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Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Clark v. New York City Housing Authority
And unlike her asbestos fraudulent concealment claim, there is nothing in the 2011 Notice by which this Court could “conclusively” determine that Clark “had knowledge of facts from which the” quartz fraud “could reasonably be inferred.” Oggioni v. Oggioni, 46 A.D.3d 646, 649 (2d Dep’t 2007) (quoting Trepuk v. Frank, 44 N.Y.2d 723 , 725 (1978)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grabis v. Navient Solutions, LLC
Finally, under subsection 213(8) of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules, a cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered.79 See Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 A.D.3d 646, 648 (2d Dep’t. 2007) (“A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered, whichever is longer . . . “) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cannariato v. Cannariato
An action alleging fraud must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]; see 203 [g]; Coleman v Wells Fargo & Co., 125 AD3d 716 [2015]; House of Spices [India], Inc. v SMJ Servs., Inc., 103 AD3d 848 , 849 [2013] ; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Coleman v. Wells Fargo & Co.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer (see CPLR 203 [g]; 213 [8]; Marasa v Andrews, 69 AD3d 584 [2010]; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hinz v. Hinz
The defendants established that the accrual date for these causes of action was either the date that they acquired the property in their names only in March 1998, or when they refused to sign the written agreement proposed by the plaintiff’s estate planning attorney in *575 March 2001 (see CPLR 213, 214; Quadrozzi v Estate of Quadrozzi, 99 AD3d 688, 690 [2012]; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Selechnik v. Law Off. of Howard R. Birnbach
Since the plaintiffs failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for their failure to appear at numerous court-ordered conferences, it is unnecessary to consider whether they demonstrated a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Ogazi v Ogazi, 46 AD3d 646, 646 [2007]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gorelick v. Vorhand
Where, as here, “it does not conclusively appear that a plaintiff had knowledge of facts from which the fraud could reasonably be inferred, a complaint should not be dismissed on motion and the question should be left to the trier of the facts” (Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d 723 , 725 [1978]; see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d at 532 ; see Pericon v Ruck, 56 AD3d 635 , 636-637 [2008]; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648-649 [2007]; Saphir Intl., SA v UBS PaineWebber Inc., 25 AD3d 315, 316 [2006]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marasa v. Andrews
For the purposes of the discovery rule, a plaintiffs cause of action accrues “at the time the plaintiff ‘possesses knowledge of facts from which the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence’ ” (Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007], quoting Town of Poughkeepsie v Espie, 41 AD3d 701, 705 [2007]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Prand Corp. v. County of Suffolk
A cause of action alleging fraud is timely if it is commenced either within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years after the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, the fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; Pericon v Ruck, 56 AD3d 635 , 636 [2008]; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]; Town of Poughkeepsie v Espie, 41 AD3d 701, 705 [2007]; Shannon v Gordon, 249 AD2d 291, 292 [1998]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pericon v. Ruck
“A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered, whichever is longer” (Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]; see CPLR 213 [8]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Seidenfeld v. Zaltz
"A cause of action based upon fraud accrues, for statute of limitations purposes, at the time the plaintiff possesses knowledge of facts from which the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence'" ( Coleman v Wells Fargo & Co. , 125 AD3d at 716 , quoting Town of Poughkeepsie v Espie , 41 AD3d 701, 705 ; see Oggioni v Oggioni , 46 AD3d at 648 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
Monteleone v. Monteleone
Pursuant to CPLR 213(8), "the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it." "A cause of action based upon fraud accrues, for statute of limitations purposes, at the time the plaintiff possesses knowledge of facts from which the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence'" ( Coleman v Wells Fargo & Co., 125 AD3d 716, 716 , quoting Town of Po…
discussed
Cited "see"
Citicorp Trust Bank v. Makkas
“Where it does not conclusively appear that a plaintiff had knowledge of facts from which the fraud could reasonably be inferred, a complaint should not be dismissed on motion and the question should be left to the trier of the facts” (Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d 723 , 725 [1978]; see Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 649 [2007]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dominick Ogazi
v.
Chioma Ogazi
v.
Chioma Ogazi
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 11, 2007.
Cited by 8 opinions | Published
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Iannacci, J.), dated October 20, 2006, which denied his motion to vacate an order of the same court dated June 27, 2006, entered upon his default in appearing at a pretrial conference.
Ordered the order is affirmed, with costs.
Although this Court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions, it is still within the Supreme Court’s discretion to determine whether a default should be vacated (see Passas v Passas, 18 AD3d 842 [2005]; Viner v Viner, 291 AD2d 398 [2002]; Black v Black, 141 AD2d 689 [1988]). Here, the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his default in appearing at a pretrial conference (see Rolston v Rolston, 261 AD2d 377 [1999]; Benito v Childs, 253 AD2d 474 [1998]). In light of the lack of a reasonable excuse, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff demonstrated a meritorious cause of action or defense to a counterclaim (see Matter of Lutz v Goldstone, 31 AD3d 449, 450 [2006]). Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the order entered upon the appellant’s default. Schmidt, J.P., Skelos, Covello and Balkin, JJ., concur.