United States v. William Kirk Mixon, 977 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1992). · Go Syfert
Search
United States v. William Kirk Mixon, 977 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
36 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ellis v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama (CONSENT) (almd, 2022-10-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ellis v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama (CONSENT)
M.D. Ala. · 2022 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Velazquez-Rivera, 366 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2004); Caldwell v. Maloney, 159 F.3d 639 , 654–55 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679 , 686–87 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bennett
5th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 571 (5th Cir.2001) (juror’s demean- or and place of residence); United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 606-07 (5th Cir.1998) (occupation, family member’s employment status, demeanor); United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1993) (socioeconomic status, inattentiveness, and demeanor); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992) (occupation and prior jury experience). 5 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Charlton (2×)
1st Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
See, e.g., King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir.1999) (rejecting a prospective African-American juror "after accepting another black venireperson... [indicates] not only was there no pattern of discriminatory strikes, there was a sort of `antipattern'"); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992) (in a situation in which "[t]he government used five out of its six challenges against blacks[, t]he one black accepted by the government weakens the argument that the government was accepting jurors solely on a racial basis").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Chambers v. State
Tex. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Gaines v. State, 811 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd.) (prosecutors may rely on nonverbal as well as verbal aspects of a veniremember's answers in assessing whether a veniremember is hostile to the prosecutor in a particular case); Lee v. State, 860 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd.) (it is permissible to strike a potential juror on the basis that he has a friend or relative who has been arrested or convicted); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992) (glaring at the prosecutor during voir dire is a race-neutral reason).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kedran Bernard Shelby v. State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
United States v. Mixon , 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bruce Carneil Webster, A/K/A B-Love
5th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.1996) (juror trying to develop rapport with defense attorney); United States v. Stedman, 69 F.3d 737, 739 (5th Cir.1995) (potential juror's brother convicted of a criminal offense, another potential juror appeared disinterested; another juror had lived in area of concern in the case; another juror’s sister had been arrested for a narcotics charge); United States v. Jackson, 50 F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir.1995) (prosecutor believed that potential juror gave hostile look to prosecutor); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barker v. Yukins
E.D. Mich. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Marin, 7 F.3d at 686-87 (“The attainment of a certain educational level has been accepted by numerous circuits as a race-neutral criterion for exercising a peremptory challenge under the Batson mandate, and, as far as we can determine, has been rejected by none.”); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992) (education and employment experience permissible considerations); United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 105-06 (4th Cir.1989) (education permissible consideration); United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481, 482 (8th Cir.1989) (age, marital status, and employment …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Clarissa Williamson, AKA Clarissa Lewis, United States of America v. Carl Marshall, United States of America v. Karen Parker, United States of America v. Edward Dryden, Jr. AKA Honky, AKA Hunky
10th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
We have previously noted that "although the mere presence of members of a certain race on the final jury does not automatically negate a Batson violation, ... it can be a relevant factor, particularly when the prosecution had the opportunity to strike them." United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 , 112 S.Ct. 882 , 116 L.Ed.2d 786 (1992); see also United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679 , 686 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 739 , 126 L.Ed.2d 702 (1994); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992); United …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Williamson
10th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
We have previously noted that “although the mere presence of members of a certain race on the final jury does not automatically negate a Batson violation, ... it can be a relevant factor, particularly when the prosecution had the opportunity to strike them.” United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 , 112 S.Ct. 882 , 116 L.Ed.2d 786 (1992); see also United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679 , 686 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 739 , 126 L.Ed.2d 702 (1994); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992); United S…
discussed Cited "see" In Re Application of US (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
W.D. Tex. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mixon, 977 F.2d at 923 , and cases cited supra at p. 577.
discussed Cited "see" In re United States (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
W.D. Tex. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mixon, 977 F.2d at 923 , and cases cited supra at p. 577.
cited Cited "see" Kohler v. Englade
M.D. La. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992) (stating all of the information taken together, including the profile, was more than enough to constitute probable cause). 33 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Bemis
5th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Montgomery (2×)
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 922-23 (5th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." D. G. and D. R., III v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
Tex. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
We also note that neither Mother nor Father asserts on appeal that they have preserved their Batson challenge, instead merely arguing that the trial court abused its discretion “[i]f” or “[a]ssuming” that the issued was preserved. 11 “[p]eremptory strikes may legitimately be based on nonverbal conduct,” although the record must indicate the nature of the nonverbal conduct); see also United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the fact that “Torres glared at the U.S. Attorney during voir dire and this might indicate a certain animosity towards the govern…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Thadeus Randolph Risher
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921 (5th Cir.1992) (upholding peremptory challenge of African-American juror who was an ordained minister); United States v. Wilson, 867 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.) (upholding peremptory challenge of African-American juror who was a social worker), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 827 (1989). 11 Further, we note that the district court did not err in concluding that the prosecutor's racially neutral explanation for the challenge was in good faith.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Jorge E. Marin
7th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992) (no Batson violation where a black was seated on the *687 jury while others were struck, some for low levels of education and non-supervisory positions at work).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Kirk MIXON, Defendant-Appellant
89-3680.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Dec 15, 1992.
977 F.2d 921
John Wilson Reed (Court-appointed), Glass & Reed, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellant., Herbert Mondros, Robert J. Boitmann, Walter F. Becker, Jr., Asst. U.S. Attys., Harry Rosenberg, U.S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellee.
Garza, Garwood, Werlein.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Mixon challenges his conviction of conspiracy to import and the actual importation of 500 plus pounds of marijuana into the United States based on alleged jury selection discrimination. He also claims a 4th Amendment search violation because of the placement of a transponder on the plane he was flying. After review we find no merit in these arguments and therefore we affirm.

