Yearusskaya v. New York City Transit Auth., 279 A.D.2d 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). · Go Syfert
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Yearusskaya v. New York City Transit Auth., 279 A.D.2d 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Mateo (nyappdiv, 2017-03-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Mateo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we vacate the defendant’s conviction of kidnapping in the second degree and the sentence imposed thereon, and dismiss that count of the indictment (see People v Garnes, 127 AD3d 1104, 1105 [2015]; People v McFarlane, 106 AD3d 836 [2013]; People v Alston, 279 AD2d 583, 584 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Garnes
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Under the circumstances of this case, the merger doctrine precludes the convictions of kidnapping in the second degree because the restraint of the complainants was essentially incidental to and inseparable from the count of burglary of which the defendant was convicted (see People v Cain, 76 NY2d 119, 124-125 [1990]; People v Mc-Farlane, 106 AD3d 836 [2013]; People v Alston, 279 AD2d 583, 584 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. McFarlane
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
However, upon exercising our interest of justice jurisdiction, we conclude that the merger doctrine precludes the conviction of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree because the restraint of the complainant was essentially incidental to and inseparable from the robbery (see People v Cain, 76 NY2d 119, 124-125 [1990]; People v Alston, 279 AD2d 583, 584 [2001]; People v Androvett, 135 AD2d 640, 642 [1987]; cf. People v McLeod, 50 AD3d 826, 826 [2008]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. McFarlane
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
However, upon exercising our interest of justice jurisdiction, we conclude that the merger doctrine precludes the conviction of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree because the restraint of the complainant was essentially incidental to and inseparable from the robbery (see People v Cain, 76 NY2d 119, 124-125 [1990]; People v Alston, 279 AD2d 583, 584 [2001]; People v Androvett, 135 AD2d 640, 642 [1987]; cf. People v McLeod, 50 AD3d 826, 826 [2008]).
discussed Cited "see" Green v. GRONEMAN
E.D.N.Y · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Alston, 279 A.D.2d 583, 584 , 719 N.Y.S.2d 679 (2d Cir.2001) (upholding probable cause finding where the evidence established the reliability of the witness and his information and the defendant fit the description of one of the perpetrators including the fact that he was in a white truck with the word “Salem” on its sides); see also People v. Douglas, 138 A.D.2d 731 , 526 N.Y.S.2d 544 (2d Dep’t 1988) (“ ‘[A]s a general rule, information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of the commission of a specific crime is sufficient to provide the polic…
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In the Matter of Yeva Yearusskaya
v.
New York City Transit Authority
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jan 22, 2001.
279 A.D.2d 583
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated December 10, 1999, which denied the application.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petitioner’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, as the petitioner did not provide any reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]; [5]). The petitioner failed to demonstrate that she was incapacitated to such an extent that she was unable to comply with the statutory notice of claim requirement (see, Figueroa v City of New York, 92 AD2d 908, 909). Although a police report was filed regarding the accident, it did not constitute actual notice to the respondent of the essential facts constituting the petitioner’s claim (see, Matter of Dominguez v City of New York, 272 AD2d 326; Matter of Deegan v City of New York, 227 AD2d 620). Finally, the passage of over five months between the date of the petitioner’s accident and her application to serve a late notice of claim prejudiced the respondent because “it had no opportunity to investigate the transitory condition that allegedly precipitated the claimant’s fall” (Doherty v City of New York, 251 AD2d 368, 369). O’Brien, J. P., Krausman, Goldstein and Schmidt, JJ., concur.