Gkanios v. Home Sav. of Am., 258 A.D.2d 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). · Go Syfert
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Gkanios v. Home Sav. of Am., 258 A.D.2d 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: People v. Valencia (nyappdiv, 2011-01-11)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Valencia
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in issuing an Allen charge (see Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]) to the jury (see Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, 63 NY2d 243, 251 [1984]; People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Francis
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
In assessing the trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion, this Court “should consider: (1) the length and complexity of the trial, (2) the length of the jury’s deliberations, (3) the extent and nature of communications between the trial court and the jury, and (4) the potential effects of requiring the jury to engage in further deliberations” (People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Coleman
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
In assessing the trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion, this Court “should consider: (1) the length and complexity of the trial, (2) the length of the jury’s deliberations, (3) the extent and nature of communications between the trial court and the jury, and (4) the potential effects of requiring the jury to engage in further deliberations” (People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Romgobind
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in accepting a partial verdict and allowing the jury to continue its deliberations (see People v Garner, 272 AD2d 873, 874 [2000]; People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Gause
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
In any event, even if we were to review it, we would conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of the broad discretion conferred by CPL 310.70 (1) (b) (see People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 930 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hill
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
Here, because there was a “manifest necessity” for a mistrial based upon the reported jury deadlock and the apparent fruitlessness of ordering further deliberations (United States v Perez, 9 Wheat [22 US] 579, 580), the court properly accepted a partial verdict and declared a mistrial with respect to the unresolved counts, and there was no violation of defendant’s right not to be twice placed in jeopardy (see People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 930 [1999]; People v Campbell, 203 AD2d 127 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 823 [1994]; see generally People v Baptiste, …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Rivera
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to accept a partial verdict (see People v Salemmo, 38 NY2d 357, 361 [1976]; People v Abreu, 184 AD2d 707, 710 [1992]; see also People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999]; People v Greenfield, 70 AD2d 662, 663 [1979]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Maria Gkanios, Also Known as Marie Gkanios
v.
Home Savings of America
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jan 19, 1999.
258 A.D.2d 602
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional[*603] distress, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Jiudice, J.), dated December 30, 1997, which granted the respective motions of the defendants Pamela M. Carroll, Paul F. Stockschlaeder, Stockschlaeder, McDonald & Sules, and Nicholas J. Boland for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

The plaintiff’s complaint is predicated upon a claim that the respondents Pamela M. Carroll, Paul F. Stockschlaeder, Stockschlaeder, McDonald & Sules, and Nicholas J. Boland (hereinafter the respondents), lawyers who represented the respondent bank in an unrelated action to foreclose on a mortgage executed by the plaintiff, obtained a judgment in favor of the bank by, inter alia, fraud, perjury, and conspiracy. The Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s first, third, and fourth causes of action, which sounded in malicious prosecution. The judgment which was rendered in favor of the bank constitutes prima facie evidence that the respondents, as counsel for the bank, had cause for bringing the foreclosure action (see, Scomello v Caronia, 232 AD2d 625; Lawson v New York City Hous. Auth., 223 AD2d 532; Campo v Wolosin, 211 AD2d 660; Whitmore v City of New York, 80 AD2d 638; Caminito v City of New York, 25 AD2d 848, 849, affd 19 NY2d 931). The plaintiff’s conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations were insufficient to rebut this presumption or to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231).

Furthermore, the respondents established a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment with- respect to the second cause of action, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, as their conduct was not extreme and outrageous (see, Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115, 121; Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135; Nader v General Motors Corp., 25 NY2d 560).

We have not considered those issues raised by the plaintiff which are not properly before the Court on this appeal. Miller, J. P., Thompson, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.