Taran Furs, Inc. v. Champagne Bridals, Inc., 116 A.D.2d 970 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Taran Furs, Inc. v. Champagne Bridals, Inc., 116 A.D.2d 970 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP v. HoganWillig, PLLC (nyappdiv, 2024-10-24)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP v. HoganWillig, PLLC (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
Plaintiff adequately pleaded that the conveyance at issue was not for fair consideration, as future legal services constituted the consideration for the $625,000 retainer paid to defendant, and a promise of future services is not fair consideration for a present conveyance ( see Kleinfeld v Pedersen , 116 AD2d 970, 971 [4th Dept 1986]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Darling v. Darling
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
(See Neshewat v Salem, 365 F Supp 2d 508, 520 [SD NY 2005], affd 194 Fed Appx 24 [2006].) Transfers between spouses have not fared well when examined for “fair consideration.” (See Joslin v Lopez, 309 AD2d at 838-839 ; Rampello v Cioffi, 282 AD2d 442, 443 [2d Dept 2001]; Rossignol v Silvernail, 222 AD2d at 940 ; Durrant v Kelly, 186 AD2d 237, 238 [2d Dept 1992]; Duckstein v Rosa, 118 AD2d 951, 952 [3d Dept 1986]; Kleinfeld v Pedersen, 116 AD2d 970, 971 [4th Dept 1986]; Century Ctr. v Davis, 100 AD2d 564, 565 [2d Dept 1984]; Merman v Miller, 82 AD2d 826, 827 [2d Dept 1981]; see also Neshewa…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wehle v. Moroczko
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Although Alfreda executed the note, her estate is not a necessary party to this action pursuant to CPLR 1001 inasmuch as the note allows plaintiff to recover the entire debt from Nicholas (see NC Venture I, L.P. v Complete Analysis, Inc., 22 AD3d 540, 543 [2005]; see also Taran Furs v Champagne Bridals, 116 AD2d 970, 970 [1986]).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Rampello v. Cioffi
N.Y. App. Div. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
Cioffi, failed to raise an issue of fact (see, Century Ctr. v Davis, 100 AD2d 564 ; Merman v Miller, 82 AD2d 826 ; see also, Kleinfeld v Pedersen, 116 AD2d 970 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Taran Furs, Inc.
v.
Champagne Bridals, Inc.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jan 24, 1986.
116 A.D.2d 970
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

— Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff sold fur coats valued at $53,325 to the defendants. Plaintiff alleges defendants represented at the time of sale that the coats were being purchased by Coles of Newark, Inc. (Coles), when in fact the merchandise was being supplied to defendant Champagne Bridals, Inc. (Champagne). Although defendants Mr. and Mrs. Nusbaum own and control both Coles and Champagne, they acknowledge that Coles is a corporation separate and distinct from Champagne. Coles filed for bankruptcy shortly after the sale of the fur coats. Plaintiff sued Champagne and the Nusbaums alleging causes of action for breach of contract, misrepresentation and related claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the United States Bankruptcy Court has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s lawsuit (CPLR 3211 [a] [2], [4], [5]) and that Coles is a necessary party (CPLR 3211 [a] [10]). Special Term properly rejected these arguments and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Only actions against the debtor and the property of the debtor’s estate are automatically stayed upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy (11 USC § 362 [a]). Plaintiff’s action is not against Coles but against Champagne. Actions against parties other than the debtor in bankruptcy are not stayed (In re Larmar Estates, 5 Bankr 328, 330 [EDNY 1980]).

Special Term also properly rejected defendant’s claim that this action could not proceed without joinder of Coles as a necessary party. Plaintiff has made no allegations against Coles. At most, Coles may be a joint tort-feasor or coobligor of the sales contract, but would not be a necessary party in either event (see, Sarubbi v Rinaldo, 98 AD2d 837; Littanzi v State of New York, 54 AD2d 1043, 1044; cf. Lottes v Slater, 114 AD2d 580).

We have considered defendants’ remaining claims and find them lacking in merit. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Davis, J. — dismiss complaint.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Pine, JJ.