Pastore v. Sabol, 230 A.D.2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). · Go Syfert
Pastore v. Sabol, 230 A.D.2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Markey v. Tietz (3×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
Thus, to "prevail[ ] in whole" under our application of the catalyst theory to the state EAJA, the party must only show that it received from the State all of the relief requested that could have been awarded in a final judgment on the merits or settlement in the party's favor ( compare Pastore v Sabol , 230 AD2d 835, 837 [2d Dept 1996]). [FN8] We recognize that reasons other than the strength of the party's challenge may impel the State to administratively reverse itself in the midst of litigation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Criss v. New York State Dept. of Health
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Second Department, in contrast, has consistently rejected application of the catalyst theory ( see Matter of Gonzalez v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision , 152 AD3d 680, 682-683 [2d Dept 2017]; Murrin , 303 AD2d at 477 ; Pastore v Sabol , 230 AD2d 835, 837 [2d Dept 1996]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gonzalez v. New York State Department of Corrections & Community Supervision
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the stipulation entered into between the parties on January 30, 2015, which was so-ordered by the court, did not reflect a material change in the legal relationship between the parties because the petitioner’s claims had already been rendered moot by Kaplan’s voluntary decision on December 30, 2014, to vacate her earlier decision removing the petitioner from the Nursery Program (see Murrin v Ford Motor Co., 303 AD2d 475 [2003]; Pastore v Sabol, 230 AD2d 835, 836 [1996]; see also Texas State Teachers Assn. v Garland Independent School Dist., 489 US…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert Pastore, and Marion Timmes, Intervenors-Respondents-Appellants
v.
Barbara J. Sabol, as Commissioner of New York City Department of Social Services, Appellants-Respondents
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Aug 19, 1996.
230 A.D.2d 835
Bracken, Goldstein, Krausman, Thompson.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published

—In an action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, (1) the defendants separately appeal, as limited by their briefs, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Posner, J.), dated May 23,1994, as (a) declared that Social Services Law § 133 requires that the State and City provide applicants for public assistance with temporary assistance to meet their immediate medical needs, and (b) directed the New York State Department of Social Services, inter alia, to promulgate regulations, or implement an administering policy which requires State and City agencies to provide applicants for public assistance, including Medicaid applicants, with preinvestigative temporary assistance to meet their immediate medical needs and to provide applicants with written notice of the availability of such preinvestigative assistance, (2) the plaintiff and plaintiffs-intervenors cross-appeal from so much of the same order and judgment as (a) permitted the New York State Department of Social Services to implement the court’s directives by nonregulatory means, and (b) denied their application for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to CPLR article 86, and (3) the defendant Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the same court, dated November 25, 1994, as, upon granting the motion of the plaintiff and the plaintiffsintervenors for reargument, awarded the plaintiff and the plaintiffs-intervenors attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to CPLR article 86. The appeal by the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services and the cross appeal by the plaintiff and the plaintiffs-intervenors from the order and judgment dated May 23, 1994, brings up for review so much of the order dated November 25, 1994, as, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination as directed the New York State Department of Social Services, inter alia, to promulgate regulations or implement an administering policy which requires State and City agencies, inter alia, to provide applicants for public assistance with preinvestigative temporary assistance to meet their immediate medical needs.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order and judgment dated May 23, 1994, as directed the New York State Department of Social Services, inter alia, to promulgate regulations, or implement an administering policy which requires[*836] State and City agencies to provide applicants for public assistance, including Medicaid applicants, with preinvestigative temporary assistance to meet their immediate medical needs and to provide applicants with written notice of availability of such preinvestigative assistance is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that portion of the order and judgment was superseded by the order dated November 25, 1994, made upon reargument; and it is further,

Ordered that the cross appeal by the plaintiff and the plaintiffs-intervenors from the order and judgment dated May 23, 1994, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as those portions of the order and judgment cross-appealed from were superseded by the order dated November 25, 1994, made upon reargument; and it is further,

Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed insofar as reviewed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and so much of the complaint as sought a declaration that Social Services Law § 133 requires that State and City agencies provide applicants for public assistance with temporary assistance to meet their immediate medical needs is dismissed as academic; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated November 25, 1994, is reversed insofar as appealed from and reviewed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, so much of the order and judgment dated May 23, 1994, as directed the New York State Department of Social Services, inter alia, to promulgate regulations or implement an administering policy which requires State and City agencies to provide applicants for public assistance, including Medicaid applicants, with preinvestigative temporary assistance to meet their immediate medical needs and to provide applicants with written notice of availability of such preinvestigative assistance, is vacated, and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety as academic.

The plaintiff and plaintiffs-intervenors contend that they are entitled to temporary assistance to meet their immediate medical needs pending the determination of their Medicaid applications pursuant to Social Services Law § 133. After the plaintiff commenced this action, he was found eligible to receive Medicaid retroactive to the date of his application. Similarly, after the plaintiffs-intervenors moved to intervene in this action, they were found eligible to receive Medicaid retroactive to the date of their applications. Because the plaintiff and plaintiffs-intervenors had received the relief requested, the Supreme Court should have dismissed this action as academic (see, Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 713).

[*837] Moreover, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff and the plaintiffs-intervenors’ application for attorneys’ fees pursuant to CPLR article 86, i.e., New York State Equal Access to Justice Act. Because this case should not have been decided on the merits, the plaintiff and the plaintiffsintervenors are not the prevailing party as the term is defined in CPLR 8602 (f). Accordingly, they are not entitled to attorneys’ fees (see, Matter of New York State Clinical Lab. Assn. v Kaladjian, 85 NY2d 346).

Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.