Jordan v. Cnty. of Schoharie, 46 A.D.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). · Go Syfert
Jordan v. Cnty. of Schoharie, 46 A.D.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" In re the Estate of Essenberg
N.Y. Sur. Ct. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
(Siffin v Rambuski, 87 AD2d 979 ; see Jordan v County of Schoharie, 46 AD2d 716 .) However, while neither the Town of Brookhaven nor the County of Suffolk oppose the instant application, the other defendant, Chrysler Corporation, contends that the decedent’s estate must remain in the action in order for it to maintain its cross claim against the estate and to offer proof at trial regarding the decedent’s culpability.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Barbara Jordan, an Infant, by Her Parent and Natural Guardian, Thomas R. Jordan
v.
County of Schoharie, and Town of Cobleskill, and Third-Party Thomas J. De Prima, Jr., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 31, 1974.
46 A.D.2d 716
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered November 12.1973 in Schoharie County, which dismissed the third-party complaint. On February 23, 1969 Barbara Jordan was injured when the car driven by respondent left the traveled portion of the highway on Quarry Road in the Town of Cobleskill, Schoharie County, and struck a tree. On January 29, 1971 the plaintiffs settled with respondent in a separate action. In the meantime in the instant action appellant brought a third-party action against the respondent seeking indemnity should it be found liable to the plaintiffs. Respondent then moved to dismiss appellant’s third-party complaint which motion Special Term granted, and the instant appeal ensued. It is conceded that since the plaintiffs settled with respondent prior to the Court of Appeals decision in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. (30 N Y 2d 143), appellant cannot predicate a right of indemnity under the theory enunciated in that case (Codling v. Paglia, 32 N Y 2d 330, 334). However, appellant urges that its right to indemnity is not premised^ on Dole but on the common-law principle that it is entitled to indemnity since its negligence is passive whereas respondent’s is active citing Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corn. (13 N Y 2d 112). While the principle urged by respondent is clearly viable, in determining whether active or passive negligence is asserted the allegations of the complaint are controlling. Moreover, acts o£ as well as acts of commission can constitute active negligence ( ***.*' ’ . Co. v. Luckenbach S. 8. Co., 9 N Y 2d 426). The complaint m the instant action[*717] premises liability against the appellant on the grounds it failed to warn motorists of a dangerous condition and failure to remedy such condition. These allegations assert active negligence (Meisner v. Healey, 18 A D 2d 368) and, thus, the third-party complaint was properly dismissed (Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co.j 5 N Y 2d 447). Order affirmed, with costs. Herlihy, P, J., Staley, Jr., Sweeney, Kane and Reynolds, JJ., concur.