Melnikow v. Northland Grp., Inc., 94 A.D.2d 955 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). · Go Syfert
Melnikow v. Northland Grp., Inc., 94 A.D.2d 955 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Herman v. Duncan (nysd, 2019-05-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Herman v. Duncan
S.D.N.Y. · 2019 · confidence medium
When the original possession is lawful, “‘conversion does not occur until the defendant refuses to return property after demand or until he sooner disposes of the property.’” Id. at 54 (quoting Johnson v. Gumer, 94 A.D.2d 955, 955 (4th Dep’t 1983)). “(Under New York law, conversion is established when ‘(1) the property subject to conversion is a specific identifiable thing; (2) plaintiff had ownership, possession or control over the property before its conversion; and (3) defendant exercised an unauthorized dominion over the thing in question, to the alteration of its condition o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simpson & Simpson, PLLC v. Lippes Mathias Wexler Friedman LLP
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
“Where the original possession is lawful, a conversion does not occur until the defendant refuses to return the property after demand” by the property’s rightful owner (Johnson v Gumer, 94 AD2d 955, 955 [1983]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simpson & Simpson, PLLC v. Lippes Mathias Wexler Friedman LLP
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
“Where the original possession is lawful, a conversion does not occur until the defendant refuses to return the property after demand” by the property’s rightful owner (Johnson v Gumer, 94 AD2d 955, 955 [1983]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reeves v. Giannotta
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
The cause of action for conversion accrued when the firearms were destroyed or, as plaintiff alternatively alleges, misappropriated by members of the police department after plaintiff made a demand for them, over a month before plaintiff obtained the court order (see Pecoraro v M&T Bank Corp., 11 AD3d 950, 951 [2004]; Johnson v Gumer, 94 AD2d 955, 955 [1983]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reeves v. Giannotta
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
The cause of action for conversion accrued when the firearms were destroyed or, as plaintiff alternatively alleges, misappropriated by members of the police department after plaintiff made a demand for them, over a month before plaintiff obtained the court order (see Pecoraro v M&T Bank Corp., 11 AD3d 950, 951 [2004]; Johnson v Gumer, 94 AD2d 955, 955 [1983]).
cited Cited "see" Weingarten v. Warren
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Gumer, 94 A.D.2d 955 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 318 , 319 (4th Dep’t 1983); see also Heller v. Gerry, 40 A.D.2d 236 , 339 N.Y.S.2d 18, 21 (3d Dep’t 1972).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Videri, Inc. v. ONAWHIM (OAW) Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Schwartz, 984 F.2d at 54; see also Johnson v. Gumer, 94 A.D.2d 955, 955 (4th Dep’t 1983). ii.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Regions Bank v. Wieder & Mastroianni, P.C.
S.D.N.Y. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Schwartz, 984 F.2d at 54 (" 'Where the original possession is lawful, a conversion does not occur until the defendant refuses to return the property after demand or until he sooner disposes of the property.’ ") *415 (quoting Johnson v. Gumer, 94 A.D.2d 955 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 318 , 319 (App.Div. 1983)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pecoraro v. M&T Bank Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
Moreover, CPLR 206 (a) (1) applies only “where a demand is necessary to entitle a person to commence an action,” but no demand was necessary in this case because defendant was a lawful custodian of the safe deposit box at the time it was passed to the scrap dealer (see MacDonnell v Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 193 NY 92, 101 [1908]; see also Johnson v Gumer, 94 AD2d 955 [1983]).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Svenska Finans International BV v. Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen, Lawler & Burstein, P.C.
N.D.N.Y. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Gumer, 94 A.D.2d 955, 955 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 318 (4th Dep’t 1983); 23 N.Y.Jur.2d Conversion, and Action for Recovery of Chattel § 50 (1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Robinson v. Kamens
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Johnson v. Gumer, 94 A.D.2d 955, 955 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 318 , 319 (1983) (Statute of limitations does not begin to run, where original possession is lawful, “until the defendant refuses to return the property after demand or until he sooner disposes of the property.”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Walter Melnikow
v.
Northland Group, Inc., and K-Mart Corp.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 25, 1983.
94 A.D.2d 955
Published

. Amended order unanimously modified by deleting the last decretal paragraph and, as modified, affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: Plaintiffs appeal from an amended order of Special Term, Onondaga County, which granted the motion of defendant K-Mart Corp. to vacate a default judgment and directed K-Mart to pay $600 to plaintiffs’ attorney. K-Mart Corp. forwarded plaintiffs’ complaint to an insurance claims adjuster who requested and received three extensions of time to answer from plaintiff’s attorney. During this period the adjuster tried, without success, to have counsel for defendant Northland Group, Inc., assume K-Mart’s defense based upon a hold harmless agreement in which Northland agreed to indemnify K-Mart. K-Mart’s counsel had no knowledge of the case until he received the file from the adjuster one day after the last extension of time to answer expired. Six days later he served plaintiff’s attorney with K-Mart’s answer. Under these circumstances, we conclude this is not law office failure (see Donnelly v Pepicelli, 58 NY2d 268; Pajor v Kralik, 88 AD2d 858; Swidler v World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 85 AD2d 239). That being so and there being a sufficient indication of merit and no indication of prejudice to plaintiffs, it was not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law for Special Term to vacate the default judgment against defendant K-Mart Corp. However, we cannot approve of Special Term’s use of a monetary sanction on these facts (see Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v International Business Machs. Corp., 76 AD2d 873, 875). (Appeal from amended order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Tenney, J. — vacate default judgment.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Schnepp, JJ.