Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cherot, 102 A.D.3d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). · Go Syfert
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cherot, 102 A.D.3d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Velez v. Forcelli (nyappdiv, 2017-07-12)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Velez v. Forcelli
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Here, the evidence elicited at the hearing demonstrated that seven visits were made to the defendant’s residence at different times, including those times when the defendant could reasonably have been expected to be found at his residence (see JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Baldi, 128 AD3d 777 [2015]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cherot, 102 AD3d 768, 769 [2013]).
discussed Cited "see" Indymac Fed. Bank, FSB v. Jones
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
The "due diligence" requirement may be met with "a few visits on different occasions and at different times to the defendant's residence or place of business when the defendant could reasonably be expected to be found at such location at those times" ( id. ; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cherot , 102 AD3d 768 ; Lemberger v Khan , 18 AD3d 447 ).
cited Cited "see" Sinay v. Schwartzman
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
Trust Co. v White, 110 AD3d 759 , 759-760 [2013]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cherot, 102 AD3d 768 [2013]).
discussed Cited "see" Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. White
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
The “due diligence” requirement may be met with “a few visits on different occasions and at different times to the defendant’s residence or place of business when the defendant could reasonably be expected to be found at such location at those times” (id. at 66; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cherot, 102 AD3d 768 [2013]; Lemberger v Khan, 18 AD3d 447 [2005]).
discussed Cited "see" Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. White
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
The “due diligence” requirement may be met with “a few visits on different occasions and at different times to the defendant’s residence or place of business when the defendant could reasonably be expected to be found at such location at those times” (id. at 66; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cherot, 102 AD3d 768 [2013]; Lemberger v Khan, 18 AD3d 447 [2005]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v.
Nicholas M. Cherot
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jan 16, 2013.
102 A.D.3d 768
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Nicholas M. Cherot appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Robert J. Friedman, J.H.O.), dated April 11, 2011, which, after a hearing, in effect, denied his motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Ordered that order is affirmed, with costs.

At a hearing to determine the validity of service of process, the plaintiffs process server testified that he made three attempts to personally serve the defendant Nicholas M. Cherot (hereinafter the appellant) at his residence, including one attempt on a weekday evening at 7:20 p.m., and one attempt early on a Saturday morning. After his third attempt to personally serve the appellant proved unsuccessful, the process server utilized “nail and mail” service pursuant to CPLR 308 (4). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the process server’s uncontradicted testimony that he made three attempts to effect personal service at the appellant’s residence at different times on different days, including a Saturday, were sufficient to satisfy the “due diligence” requirement of CPLR 308 (4) (see Lopez v DePietro, 82 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; Farias v Simon, 73 AD3d 569, 570 [2010]; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Szajna, 72 AD3d[*769] 902, 903 [2010]; County of Nassau v Gallagher, 43 AD3d 972, 973-974 [2007]; Lemberger v Khan, 18 AD3d 447 [2005]; Johnson v Waters, 291 AD2d 481 [2002]; cf. Serraro v Staropoli, 94 AD3d 1083 [2012]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Eng, P.J., Angiolillo, Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.