FACTS

One January 7, 1986, Special Agent Lu-zak received a tip from a confidential source that two men had requested that their Cessna 210D aircraft be modified. They requested that the rear seats be removed to create added storage space and that extra bladder gas tanks be connected to the wing tips. The extra tanks cost $4800 and increased gas capacity from thirty gallons to eighty gallons of fuel, thereby increasing its range to 1200 miles. Luzak personally observed the modifications being done. The source told Luzak that the two men were called “Fred” and “Kirk” and that they were staying at the Holiday Inn in Vicksburg, Mississippi. Luzak was also informed that they were driving a blue Ford long bed pickup truck. Luzak corroborated this information and determined that the vehicle was registered to an Alex A. Vega, Jr., who had a record of firearm violations. One of the men was identified as Fred Cody Magee who had a very extensive drug record including a conviction in 1985 for conspiracy to sell one ton of marijuana in Dallas. Luzak also identified an accompanying individual as John Joseph Matrone who had been arrested for forgery and convicted for aiding and abetting wire fraud.

Luzak testified that the modified plane fit the profile for a drug smuggling aircraft. Luzak got a warrant to place a transponder on the plane to trace its travel. On January 16, 1986, the plane was spotted coming in from the direction of Jamaica and landing in a cane field outside Baton Rouge. The agents descended upon the plane about two hours after it landed because they had lost contact with the tracer. They did not find any marijuana and a few minutes later Mixon, the appellant, returned to the aircraft and explained that the plane had broken down. Mixon, Ma-trone and Magee were indicted in 1988.

Magee testified for the government at Mixon’s trial and stated that they had all conspired to import about 500 pounds of marijuana from Jamaica and that they had actually succeeded the night of January 16. The marijuana was already removed by the time the officers got to the plane. Magee received five (5) years active probation, Ma-trone two (2) years imprisonment and Mix-on was sentenced to twenty (20) years for conspiracy to import and another twenty (20) for the actual importation. His prison terms are to run concurrently.

ANALYSIS

Mixon claims that the government racially discriminated against blacks in its peremptory challenges during jury selection and therefore deprived him of a racially balanced jury. The standard required in jury selection is racial neutrality. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1718, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1985). Every individual is entitled to a jury that is selected without racial bias. Defendants can challenge perceived racial discrimination in jury selection whether the stricken juror is of the same or different race as his own. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 428 (1991). Therefore, Mixon who is white, may challenge the striking of blacks from sitting on the jury. “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason given by the prosecutor will be deemed race-neutral.” U.S. v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir.1991); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.[*923] -, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).

The reasons given by the government in the present ease in response to the defense prima facie contention of bias were found by the court to be race-neutral and credible. Upon review we also find that reasons given are race neutral and we find no clear error. The final jury comprised of one (1) black and eleven (11) whites. The government used five out of its six challenges against blacks. The one black accepted by the government weakens the argument that the government was accepting jurors solely on a racial basis. The defense also used one of its preemptory challenges against a black.

The reasons given for the rejections for juror # 2, James Cloud, and juror # 11, Yvonne Harvey, were low levels of education and non-supervisory positions at work. The government argued that the case was entirely based on circumstantial evidence and needed jurors who could grasp the nuances. Even though there were white jurors with equivalent backgrounds the preempted jurors’ answers and appearance went into the equation and the trial judge found the government’s reasoning non-pretextual.

Jurors # 21, Cassandra Waddell, and # 28, Maryellen Bottley, were both rejected because they had previously been members of hung juries. The government didn’t inquire about their votes on those juries because the fact that they were both exposed to hung juries alone might predispose to them to accept the same result in the present case and they were seen as risks. Bottley also indicated that her brother was convicted of a crime and this was viewed by the government as an added risk. They accepted a white juror who indicated that a relative was convicted of bootlegging but this was acceptable to them because the relative was an in-law and not a blood relative.

Finally juror # 8, Mercedes Torres, was rejected because she indicated that she and her husband were ordained ministers and the government felt that perhaps she would have a higher threshold of reasonable doubt. The government also explained that Torres glared at the U.S. Attorney during voir dire and this might indicate a certain animosity towards the government.

These reasons are all race neutral and the defense failed to show that they were fabricated. We find no error in the judge’s finding of credibility.

The issue claiming an illegal search of the airplane because of the placement of the transponder is equally meritless. Its placement in the aircraft was authorized by a warrant duly executed by the Southern District Court of Mississippi on January 11, 1986. There was sufficient probable cause for the placement of this tracer.

The government was first alerted to the modification of the plane by a confidential source. Agent Luzak duly corroborated the information. Government agents personally observed the rear seat being removed and the extra tanks added to the wings. A check on the individuals involved uncovered a convicted drug felon, Magee. A check on Matrone revealed that he was also a criminal with a history of forgery arrests and a conviction on aiding and abetting wire fraud. A check on the registered owner of the pickup truck, Alex Vega, revealed that he had violated firearm regulations. The modified plane fit the profile of a drug smuggling aircraft. All of the information together was more than enough to give the agents probable cause to suspect the individuals of planning to smuggle drugs and it was proper to request a warrant to place a transponder to trace the Cessna in question. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

For all the above mentioned reasons the appellant’s conviction is

AFFIRMED.