Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996
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Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Torres v. Mamadou
See id. at *3; Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 394 (2d Dep’t 1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Phillip v. D&D Carting Co., Inc.
Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]; Hurley v Izzo, 248 AD2d 674, 676 [1998]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sayyed v. Murray
The operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision because he or she is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to, inter alia, a mechanical failure, an unavoidable skidding on a wet pavement, or some other reasonable cause (see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sayyed v. Murray
The operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision because he or she is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to, inter alia, a mechanical failure, an unavoidable skidding on a wet pavement, or some other reasonable cause (see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DeLouise v. S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp.
As a general rule, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the rearmost vehicle, imposing a duty of explanation on that operator to excuse the collision either through a mechanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on a wet pavement, or any other reasonable cause (see Klopchin v Masri, 45 AD3d 737, 737 [2007]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Taveras v. Amir
Proof of a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle that strikes the forward vehicle and imposes a duty upon such operator to explain how the accident occurred (see Moran v Singh, 10 AD3d 707, 708 [2004]; Velazquez v Denton Limo, Inc., 7 AD3d 787, 788 [2004]; McGregor v Manzo, 295 AD2d 487 [2002]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McCauley v. Vandina
In opposition to her prima facie showing of her entitlement to summary judgment, Goldman and the Brills failed to come forward with a non-negligent explanation for the rear-end collision with the stopped vehicle in which the appellant was a passenger (see Tricoli v Malik, 268 AD2d 469, 470 [2000]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393-394 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rainford v. Han
Neville Rainford’s conclusory allegation that the driver of the appellants’ vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence (see Russ v Investech Sec., supra; Vecchio v Hildebrand, supra; McGregor v Manzo, supra; McKeough v Rogak, supra; Geschwind v Hoffman, 285 AD2d 448, 449 [2001]; Colon v Cruz, 277 AD2d 195 [2000]; Levine v Taylor, 268 AD2d 566 [2000]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393-394 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Steinmetz v. Collison
The driver of a moving vehicle that strikes another vehicle in the rear has the burden of providing a non-negligent explanation for such a collision (see McGregor v Manzo, 295 AD2d 487 [2002); Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Scholze v. Washington
Defendants failed to rebut the presumption of negligence and thus failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Ruzycki, 301 AD2d at 50 ; Mascitti v Greene, 250 AD2d 821, 822 [1998]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393-394 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Comiskey v. Pisano
A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of liability against the moving vehicle and imposes a duty of explanation on its driver (see Kachuba v A & G Cleaning Serv., 273 AD2d 277 [2000]; Sekuler v Limnos Taxi, 264 AD2d 389 [1999]; Bando-Twomey v Richheimer, 229 AD2d 554, 555 [1996]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Velazquez v. Denton Limo, Inc.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the moving vehicle, requiring the operator of that vehicle to come forward with a non-negligent explanation for the accident (see Shamah v Richmond County Ambulance Serv., 279 AD2d 564, 565 [2001]; Power v Hupart, 260 AD2d 458 [1999]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635, 636 [1995]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Guzman v. Schiavone Construction Co.
That operator, being in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to reasonable cause, is obligated to explain how the accident occurred (see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gross v. Marc
A rear-end collision with a stopped automobile establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to explain how the accident occurred (see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]; Gambino v City of New York, 205 AD2d 583 [1994]; Benyarko v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 162 AD2d 572 [1990]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hart v. Town of North Castle
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle (see McGregor v Manzo, 295 AD2d 487 [2002]; Kosinski v Sayers, 294 AD2d 407, 408 [2002]; McKeough v Rogak, 288 AD2d 196, 197 [2001]; Garcia v Hazel, 287 AD2d 481, 482 [2001]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]; Pincus v Cohen, 198 AD2d 405, 408 [1993]; cf. Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Zanghi v. Doerfler
It is well settled that "a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle" ( Pitchure v Kandefer Plumbing & Heating , 273 AD2d 790, 790 [4th Dept 2000]; see Leal v Wolff , 224 AD2d 392 , 393 [2d Dept 1996]).
discussed
Cited "see"
TATE, FRANKLIN v. BROWN, TIMOTHY L.
It is well settled that “a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle” (Pitchure v Kandefer Plumbing & Heating, 273 AD2d 790, 790 [2000]; see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Taing v. Drewery
Even if the plaintiff did, in fact, come to a sudden stop, “vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her car and the car ahead” (Shamah v Richmond, County Ambulance Serv., 279 AD2d 564, 565 [2001], citing Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 394 [1996]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Taing v. Drewery
Even if the plaintiff did, in fact, come to a sudden stop, “vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her car and the car ahead” (Shamah v Richmond, County Ambulance Serv., 279 AD2d 564, 565 [2001], citing Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 394 [1996]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Shulga v. Ashcroft
“It is well established that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle . . . [and that, i]n order to rebut the presumption, the driver of the rear vehicle must submit a [nonnegligent] explanation for the collision” (Pitchure v Kandefer Plumbing & Heating, 273 AD2d 790, 790 [2000]; see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 [1996]; see also Suitor v Boivin, 219 AD2d 799, 800 [1995]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Mohan v. Puthumana
“A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the rearmost vehicle, imposing a duty of explanation on that operator to excuse the collision either through a mechanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead * * * or any other reasonable cause” (Filippazzo v Santiago, 277 AD2d 419 ; see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
Ruzycki v. Baker
“When a driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his or her vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle” (Power v Hupart, 260 AD2d 458, 458 ; see Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635, 637 ). “[A] rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle” (Pitchure v Kandefer Plumbing & Heating, 273 AD2d 790, 790 ; see Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392, 393 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
Santarpia v. First Fidelity Leasing Group, Inc.
It is well settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped automobile creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to explain how the accident occurred (see, Dwyer v Cohen, 262 AD2d 600 ; see generally, Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392 ).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Berkan v. Penske Truck Leasing Canada, Inc.
See also Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 393 , 638 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dept.1996).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lance C. Kramer
v.
Jerome Rosenthal
v.
Jerome Rosenthal
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Feb 5, 1996.
Cited by 17 opinions | Published
—In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant Jerome Rosenthal appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dye, J.), dated April 11, 1995, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against him.
Ordered that the order is reversed on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the defendant Jerome Rosenthal, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff, in opposition to a motion of a defendant physician for summary judgment, must submit evidentiary facts or materials to rebut a prima facie showing by the defendant that he was not negligent in treating the plaintiff so as to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320; Fileccia v Massapequa Gen. Hosp., 63 NY2d 639; Toledo v Ordway, 208 AD2d 518). General allegations of medical malpractice, merely conclusory in nature and unsupported by competent evidence tending to establish the essential elements of the claim, are insufficient to defeat a defendant physician’s entitlement to summary judgment (see, Alvarez v Prosepct Hosp., supra; Toledo v Ordway, supra). The requisite elements of proof in a medical malpractice action are a deviation or departure from accepted practice and evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury or damage (see, Bloom v City of New York, 202 AD2d 465).
The affidavit submitted by the appellant in support of his motion for summary judgment established a prima facie case that his treatment of the plaintiff was not negligent. In his affirmation in opposition to the motion, the plaintiff’s' medical expert failed to confirm the existence of the plaintiff’s alleged symptoms or that he had sustained damage or injury. The medical evidence submitted by the plaintiff therefore was insufficient to defeat the appellant’s entitlement to summary judgment. Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.