Jones v. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 283 A.D.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). · Go Syfert
Jones v. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 283 A.D.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Miller v. Department of Corr. & Community Supervision
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
Contrary to petitioner's contention, this language provides a person of ordinary intelligence with sufficient notice that petitioner's behavior in this matter constitutes conduct proscribed by the rule ( see Matter of McLean v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision , 132 AD3d 1041, 1042 [3d Dept 2015], appeal dismissed 26 NY3d 1082 [2016]; Matter of Henry v Fischer , 98 AD3d 1157 , 1158 [3d Dept 2012]; Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y. , 283 AD2d 805, 805 [3d Dept 2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Smith v. Annucci
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
Finally, to the extent that petitioner argues, for the first time on appeal, that the loss of good time assessed as part of the penalty was not restored to him following his completion of the residential rehabilitation unit programs ( see Correction Law § 137 [m] [iv]), he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and judicial review of the issue is precluded ( see Matter of Derby v Annucci , 227 AD3d 1413 , 1415 [4th Dept 2024]; Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y. , 283 AD2d 805, 806 [3d Dept 2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of McLean v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Likewise, we reject petitioner’s assertion that disciplinary rule 103.20 is unconstitutionally vague considering that the rule contains language providing a person of ordinary intelligence with notice that posting information on a website seeking donations to a legal defense fund constitutes conduct proscribed by the rule (see Matter of Brown v Selsky, 5 AD3d 905, 906 [2004]; Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y., 283 AD2d 805, 805 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marhone v. LaValley
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The misbehavior report, the letter itself, and petitioner’s admission that he authored it provide substantial evidence supporting that part of the determination of guilt (see Matter of Sloane v McKinney, 48 AD3d 850, 850 [2008]; Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y., 283 AD2d 805, 805 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marhone v. LaValley
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The misbehavior report, the letter itself, and petitioner’s admission that he authored it provide substantial evidence supporting that part of the determination of guilt (see Matter of Sloane v McKinney, 48 AD3d 850, 850 [2008]; Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y., 283 AD2d 805, 805 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Koehl v. Fischer
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the content of the letter—which contains violent, threatening and obscene language directed at the recipient and his family—does not constitute protected speech under the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution (see Matter of Reid v Selsky, 43 AD3d 1258, 1258-1259 [2007]; Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y., 283 AD2d 805, 805-806 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reid v. Selsky
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the offending references were not protected expressions under the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution (see Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y., 283 AD2d 805, 805-806 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. Selsky
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
The misbehavior report, together with the letter and petitioner’s admission that he authored the letter, provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt (see Matter of Alston v Goord, 25 AD3d 852, 852 [2006]; Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y., 283 AD2d 805, 805 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Selsky
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
Insofar as the above rules are sufficiently particular to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with notice that engaging in a physical altercation with another inmate is proscribed conduct (see Matter of Jones v Department of Correctional Servs. of State of N.Y., 283 AD2d 805, 805 [2001]; Matter of Di Rose v New York State Dept. of Correction, 228 AD2d 868, 868 [1996]), we find petitioner’s contentions to be unavailing.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Charles Jones
v.
Department of Correctional Services of the State of New York
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 17, 2001.
283 A.D.2d 805
Peters.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
—Peters, J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Superintendent of Ogdensberg Correctional Facility which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

While incarcerated at a State correctional facility, petitioner mailed letters to two Justices of the First Department containing insolent and abusive language. Following a tier II hearing, he was found guilty of violating the prison disciplinary rule prohibiting inmates from engaging in harassment. The sole penalty was counseling and a reprimand. This CPLR article 78 proceeding was commenced to challenge, inter alia, the determination rendered.

The misbehavior report and letters received into evidence at the hearing, together with petitioner’s admission that he authored the letters, provide substantial evidence of his guilt (see, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez v Goord, 261 AD2d 740, 741, lv denied 93 NY2d 818). Petitioner’s assertion that the disciplinary rule governing harassment is unconstitutionally vague is unavailing. Disciplinary rule 107.11 (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [8] [ii]) states that “[finmates shall not harass employees or any other persons verbally or in writing. This includes, but is not limited to, using insolent, abusive, or obscene language or gestures, or writing or otherwise communicating messages of a personal nature to employees or volunteers.” In our view, this language provides a person of ordinary intelligence with sufficient notice that sending threatening letters to judges will constitute conduct proscribed by the rule (see, Matter of Di Rose v New York State Dept. of Correction, 228 AD2d 868; Matter of Hobson v Coughlin, 137 AD2d 940). Petitioner’s further contention that his letters constituted protected expression under the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution is also[*806] unpersuasive (see, Matter of Amaker v Senkowski, 271 AD2d 772, lv denied 95 NY2d 760).

As to the allegations first raised by petitioner in this proceeding that he was denied proper dental treatment, his failure to have first exhausted available administrative remedies precludes our review (see, Matter of Hakeem v Wong, 223 AD2d 765, 765-766, lv denied 88 NY2d 802).

Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been examined and found to be either unpreserved or lacking in merit.

Cardona, P. J., Crew III, Spain and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.