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Positive treatment
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Treatment trajectory · 2013 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lutz v. Defabio
This affidavit was sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as it demonstrated that she was not comparatively negligent in the happening of the subject accident and established a prima facie case of negligence against the defendants, requiring them to come forward with a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision with her vehicle (see Cortese v Pobejimov, 136 AD3d 635 [2016]; Phillip v D&D Carting Co., Inc., 136 AD3d at 23; Sokolowska v Song, 123 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2014]; Lisetskiy v Weiss, 123 AD3d 775, 777 [2014]; Gallo v Jairat…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Binkowitz v. Kolb
Sales, Inc., 134 AD3d 667 [2d Dept 2015]; D'Agostino v YRC, Inc., 120 AD3d 1291, 1292 [2014]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]; Fajardo v City of New York, 95 AD3d 820, 821 [2012]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Phillip v. D&D Carting Co., Inc.
Corp., 102 AD3d 658 , 658-659 [2013]; Menelas v Yearwood-Bobb, 100 AD3d 603, 604-605 [2012]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Leak v. Hybrid Cars, Ltd.
Here, the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by proffering evidence that Islam, the operator of their automobile, was not at fault in the happening of the accident (see Gavrilova v Stark, 129 AD3d 907, 909 [2015]; Le Grand v Silberstein, 123 AD3d 773, 774 [2014]; Hearn v Manzolillo, 103 AD3d 689, 690 [2013]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lisa v. Parikh
Although he is now retired, the plaintiff’s tenure as a Justice of the Supreme Court, Queens County, supports a change of venue of the action from Queens County to Nassau County to “protect[ ] the court from even a possible appearance of impropriety” (Pruitt v Patsalos, 96 AD3d 924, 924 [2012]; see Kavelman v Taylor, 245 AD2d 9 [1997]; Milazzo v Long Is.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rutherford v. Patel
“To obtain a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510 (2), a movant is required to produce admissible factual evidence dem *934 onstrating a strong possibility that an impartial trial cannot be obtained in the county where venue was properly placed” (Pruitt v Patsalos, 96 AD3d 924, 924 [2012]; see Miller-Frankel v Frankel, 93 AD3d 826, 827 [2012]; Matter of Michiel, 48 AD3d 687 [2008]; Behrins & Behrins, P.C. v Chan, 40 AD3d 560 [2007]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Le Grand v. Silberstein
“One of several nonnegligent explanations for a rear-end collision [may be] a sudden stop of the lead vehicle” (Chepel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235, 237 [2003]; see Amador v City of New York, 120 AD3d 526, 526 [2014]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]; Vargas v Luxury Family Corp., 77 AD3d 820, 821 [2010]; Foti v Fleetwood Ride, Inc., 57 AD3d 724 [2008]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lisetskiy v. Weiss
Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting the affidavit of the plaintiff Vladislav Lisetskiy, who stated that their vehicle was struck in the rear while it was stopped at a red traffic light (see Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850, 851-852 [2013]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]), thereby shifting the burden to the defendants to come forward with a nonnegligent explanation for the accident (see Abbott v Picture Cars E., Inc., 78 AD3d 869 [2010]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Singh v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc.
This evidence established the plaintiffs prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability (see Williams v Spencer-Hall, 113 AD3d 759 [2014]; Sayyed v Murray, 109 AD3d 464 [2013]; Prosen v Mabella, 107 AD3d 870 Markesinis v Jaquez, 106 AD3d 961 [2013]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850 [2013]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 926 [2012]; Napolitano v Galletta, 85 AD3d 881 [2011]; Kastritsios v Marcello, 84 AD3d 1174 [2011]), which required the defendants to come forward with evidence to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gutierrez v. Trillium USA
“A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” (Pollard v Independent Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 94 AD3d 845, 845-846 [2012]; see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Delvalle v Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 94 AD3d 942 [2012]; Perez v Roberts, 91 AD3d 620, 621 [2012]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]; Giangrasso v Callahan, 87 AD3d …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gutierrez v. Trillium USA
“A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” (Pollard v Independent Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 94 AD3d 845, 845-846 [2012]; see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Delvalle v Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 94 AD3d 942 [2012]; Perez v Roberts, 91 AD3d 620, 621 [2012]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]; Giangrasso v Callahan, 87 AD3d …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kertesz v. Jason Transportation Corp.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]; Pollard v Independent Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 94 AD3d 845, 845-846 [2012]; Delvalle v Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 94 AD3d 942 [2012]; Perez v Roberts, 91 AD3d 620, 621 [2012]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kertesz v. Jason Transportation Corp.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924, 925 [2012]; Pollard v Independent Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 94 AD3d 845, 845-846 [2012]; Delvalle v Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 94 AD3d 942 [2012]; Perez v Roberts, 91 AD3d 620, 621 [2012]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Amador v. City of New York
“One of several nonnegligent explanations for a rear-end collision is a sudden stop of the lead vehicle” (Chepel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235, 237 [2003]; see Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96 AD3d 924 [2012]; Vargas v Luxury Family Corp., 77 AD3d 820 [2010]; Foti v Fleetwood Ride, Inc., 57 AD3d 724 [2008]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Hearn v. Manzolillo
The appellants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them on the ground that they were not at fault in the happening of the subject accident. “ ‘A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle’ ” (Fajardo v City of New York, 95 AD3d 820, 820-821 [2012], quoting Ortiz v Hub Truck Rental Corp., 82 AD3d 725, 726 [2011]; see Taing v Brewery, 100 AD3d 740 [2012]), and a re…
discussed
Cited "see"
Hearn v. Manzolillo
The appellants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them on the ground that they were not at fault in the happening of the subject accident. “ ‘A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle’ ” (Fajardo v City of New York, 95 AD3d 820, 820-821 [2012], quoting Ortiz v Hub Truck Rental Corp., 82 AD3d 725, 726 [2011]; see Taing v Brewery, 100 AD3d 740 [2012]), and a re…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
David Pruitt
v.
Peter C. Patsalos
v.
Peter C. Patsalos
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jun 20, 2012.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Ecker, J.), entered August 3, 2011, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 510 (2) to change the venue of the action from Orange County to Dutchess County.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 510 (2) to change the venue of the action from Orange County to Dutchess County is granted, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Orange County, is directed to deliver to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, all papers filed in the action and certified copies of all minutes and entries (see CPLR 511 [d]).
To obtain a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510 (2), a movant is required to produce admissible factual evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that an impartial trial cannot be obtained in the county where venue was properly placed (see Matter of Michiel, 48 AD3d 687 [2008]; Jablonski v Trost, 245 AD2d 338, 339 [1997]; Albanese v West Nassau Mental Health Ctr., 208 AD2d 665, 666 [1994]). Under the circumstances of this case, including the evidence demonstrating that the defendant is a retired Orange County Supreme Court Justice, who presided in that court for more than two decades, that his relative is a retired Orange County Court Judge, and that the defendant’s daughter is a Support Magistrate in the Orange County Family Court, the protection of the court from even a possible appearance of impropriety requires a change of the venue of the action from Orange County to Dutchess County (see Saxe v OB/GYN Assoc., 86 NY2d 820, 822 [1995]; Kavelman v Taylor, 245 AD2d 9 [1997]; Milazzo v Long Is. Light. Co., 106 AD2d 495 [1984]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 510 (2) to change the venue of the action from Orange County to Dutchess County. Rivera, J.P., Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.