outcome" ( Campbell v City of Elmira , 84 NY2d 505, 510 [1994]; see Bliss v State of New York , 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]).
discussed Cited "see" FERRAND, LANCE v. TOWN OF NORTH HARMONY
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
That standard requires evidence that a person has acted “in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that [was] so great as to make it highly probable that harm [would] follow” (Primeau v Town of Amherst, 17 AD3d 1003, 1003 , affd 5 NY3d 844 ; see Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501 ; see generally Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 ).
discussed Cited "see" Ferrand v. Town of North Harmony
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
That standard requires evidence that a person has acted “in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that [was] so great as to make it highly probable that harm [would] follow” (Primeau v Town of Amherst, 17 AD3d 1003, 1003 [2005], affd 5 NY3d 844 [2005]; see Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994]; see generally Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]).
discussed Cited "see" Ferrand v. Town of North Harmony
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
That standard requires evidence that a person has acted “in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that [was] so great as to make it highly probable that harm [would] follow” (Primeau v Town of Amherst, 17 AD3d 1003, 1003 [2005], affd 5 NY3d 844 [2005]; see Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994]; see generally Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]).
discussed Cited "see" Catanzaro v. Town of Lewiston
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
We conclude that defendants met their initial burden of establishing that the snowplow truck was “actually engaged in work on a highway” and that they did not act with “reckless disregard for the safety of others” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 [b]; see Primeau v Town of Amherst, 17 AD3d 1003 [2005], affd 5 NY3d 844 [2005]; see Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]; see generally Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994]).
discussed Cited "see" Government Employees Insurance v. Town of Oyster Bay
N.Y. App. Term. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
Co. v Bellini, 2 Misc 3d 40 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]), and, as such, when actually engaged in sanding operations is subject to a statutory standard of care to avoid “reckless disregard for the safety of others” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 [b]; see Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]; Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d at 459).
discussed Cited "see" Haist v. Town of Newstead
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
“A person acts recklessly when he acts in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow” (Primeau, 17 AD3d at 1003 ; see Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911, 913 [2000]; Riley, 95 NY2d at 466 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Riley v. County of Broome
NY · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
Thus, “the only way to apply the statute is to read its general admonition to exercise ‘due care’ in light of its more specific reference to ‘recklessness’ ” (id., at 501-502; see also, Bliss v State of New York, 95 NY2d 911 [decided today]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Joan M. Bliss
v.
State of New York
New York Court of Appeals.
Nov 21, 2000.
742 N.E.2d 106
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Pace & Pace, L. L. P., West Islip (Alan B. Sparer of counsel), for appellants., Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Michael S. Buskus, Preeta D. Bansal, Daniel Smirlock and Peter H. Schiff of counsel), for respondents.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by denying defendants’ motion for summary[*913] judgment and remitting to the Court of Claims for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum, and as so modified, affirmed.

Claimant George Bliss brought this personal injury action, arising out of an October 20, 1995 accident caused by a New York State Thruway Authority (NYSTA) truck driven by John Lawler. The Court of Claims granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that a recklessness standard applied because the truck was “actually engaged in work on a highway,” and that claimant had failed to present sufficient evidence of recklessness. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that a recklessness standard applied, and that “under the circumstances of this case, that standard was not met.” (272 AD2d 567.)

At the outset, the trial court and the Appellate Division correctly held that, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), Lawler’s truck was exempt from the rules of the road since it was “actually engaged in work on a highway.” Therefore, in order to recover, claimant must show that Lawler acted recklessly (see, Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455 [decided today]; see also, Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501).

Claimant’s evidence demonstrates that Lawler backed his truck, which had only side view mirrors and no rear view mirror, down a narrow decline on a bridge — located on a heavily-traveled interstate highway — in excess of the maximum safe speed. There is no indication that Lawler attempted to slow down or sound his horn before colliding with claimant’s automobile. Further, Lawler violated NYSTA safety directives by straying 100 to 250 feet from the cone truck instead of staying within the required 30 feet, and there was no evidence that a required spotter was provided for the operation. There is also evidence that the work crew was hurrying to dismantle the lane closure because they started late. Finally, Lawler pleaded guilty to a traffic offense — unsafe backing in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1211 (a) — as a result of the incident. While factual and credibility issues remain that prevent us from concluding as a matter of law that Lawler acted recklessly — in conscious disregard of “a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow” (see, Saarinen v Kerr, supra, at 501) — claimant raised a triable issue for the jury to consider, and summary judgment was improperly granted (see, Rizzuto v Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 351). Thus, the case must be remitted to the Court. of Claims.

[*914] We do not pass on the viability of defendants’ affirmative defenses, since claimant’s cross motion to dismiss those defenses should be addressed, in the first instance, by the Court of Claims.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur in memorandum.

Order modified, etc.