Schiller v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 225 A.D.2d 1053 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Schiller v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 225 A.D.2d 1053 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …although the adequacy of a warning generally is a question of fact, in a proper case the court can decide as a matter of law that there is no duty to warn or that the duty has been discharged as a matter of law at p. 1054 ✓
18 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fisher v. Multiquip, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
“Although the adequacy of a warning generally is a question of fact, in a proper case the court can decide as a matter of law that there is no duty to warn or that the duty has been discharged as a matter of law” (Schiller v National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see generally Theoharis v Pengate Handling Sys. of N.Y., 300 AD2d 884, 884-885 [2002]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fisher v. Multiquip, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
“Although the adequacy of a warning generally is a question of fact, in a proper case the court can decide as a matter of law that there is no duty to warn or that the duty has been discharged as a matter of law” (Schiller v National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see generally Theoharis v Pengate Handling Sys. of N.Y., 300 AD2d 884, 884-885 [2002]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fitzgerald v. Federal Signal Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Viewing the allegations in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every reasonable inference, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for strict products liability based on Federal’s alleged duty and failure to warn them, as the risk alleged is “open and obvious” and “readily apparent as a matter of common sense” (Liriano v Hobart Corp., 92 NY2d 232, 241-242 [1998]; see Warlikowski v Burger King Corp., 9 AD3d 360, 362 [2004]; Schiller v National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996]…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stalker v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Co., 20 AD3d 854, 855 [2005]; Schiller v National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996]; cf. Brady v Dunlop Tire Corp., 275 AD2d 503, 504 [2000]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lichtenstein v. Fantastic Merchandise Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Corp., 261 AD2d 589, 590 [1999]; Schiller v National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996]; see also Billiar v Minnesota Min. & Mfg.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vail v. KMart Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
While there can be no duty to warn of a known hazard (see Warlikowski v Burger King Corp., 9 AD3d 360, 362 [2004]; Payne v Quality Nozzle Co., 227 AD2d 603 [1996]; Banks v Makita, U.S.A., 226 AD2d 659, 660 [1996]; Schiller v National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996]; Van Buskirk v Migliorelli, 185 AD2d 587, 590 [1992]), since the plaintiff must establish that the failure to warn was a proximate cause of the injury (see Smith v Stark, 67 NY2d 693, 694 [1986]; Banks v Makita, U.S.A., supra at 660; Belling v Haugh's Pools, 126 AD2d 958 [1987]), the question in this case is not simply whe…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wesp v. Carl Zeiss, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
Plaintiff was aware of the specific hazard that caused her injury, i.e., the difficulty in moving the mounted surgical microscope, based on her previous experience in moving it; therefore, any warning would have been superfluous (see Schiller v National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996]; Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 AD2d 55, 65 [1980]; see also Warlikowski v Burger King Corp., 9 AD3d 360, 362 [2004]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clarke v. LR SYSTEMS
E.D.N.Y · 2002 · confidence medium
However, a court may dismiss a failure to warn claim as a matter of law if: (1) the defendant had no duty to warn because the hazard was patently dangerous or posed an open and obvious risk, see Burke, 252 F.3d at 137 ; Liriano, 92 N.Y.2d at 241 , 677 N.Y.S.2d at 769 , 700 N.E.2d 303 ; or (2) the plaintiff cannot prove causation because “the injured party was fully aware of the hazard through general knowledge, observation or common sense, or participated in the removal of a safety device whose purpose is obvious.” Liriano, 92 N.Y.2d at 241 , 677 N.Y.S.2d at 769 , 700 N.E.2d 303 ; see also…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kelly A. Schiller, Individually and as Natural Guardian of Molly B. Schiller, an Infant
v.
National Presto Industries, Inc.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Mar 8, 1996.
225 A.D.2d 1053
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

[*1054] Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of defendant National Presto Industries, Inc. (Presto), for summary judgment dismissing the failure to warn causes of action in the complaint. There is no duty "to warn a customer already aware — through common knowledge or learning — of a specific hazard” (Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 AD2d 55, 65; see also, Lonigro v TDC Elecs., 215 AD2d 534; Baptiste v Northfield, Foundry & Mach. Co., 184 AD2d 841, 843; Billsborrow v Dow Chem., 177 AD2d 7, 15, n; Lombard v Centrico, Inc., 161 AD2d 1071, 1072; Cramer v Toledo Scale Co., 158 AD2d 966, 967; Belling v Haugh’s Pools, 126 AD2d 958, 959, lv denied 70 NY2d 602, rearg dismissed 70 NY2d 748). Further, no duty to warn arises where the product-related danger is obvious, readily-discernible or apparent (see, Lonigro v TDC Elecs., supra; Allessandrini v Weyerhauser Co., 207 AD2d 996; Baptiste v Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., supra, at 843; Petrie v Goodrich Co., 175 AD2d 669). "Although the adequacy of a warning generally is a question of fact, 'in a proper case the court can decide as a matter of law that there is no duty to warn or that the duty has been discharged as a matter of law’ ” (Allessandrini v Weyerhauser Co., supra, at 996, quoting Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v Northern Propane Gas Co., supra, at 65; see also, Belling v Haugh’s Pools, supra, at 959; cf., Feiner v Calvin Klein, Ltd., 157 AD2d 501, 502).

From the deposition testimony of plaintiff, it is apparent that she was aware, through her own knowledge and experience, of the specific hazard that caused her daughter’s injuries. Moreover, the danger in allowing the cord of a hot deep fryer to dangle over the edge of a kitchen counter is readily apparent. Consequently, Presto had no duty to warn plaintiff of that danger. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Wolfgang, J.— Summary Judgment.) Present — Green, J. P., Lawton, Fallon, Doerr and Balio, JJ.