United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). · Go Syfert
United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
55 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Jalen McSmith (ca8, 2020-07-31)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 45 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Jalen McSmith (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the district court has wide latitude to weigh the 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Antony Sallis
8th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the district court has wide latitude to weigh the 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Donald Crane
8th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011). “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Tanner Halverson-Weese
8th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
But “[t]he district court has wide latitude to weigh the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Ballard, 872 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Malik Ross
8th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Derek Rogers
8th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert Barber, Jr.
8th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Shaun Short (2×)
8th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bernard Jackson
8th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Randall Comly
8th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ryan Manning
8th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Alejandro Acosta
8th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Clinton McDonald
8th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Further, while the district court gave considerable weight to McDonald’s criminal history and the need to deter criminal conduct, “[t]he district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009)). -3- Finally, McDonald asserts that his sentence yields sentencing disparities with the individuals who were with him in the vehicle during the high speed p…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Anthony Tobias-Haywood
8th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Glen Sedlacek
8th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Put differently, “[t]he district court has -4- wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rudolph George
8th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lekedric Davis
8th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Buck Otto White
8th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Anton Alexander Martynenko
8th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. -2- irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment." United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jamie Ballard
8th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Timothy Kirlin
8th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2005). “ lA district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.’” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mark David McGinley
8th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
McGinley’s “within-guidelines *456 sentence is presumptively reasonable on appeal.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Juan Hernandez-Martinez
8th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Additionally, Hernandez-Martinez’s sentence is within the guidelines range, so we accord it a presumption of reasonableness, see Bolden, 596 F.3d at 985 , and note that “[t]he district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jermaine Travis
8th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
A court abuses its discretion during sentencing if it “(1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cesar Gonzalez
8th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Romondo Jenkins
8th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
We have held consistently that a “district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an ap *1051 propriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2009)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jermaine Edison
8th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cecil Aldridge
8th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
We have carefully reviewed the record, see United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011) (reviewing district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion), and find the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors, see United States v. Blackmon, 662 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir.2011) (finding the district court’s § 3553(a) explanation was sufficient and no particular recitation was necessary), and did not impose an unreasonable sentence, see United States v. Petreikis, 551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.2009) (applying presumption of substantive reasonablen…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Romeo Geraci
8th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
United States v. Borro-meo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. William Wellington Williams
8th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
As we have consistently held, “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2009)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Donald Bleckler, Sr.
8th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
As we have often stated, “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) [sentencing] factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.2011) (quotations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joseph Young
8th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
A sentence within the guideline range is “presumptively reasonable on appeal,” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011), and district courts have “broad statutory authority” to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mark Shore
8th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
A "within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable on appeal,” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011), and Shores has not presented us with any reasons to deviate from this presumption.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Selvis Garcia-Alvaro (2×)
8th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Elodio-Benitez
8th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.2011) (quotation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mabie
8th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Roger Bates
8th Cir. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.2011) (“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.”).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Bruce Prevost
8th Cir. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Larry Phillips
8th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Phana Parsypo
8th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Hudgens
5th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Because the government had charged all of [the defendant’s] crimes in just one count, the statutory maximum was 30 years and that had the effect of reducing the guidelines range to 30 years as well.”); see also United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming a district court’s sentence for producing child pornography as substantively reasonable where the defendant argued the court gave too much weight to the uncharged abuse of other minors); cf. United States v. Rosales, 768 F. App’x 195 , 198 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court’s inquiries w…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Hudgens
5th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Because the government had charged all of [the defendant’s] crimes in just one count, the statutory maximum was 30 years and that had the effect of reducing the guidelines range to 30 years as well.”); see also United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming a district court’s sentence for producing child pornography as substantively reasonable where the defendant argued the court gave too much weight to the uncharged abuse of other minors); cf. United States v. Rosales, 768 F. App’x 195 , 198 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court’s inquiries w…
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Walter Roberts
8th Cir. · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756-57 (8th Cir.2011).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. John Perry
8th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.2011).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Brandon Davis
8th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for abuse of discretion, appellate court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error, and then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence); see also United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.2011) (district court has wide latitude in weighing 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors and in assigning some factors greater weight than others).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael Angelo BORROMEO, Defendant-Appellant
10-3229.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Sep 30, 2011.
657 F.3d 754
Katherine M. Menendez, AFPD, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant., Laura M. Provinzino, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.
Loken, Beam, Gruender.
Cited by 46 opinions  |  Published
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In February 2009, fifteen-year-old J.A.B. reported to school officials that she had been raped by Michael Borromeo, the leader of her scout troop who had lived with J.A.B.’s family during the summer of 2007. An investigation uncovered lascivious photographs of J.A.B. and her thirteen-year-old sister on Borromeo’s cell phone and computer and a pornographic video depicting J.A.B. and an adult male. The investigators learned that Borromeo had sexually abused J.A.B. since late 2007, abuse that included oral, vaginal, and anal sex. Borromeo admitted the accusations and was charged with seven counts of child pornography offenses. After Borromeo’s arrest, his twelve-year-old daughter, O.M.B., reported that he had sexually abused her regularly for six years, including vaginal and anal sex, and that she had been present when Borromeo had sex with J.A.B.

