People v. Baez, 262 A.D.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). · Go Syfert
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People v. Baez, 262 A.D.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2011–2013 · …does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated at p. 131 ⚠ not in text
36 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Dissolution of Therm, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as limited the first and second causes of action to events occurring on or after November 26, 2007, and, as so modified, affirmed. * The cause of action for common-law dissolution is premised, in part, upon allegations of various fiduciary breaches (see generally Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131-132 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loeuis v. Grushin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated (see Incorporated Vil. of Muttontown v Ryba, 121 AD3d 757, 759 [2014]; Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. Consolidated Risk Services, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Plaintiff maintains that the court misapplied the repudiation rule, which provides that “the applicable statutory period . . . does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” (Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1999]; see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 201-202 [2008]; Matter of Baird, 58 AD3d 958, 959 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Incorporated Village of Muttontown v. Ryba
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
However, the limitations period for a cause of action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty relationship does not begin to run “until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” (Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1999]; see Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80 [1972]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rye Police Ass'n v. Chittenden
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
To avoid any misinterpretation of this ruling, this court’s holding that the conversion cause of action is partially time-barred should not be viewed as limiting the temporal scope of the plaintiffs cause of action for an accounting, which is timely in all respects (see Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 132 [1st Dept 1999] [“since the statutory period was tolled between the alleged fiduciary misconduct and August 29, 1990”—the last date that the defendants served as officers of the plaintiff not-for-profit corporation—“the alleged misconduct antedating August 29…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. Day
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The statute of limitations “does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” (Westchester Religious Inst, v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1st Dept 1999] [an action seeking an accounting]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. Day
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The statute of limitations “does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” (Westchester Religious Inst, v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1st Dept 1999] [an action seeking an accounting]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Knobel v. Shaw
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Indeed, the statute of limitations against a fiduciary for an accounting “does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” (Wes tchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1999]; see also Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80 [1972]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ben
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
The statute of limitations is tolled “until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” (Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Evangelista v. Mattone
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Claims such as those at issue here accrue when “there is either an open repudiation of the fiduciary’s obligation or a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account” (Matter of Meyer, 303 AD2d 682, 683 [2003]; see Matter of Rodken, 270 AD2d 784, 785 [2000]; Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131-132 [1999]; see also Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Elliott v. Qwest Communications Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
By arguing that his unjust enrichment claim did not accrue until his 2002 demand was refused, 3 plaintiff is, in effect, seeking to avail himself of the unique tolling provisions applicable to claims arising out of a fiduciary relationship which do not accrue “until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation” (Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131 [1999]).
discussed Cited "see" Matter of George
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
This rule tolls [*3]the statute of limitations "for all misconduct committed by the fiduciary prior to repudiation of its obligation or termination of the [fiduciary] relationship" ( New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v Consolidated Risk Servs., Inc. , 125 AD3d 1250, 1253 [2015] [emphasis omitted]; see Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman , 262 AD2d 131, 131-132 [1999]) since, absent either repudiation or removal, the aggrieved parties "were entitled to assume that the [fiduciary] would perform his [or her fiduciary] responsibilities" ( Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP , 11 NY…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York
v.
Jose Baez
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jun 15, 1999.
262 A.D.2d 131
Published

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County. (Marcy Kahn, J., at suppression hearing; Bonnie Wittner, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered April 25, 1996, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 6 to 12 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied. We see no basis to disturb the hearing court’s credibility determinations. The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. We likewise see no reason to disturb the jury’s credibility determinations. Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Tom, Rubin, Saxe and Buckley, JJ.