Levine v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 227 A.D.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Levine v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 227 A.D.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …set forth with particularity their efforts ... to secure the initiation of such action by the board or the reasons for not making such effort at p. 596 ⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2011 · …the question of whether the demand requirement ... has been met is a matter within the discretion of the court. ⚠ not in text
14 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Wynkoop
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
In order to adequately plead a shareholders’ derivative cause of action, in the complaint shareholders must “set forth with particularity [their] efforts ... to secure the initiation of such action by the board or the reasons for not making such effort” (Business Corporation Law § 626 [c]; see Walsh v Wwebnet, Inc., 116 AD3d 845, 846 [2014]; Malkinzon v Kordonsky, 56 AD3d 734 , 735 [2008]; Lewis v Akers, 227 AD2d 595, 596 [1996]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walsh v. Wwebnet, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 626 (c), in order to assert a derivative cause of action, in their complaint, shareholders must “set forth with particularity [their] efforts ... to secure the initiation of such action by the board or the reasons for not making such effort” (see Malkinzon v Kordonsky, 56 AD3d 734 , 735 [2008]; Lewis v Akers, 227 AD2d 595, 596 [1996]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walsh v. Wwebnet, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 626 (c), in order to assert a derivative cause of action, in their complaint, shareholders must “set forth with particularity [their] efforts ... to secure the initiation of such action by the board or the reasons for not making such effort” (see Malkinzon v Kordonsky, 56 AD3d 734 , 735 [2008]; Lewis v Akers, 227 AD2d 595, 596 [1996]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Donata Levine
v.
St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 28, 1996.
227 A.D.2d 595
Published

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Levine, J.), dated May 9, 1995, which denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate a prior order of the same court which dismissed the complaint on her default, and to restore the case to the trial calendar.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case we discern no improvident exercise of discretion in the Supreme Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion {see, Fennell v Mason, 204 AD2d 599; Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333). The proffered excuse of law office failure was not a reasonable excuse for the plaintiff’s default. Mangano, P. J., Thompson, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.