Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2005–2018 · 2 courts · …to establish a viable cause of action sounding in promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must allege (1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on the promise. ✓
48 citation events (39 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Edwards v. Prime Stor. (nyappterm, 2023-04-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. Prime Stor.
N.Y. App. Term. · 2023 · confidence medium
We further find that plaintiff's statement that defendant had promised to refrain from auctioning her property provided that she paid defendant "by Tuesday," that she relied on that promise and went to defendant's premises on Tuesday to pay the sum owed, and that as a result of defendant's earlier auction of her property she lost her possessions, demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action for promissory estoppel ( see Rogers v Town of Islip , 230 AD2d 727, 727 [1996]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. Syracuse University
N.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
Co., 669 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (2d Dept. 1998) (quoting Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D. 2d 727, 727 (2d Dept. 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mumin v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
unknown court · 2017 · confidence medium
(Mumin Compl, ¶¶ 100-102.) Claims based on promissory estoppel under New York law “must allege (1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on that promise.” Fleet Bank v. Pine Knoll Corp., 290 A.D.2d 792 , 736 N.Y.S.2d 737, 742 (2002) (quoting Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (1996)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Franklin v. Hafftka
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Co., 24 AD3d 425 [2005]; Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 727 [1996]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Estate of Hennel
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Petitioners invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel in order to do so, which requires “(1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on the promise” (Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 727 [1996]; see Clifford R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Estate of Hennel
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Petitioners invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel in order to do so, which requires “(1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on the promise” (Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 727 [1996]; see Clifford R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. Dantas
2d Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
“To establish a viable cause of action sounding in promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must allege,” among other elements, “a clear and unambiguous promise.” Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (2d Dep’t 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mendez v. Bank of America Home Loans Servicing, LP
E.D.N.Y · 2012 · confidence medium
Ventures I, LLC v. Eclipsys Solutions Corp., 23 A.D.3d 213 , 804 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303 (1st Dep’t 2005) (citing Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (2d Dep’t 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prospect Street Ventures I, LLC v. Eclipsys Solutions Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
Since the promissory estoppel claim is precluded by the terms of the letter, the rule that a detailed showing of the elements of promissory estoppel need not be shown to survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 728 [1996]) is irrelevant here; the deficiency is not in the completeness of the allegations, but in their contradiction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prospect Street Ventures I, LLC v. Eclipsys Solutions Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
Since the promissory estoppel claim is precluded by the terms of the letter, the rule that a detailed showing of the elements of promissory estoppel need not be shown to survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 728 [1996]) is irrelevant here; the deficiency is not in the completeness of the allegations, but in their contradiction.
cited Cited as authority (rule) National Mortgage Corp. v. Greenwich Capital Financial Products, Inc.
10th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir.2001); Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (N.Y.App.Div.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shapira v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · confidence medium
Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727, 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (2d Dept.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fleet Bank v. Pine Knoll Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2002 · confidence medium
“To establish a viable cause of action sounding in promissory estoppel, [the aggrieved party] must allege (1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on the promise * * *” (Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 727 [citation omitted]; see, Freedman & Son v A.I.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hyatt Corp. v. Women's International Bowling Congress, Inc.
W.D.N.Y. · 1999 · confidence medium
A cause of action sounding in promissory estoppel requires “ ‘(1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on the promise.’ ” Gurreri v. Associates Insurance Co., 248 A.D.2d 356 , 669 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (2d Dept.1998) (quoting Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (2d Dept.1996)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Russell v. Board of County Commissioners (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Okla. · 1997 · confidence medium
Co., 1978 OK 128 , 586 P.2d 726, 730 . [50] Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okl. 161 , 235 P. 502, 506 (1924); Bickerstaff v. Gregston, 1979 OK CIV APP 64 , 604 P.2d 382, 384 . [51] See, e.g., Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (1996); Weiper v. W.A.
discussed Cited "see" havePower, LLC v. General Electric Co. (2×)
D. Maryland · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rogers v. Town of Islip, 230 A.D.2d 727 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1996) (citing Ripple’s of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assocs., 88 A.D.2d 120, 122 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1982), lv. denied, 57 N.Y.2d 609 , 456 N.Y.S.2d 1026 , 442 N.E.2d 1277 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fenton v. Fenton
N.Y. App. Div. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
Furthermore, the mother’s cause of action based on promissory estoppel cannot be sustained since the father’s alleged promise, based upon his purported statement that she should let him know the cost of the wedding, is too ambiguous to convey the understanding that the father would reimburse the mother for any expenses she incurred for the wedding, and it was unreasonable for her to rely upon such a representation (see, Ripple’s of Clearview v Harvre Assocs., 88 AD2d 120, 122-123 ; see also, Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Rogers
v.
Town of Islip
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Aug 5, 1996.
230 A.D.2d 727
Bracken, Goldstein, McGinity, Santucci.
Cited by 33 opinions  |  Published

—In an action to recover damages for wrongful termination, the defendant Town of Islip appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Oshrin, J.), dated July 12,1995, as denied those branches of its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211, which were to dismiss the second and sixth causes of action of the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On July 16, 1993, the plaintiff John Rogers was dismissed by his employer, the defendant Town of Islip, allegedly in violation of Rogers’ considerable seniority rights. In this action, Rogers and his wife sought damages based upon, inter alia, promissory estoppel. The Town of Islip moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 for failure to state a cause of action.

The Supreme Court dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded a cause of action for promissory estoppel. We affirm.

To establish a viable cause of action sounding in promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must allege (1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and (3) an injury sustained in reliance on the promise (see, Ripple’s of Clearview v Le Havre Assocs., 88 AD2d 120, 122). The plaintiffs in this action alleged all of these elements, and at this stage of the proceedings, their allegations must be taken as true (see, Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391, 394). Although the plaintiffs will be[*728] required, at trial, to prove the specific details of each of the elements (see, Swerdloff v Mobil Oil Corp., 74 AD2d 258, 263), no such detailed showing is required to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211.

Since the claim sounding in promissory estoppel was adequately pleaded, the derivative claim on behalf of the plaintiff Barbara Rogers was also properly allowed to stand.

Bracken, J. P., Santucci, Goldstein and McGinity, JJ., concur.