People v. Ju Ju Jiang, 99 A.D.3d 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). · Go Syfert
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People v. Ju Ju Jiang, 99 A.D.3d 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
6 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Nicholas (nyappdiv, 2013-05-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nicholas
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we reduce the defendant’s convictions of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree under counts one and two of the indictment to criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and vacate the sentences imposed thereon (see CPL 470.15 [2] [a]; People v Ju Ju Jiang, 99 AD3d 724, 725 [2012]; People v Oates, 33 AD3d at 823).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. McFadden
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Since the defendant has already served the maximum permissible sentence that could have been imposed upon a conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (see Penal Law §§ 70.15 [1]; 220.03; People v Nunez, 127 AD2d 801 [1987]), the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the imposition of a sentence of time served on the conviction of that offense (see generally People v Ju Ju Jiang, 99 AD3d 724, 725 [2012]; People v Seymour, 77 AD3d 976, 980 [2010]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nicholas
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we reduce the defendant’s convictions of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree under counts one and two of the indictment to criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and vacate the sentences imposed thereon (see CPL 470.15 [2] [a]; People v Ju Ju Jiang, 99 AD3d 724, 725 [2012]; People v Oates, 33 AD3d at 823).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. McFadden
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Since the defendant has already served the maximum permissible sentence that could have been imposed upon a conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (see Penal Law §§ 70.15 [1]; 220.03; People v Nunez, 127 AD2d 801 [1987]), the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the imposition of a sentence of time served on the conviction of that offense (see generally People v Ju Ju Jiang, 99 AD3d 724, 725 [2012]; People v Seymour, 77 AD3d 976, 980 [2010]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Christburg
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
Based only upon “a computer search,” the police approximated the value of the unvouchered, stolen property “to be over $13,000.” However, the People are required to present the grand jury with sufficient evidence to establish the value of property where value is an element of the grand larceny theory alleged (People v Mathis, 179 AD2d 779 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1004 [1992]; see also People v Ju Ju Jiang, 99 AD3d 724 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1062 [2013]; People v Seymour, 77 AD3d 976 [2d Dept 2010]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York
v.
Ju Ju Jiang
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 3, 2012.
99 A.D.3d 724
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

The defendant’s contention that the evidence presented as to the sixth count of the indictment, charging him with attempted grand larceny in the third degree, was legally insufficient to prove that the value of the stolen property exceeded $3,000, was not preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]). However, we reach the issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see People v Oates, 33 AD3d 823, 823 [2006]; People v Jackman, 8 AD3d 678, 678-679 [2004]).

As the Feople correctly concede, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the stolen property had a value in excess of $3,000, as required to support a conviction of attempted grand larceny in the third degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.35 [1]). Nonetheless, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction of the lesser-included offense of attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.30 [1]). Accordingly, we reduce the defendant’s[*725] conviction of attempted grand larceny in the third degree to attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and vacate the sentence imposed thereon (see CPL 470.15 [2] [a]; People v Jackman, 8 AD3d at 679). Since the defendant has already served the maximum permissible sentence for that crime (see Penal Law § 70.15 [1]), the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the imposition of a sentence to time served on the conviction of attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (see People v Seymour, 77 AD3d 976, 980 [2010]; People v Harvin, 75 AD3d 559, 561 [2010]).

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying his challenge for cause to a prospective juror who expressed doubt as to her ability to remain impartial if the defendant chose not to testify at trial. However, upon further inquiry, the prospective juror gave unequivocal assurances that she would follow the court’s instructions regarding the presumption of innocence, and that she would not draw any negative inferences from the defendant’s failure to testify. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s challenge for cause to this prospective juror (see People v High, 18 AD3d 775, 776 [2005]; People v Porter, 7 AD3d 817 [2004]; People v Narvaez, 298 AD2d 603, 603 [2002]; cf. People v Bludson, 97 NY2d 644, 645 [2001]; People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P, Dickerson, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.