¹ Previous Judge’s Bias or Conflict First, Michael argues the previous trial court judge was biased against him, should have recused himself, and the previous judge’s errors prevented Michael from having a fair and unbiased judicial proceeding. Without question, Michael had a right to trial by a fair and impartial jurist, see Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. 2006); Markowitz v. Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19, but he also had to properly present his issues for review. - 12 - 04-19-00736-CV In his complaints, Michael cites to six volumes of the reporter’s record in their entireties, but he does not identify any specific ruling or rulings that demonstrate the trial court’s bias, and we will not—and may not—scour multiple volumes of the record in search of some ruling that might support Michael’s due process complaints. See Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“It would be inappropriate for this court to speculate as to what appellant may have intended to raise as an error by the trial court on appeal. To do so would force this court to stray from our role as a neutral adjudicator and become an advocate for appellant.” (citation omitted)). It was Michael’s burden to identify to this court the trial court’s specific rulings which he claims were erroneous, but he has not. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Canton-Carter, 271 S.W.3d at 931; cf. Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d at 87 (“Only in the rarest circumstances are judicial rulings demonstrative of the degree of favoritism or antagonism required to show that a fair and impartial trial is impossible.”). Nor does Michael identify any motion to recuse that he presented that was improperly denied. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a (recusal); 18b (grounds for recusal); Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d at 86–88. Michael’s brief failed to adequately present these points, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), and he failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review, see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 294 (Tex. 2021) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)) (“[W]ith limited exceptions, a party cannot obtain reversal of a trial court’s judgment on appeal based on an error that was never raised in the trial court.”).

² Lead Attorney’s Illness Second, Michael asserts that his lead attorney’s physical and mental illnesses prevented him from “actively participating in the litigation process,” appearing for hearings, timely responding to discovery, and developing Michael’s case. - 13 - 04-19-00736-CV It is undisputed that this lead attorney, now deceased, suffered periods of physical and mental illness during the years he represented Michael. But the record also conclusively establishes that at other times during his representation, this lead attorney actively participated in the litigation process including appearing for hearings, responding to discovery, preparing trial exhibits, and serving as lead counsel throughout trial. Further, in some of the pretrial hearings, throughout trial, and in post-trial hearings, other counsel assisted this lead attorney. Assuming without deciding that Michael’s brief adequately presented these points, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), we nevertheless conclude that Michael has not shown how his once lead attorney’s intermittent periods of illness denied Michael the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 136 S.W.3d at 658; Perry, 67 S.W.3d at 92.

³ Inadequate Time to Prepare Third, Michael argues that the trial court refused to allow co-counsel Christopher J. Byrd adequate time to prepare for trial. The record shows Mr. Byrd entered an appearance in the case almost six weeks before trial, but he asked that the matter be continued for a period of six months—to conclude a pending guardianship case pertaining to Robyn. The trial was not continued, and on the first day of trial, Michael did not move for a continuance. To the contrary, the lead attorney, with Mr. Byrd present, announced ready for trial. On this point, Michael failed to preserve his claim of error, and he “cannot obtain reversal of [the] trial court’s judgment on appeal based on an error that [he] never raised in the trial court.” See In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 294 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)). - 14 - 04-19-00736-CV

⁴ Applicable Law “A claim for reimbursement is an equitable claim arising upon dissolution of a marriage when funds from one marital estate have been expended to benefit another marital estate.” Roberts v. Roberts, 402 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982)). “The party claiming the right of reimbursement has the burden of pleading and proving that the expenditures and improvements were made and that they are reimbursable.” Hinton v. Burns, 433 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (quoting Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459). “The degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate property is clear and convincing evidence.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003; accord Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011). “Thus, a spouse making a claim for reimbursement on behalf of a separate estate must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the funds expended on behalf of the community estate were separate funds.” Hinton, 433 S.W.3d at 196; accord Henry v. Henry, 48 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Further, “[t]he rule of reimbursement is purely an equitable one.” Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 458; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402 (“The court shall resolve a claim for reimbursement by using equitable principles . . . .”). In dividing a community estate, “[c]ourts apply equitable - 19 - 04-19-00736-CV principles to determine whether to recognize the claim for reimbursement and to order a division of the claim for reimbursement, if appropriate, in a manner the court considers just and right.” Chavez v. Chavez, 269 S.W.3d 763, 767–68 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.007 (“Disposition of Claim for Reimbursement”)). “The discretion to be exercised in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is equally as broad as that discretion subsequently exercised by the trial court in making a ‘just and right’ division of the community property.” Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988); accord Chavez, 269 S.W.3d at 768; see Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459 (“Reimbursement is not available as a matter of law, but [it] lies within the discretion of the court.”).