Borromeo pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The plea agreement included sentencing stipulations that produced an advisory guidelines range of 262-[*756] 327 months in prison but were not binding on the district court. The subsequent Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) applied a multiple victims upward adjustment and the offense level prescribed for repeat and dangerous sex offenders against minors, resulting in a recommended guidelines sentence of life in prison. At sentencing, Borromeo withdrew his objections to the PSR’s fact recitations, and neither party objected when the district court [1] adopted the guidelines determinations recommended in the PSR. This resulted in an advisory guidelines range of 360 months, the statutory maximum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e); U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(a).

Both parties urged the court to vary downward to the plea agreement range. The government urged a 327-month sentence, the top of that range; Borromeo urged 262 months, the bottom of that range. J.A.B. and members of her family opined in victim impact statements that life in prison was the only way to protect other children from Borromeo. The district court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, the guidelines sentence. Borromeo appeals, arguing the court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We review this issue under the abuse-of-discretion standard, “takfing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable on appeal. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). We affirm.

“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (quotation omitted). Borromeo does not argue that the district court failed to consider a relevant factor or gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor. Rather, he argues the court gave too much weight to the seriousness of his offense and the uncharged abuse of other minors, and too little weight to mitigating circumstances, namely, his unfortunate personal history and the fact that he did not distribute the child pornography.

At sentencing, the district court expressly considered the sentencing position memoranda and arguments presented by both parties, received victim impact statements, and then stated at length its reasons for the sentence imposed. The court described in detail why Borromeo was guilty of “criminal conduct of a severity that we don’t see very often,” making him “a danger to the community in a way that is extreme.” The court acknowledged that Borromeo had “a very difficult upbringing” in which he himself was victimized. “And it’s true, as your lawyer says, that victims often become perpetrators. But the cycle of violence has got to stop somewhere, and you created three more victims in this case.”

The court then considered Borromeo’s argument that the statutory maximum sentence was unwarranted because he did not share or distribute the pornographic images he produced. The court acknowledged that “the victimization would be much more severe” had the images been distributed but noted that this factor was “counter-balanced by the extreme harm[*757] and the fact that these victims are never, ever, ever going to recover.” The court concluded: “this is one of those cases where the statutory maximum is the right sentence for you.... I just don’t think anything less is going to protect the public or adequately punish you for these really extraordinarily egregious crimes.”

Having carefully considered the totality of the circumstances revealed by the sentencing record, we have no difficulty concluding that this is not the “unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence — whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range — as substantively unreasonable.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464 (quotation omitted). The district court considered all the mitigating circumstances urged by Borromeo and concluded, not unreasonably, that they were outweighed by the seriousness of the offense and the special relationships with the child victims that Borromeo had fostered and then abused. “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2009). The victim relationships that Borromeo manipulated, the severe danger he presents to the public, and the repetitive nature of his egregious crimes are “precisely the kind of defendant-specific determinations that are within the special competence of sentencing courts.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464 (quotation omitted). There was no abuse of the district court’s substantial sentencing discretion.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.