Topper v. Topper, 271 A.D.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). · Go Syfert
Topper v. Topper, 271 A.D.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Kaur v. Singh (nyappdiv, 2010-05-25)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kaur v. Singh
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Contrary to the appellant’s contention, it was not incumbent upon the Family Court to specify the particular family offense, i.e., what degree of menacing his acts constituted, where it was clear from the record that his acts constituted menacing in the third degree (see Matter of Abbott v Burnes, 27 AD3d 555 [2006]; Matter of Topper v Topper, 271 AD2d 613, 613-614 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Creighton v. Whitmore
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Contrary to the appellant’s contention, it is not incumbent upon the Family Court to specify in the protective order the particular family offense he committed where it is clear from the allegations in the petition and the evidence adduced at the hearing (see Matter of Abbott v Burnes, 27 AD3d 555 [2006]; Matter of Topper v Topper, 271 AD2d 613, 613-614 [2000]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Ginger Topper
v.
Robert Topper
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 17, 2000.
271 A.D.2d 613
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

—In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the appeal is from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (McNulty, J.), entered May 28, 1999, which, after a hearing, directed the husband to refrain from any acts of physical violence toward the wife.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Family Court’s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight (see, Matter of Hallissey v Hallissey, 261 AD2d 544; Matter of Dendy v Bonelli, 260 AD2d 633). The record supports the Family Court’s determination that, based on a preponderance of the credible evidence, the husband committed a family offense on March 18, 1999. The evidence, including the husband’s admission of physical contact with the wife, established the elements of harassment in the second degree (see, Penal Law § 240.26; Family Ct Act § 812 [1]). The husband’s contention that the Family Court’s fact-finding decision failed to adequately specify the particular[*614] family offense under Family Court Act § 812 (1) that he had committed is without merit. It was clear at the hearing that he was charged with conduct constituting harassment in the second degree.

The husband’s remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.