⁵ Disposition of Michael’s Reimbursement Claims The record shows that about eleven months before trial, the trial court struck Michael’s reimbursement claims as a sanction. However, even if such a pretrial sanction was error, the error was harmless because Michael’s reimbursement claims were tried. a. Due Process Complaint The record also shows that Michael received notice of the trial setting, and as the trial on the merits began, Michael announced ready and deferred his opening statement. Thereafter, Robyn gave her opening statement, and testimony began. See Joseph v. Jack, 624 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Generally, the right to be heard includes the rights to a full and fair hearing before a court with jurisdiction, to introduce evidence and examine witnesses, and to have judgment rendered only after a trial on the merits.” (citing Soefje v. Jones, 270 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.))). Over Robyn’s objections, the trial court admitted Davidson’s summary of Michael’s reimbursement claims, which effectively granted Michael’s previous motion to reconsider the sanctions order. The trial court then heard testimony elicited from Davidson by Michael to support - 20 - 04-19-00736-CV Michael’s reimbursement claims, including Davidson’s opinion of the nature of a $1,050,000 capital contribution or loan, about which Robyn had earlier questioned Davidson. Cf. id. Because the record establishes that the merits of Michael’s reimbursement claims were presented to, and heard by, a court of proper jurisdiction where he introduced evidence and examined witnesses, see Soefje, 270 S.W.3d at 625, we conclude that Michael was not denied due process of law with respect to his reimbursement claims. See Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 136 S.W.3d at 658; Perry, 67 S.W.3d at 92. b. Evidence for Reimbursement Claims In evaluating the evidence and the testimony, the trial court was the factfinder, see Matter of Marriage of Thrash, 605 S.W.3d 224, 229 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005)), and its findings are subject to our review, Monroe v. Monroe, 358 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). Having reviewed the evidence, we conclude that it does not conclusively establish Michael’s claims, nor is the contrary evidence so strong that the trial court’s finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 232 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied); Gardner v. Gardner, 229 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). We also conclude that the trial court could have found that Michael did not meet his evidentiary burden to prove his reimbursement claims. See Hinton, 433 S.W.3d at 196; Henry, 48 S.W.3d at 477. c. Other Complaints Further, even if the trial court had found that Michael met the evidentiary burden for his reimbursement claims, it was still within the trial court’s broad discretion to not award Michael his claimed amount based on the trial court’s determination of a just and right division of the community estate. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402 (requiring a reimbursement claim to be - 21 - 04-19-00736-CV resolved using equitable principles); id. § 7.007 (authorizing the trial court to divide a reimbursement claim “in a manner the court considers just and right”); Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 198 (trial court’s broad discretion); Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459. And finally, although Michael’s reimbursement claims were not awarded, they were adjudicated: The final decree orders “that all relief requested in this case and not expressly granted is denied.” See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex. 2001). We overrule Michael’s complaints about his reimbursement claims. B. Attorney’s, Expert’s Fees In the second part of his second issue, Michael argues that the trial court had no statutory authority to order him to pay Robyn’s pretrial attorney’s fees—which he did not pay—and the final decree’s order for him to pay Robyn’s attorney’s fees and the fee for her accountant expert are, in effect, punitive and excessive sanctions. We disagree with Michael’s view. 1. Applicable Law “[T]he trial court [has discretion] in determining the proper division of the community estate of the parties . . . . The attorney’s fee is but a factor to be considered by the court in making an equitable division of the estate, considering the conditions and needs of the parties and all of the surrounding circumstances.” Tedder v. Gardner Aldrich, LLP, 421 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Carle v. Carle, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (Tex. 1950)); accord Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981) (also quoting Carle). 2. Fees Award as Part of Just and Right Division In the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce, under the heading “Debts to Respondent from Prior Court Orders,” the decree states that “prior rulings of the Court must be enforced and imposed upon [Michael] as final orders in this Final Decree of Divorce.” The decree then orders Michael - 22 - 04-19-00736-CV to pay Robyn’s attorneys $96,800 in attorney’s fees and Robyn’s accountant expert $66,000 for his fee. Michael argues these awards are punitive and excessive sanctions, but the final decree does not state that these fees were awarded as sanctions; it refers to them as debts from prior court orders. In prior court orders, the trial court ordered Michael to pay Robyn’s interim attorney’s fees and expert fees—based on Robyn’s assertion that she was “not in control of sufficient community assets to pay attorney’s fees and anticipated expenses.” Despite Robyn’s requests and the trial court’s orders, Michael did not pay the fees as ordered. Thus, when the trial court rendered its final decree to divide the community estate, it had discretion to award Robyn’s expert’s and attorney’s fees as part of a just and right division. See Tedder, 421 S.W.3d at 656; Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we overrule Michael’s attorney’s and expert’s fees complaints. MICHAEL’S THIRD ISSUE: DIVISION NOT JUST AND RIGHT In his third issue, Michael argues the trial court’s division of the community estate was not just and right, but he failed to meet his burden to show the trial court abused its discretion. A. Challenging, Reviewing Just and Right Division “The trial court has wide discretion in dividing the estate of the parties and that division should be corrected on appeal only when an abuse of discretion has been shown.” Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698; accord Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. To demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion, “[t]he party attacking the property division bears the heavy burden of showing that the trial court’s property division was - 23 - 04-19-00736-CV not just and right.” Walter v. Walter, 127 S.W.3d 396, 398 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.); accord Pletcher v. Goetz, 9 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). In our review of the division, “[w]e must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s proper exercise of its discretion in dividing marital property.” Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (citing Pletcher, 9 S.W.3d at 446). B. Michael’s Arguments Michael first complains that the trial court created a “double recovery” for Robyn because it awarded Robyn (1) “half of the funds used to acquire the Ohio Development option [and] half of the option itself,” and (2) “half of the funds used to acquire the house . . . at 127 Cibolo Basin [and] half of the interest in the house itself.” Michael next complains that the trial court made a disproportionate award by awarding Robyn (1) 100% ownership of a Mercedes Benz automobile and the marital home and (2) 50% ownership in approximately 11.47 acres in Tapatio Springs and the loan proceeds from Amboy Bank, but assigning all the corresponding debt to Michael, except for Robyn’s one-half of the mortgage on the marital home. Finally, Michael complains that the trial court exacerbated the disproportionate award by awarding Robyn an amount equal to half of the attorney’s fees Michael incurred for the divorce. C. Division Within Discretion Michael’s “heavy burden” is to show the division was not just and right, see Walter, 127 S.W.3d at 398; Pletcher, 9 S.W.3d at 446; merely showing that the property division was disproportionate is not enough. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (just and right division); Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 588 (recognizing that the “[just and right] standard may at times lead to a disproportionate division of assets and liabilities of the parties, depending on the circumstances that courts may consider in refusing to divide the marital estate equally”). - 24 - 04-19-00736-CV Michael’s brief includes some generalized statements of the law about dividing community property and disproportionate divisions, but he does not present any cases to show how the overall division was not just and right given the facts in this case—including his uncontroverted net worth of more than three times the value of the entire community estate, the disparities of their respective incomes and earning capacities, and other relevant circumstances. Cf. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 588; Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698–99. Given that “[w]e must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s proper exercise of its discretion in dividing marital property,” Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 610, we cannot conclude that Michael met his burden to show the trial court’s division was an abuse of discretion, see Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 588–89; Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698–99. We overrule Michael’s third issue. MICHAEL’S FOURTH ISSUE: PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATION In his fourth issue, Michael argues the trial court erred in dividing property owned by BGS Realty; Shalit-BHL, LLC; and other entities. A. BGS Realty Property In his first subissue, Michael repeats his complaint that the trial court divided BGS Realty partnership property, but we have already considered and rejected this argument. As we noted in our disposition of the last part of Michael’s first issue, the trial court had authority to divide the 62.5% community property interest in the partnership. See, e.g., Lifshutz v. Lifshutz, 61 S.W.3d 511, 518 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). And we construed the decree to divide the 62.5% community property interest in the partnership, not the partnership property itself. See Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003). - 25 - 04-19-00736-CV B. Shalit-BHL, LLC Property In his second subissue, Michael argues that the trial court erred when it awarded Robyn one-half of 62.5% of the $776,000 because (1) those funds belonged to Shalit-BHL, LLC (BHL), which was 99% Michael’s separate property and 1% Robyn’s separate property, and (2) the only evidence presented at trial was that the funds belonged to BHL. As Michael asserts, the record establishes that Shalit-BHL, LLC was 99% Michael’s separate property and 1% Robyn’s separate property. However, Michael’s assertion that the $776,000 belonged to BHL is not supported by the record. Specifically, Michael cites to testimony by David Owens, Robyn’s expert witness CPA, and to Owens’s final report. In his final report, Owens shows the $776,000 as “[u]nlocated sales proceeds” from the sale of the 61.23-acre tract. In his testimony, Owens stated that “we haven’t had an accounting for this $776,000, and we feel that the community is owed that.” Thus, the evidence contradicts Michael’s assertion that the $776,000 belonged to BHL. Further, contrary to Michael’s assertion that the trial court divided BHL’s assets, the trial court did not find that the $776,000 belonged to BHL, and the final decree’s only mention of BHL is to confirm Robyn’s 1% separate property interest in it. C. Other Entities’ Assets In his third subissue, Michael argues that the trial court erred in dividing assets belonging to thirteen other family-owned business entities, including partnerships and LLCs. He insists “that instead of making a determination of the marital estate’s ownership in each entity and then dividing the same, the trial court made an award of the entity’s assets directly.” We disagree. To begin, Michael does not identify any other entity’s asset that the final decree directly awards: His blanket assertion lacks even a single specific example. Cf. King v. Wells Fargo Bank, - 26 - 04-19-00736-CV N.A., 205 S.W.3d 731, 734–35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (noting that appellants had “the burden of directing us to the evidence in the record that supports their contentions”). Next, the decree does exactly what Michael argues it should have done. For each entity, the decree states the community property interest in that entity, and then it awards Robyn and Michael each “a one-half (50%) interest” in the community property interest in that entity. Michael’s argument on this subissue, if not waived, is unavailing. Having considered each of its subissues, we overrule Michael’s fourth issue. MICHAEL’S FIFTH ISSUE: DIVIDING SEPARATE PROPERTY In his fifth issue, Michael argues the trial court erred when it implicitly mischaracterized Kimberly Investment Company, LLC as community property and then divided it between him and Robyn. We agree. On the fourth day of trial, the parties agreed to offer “evidence to speed things up . . . to use as a summary to try to facilitate the Court’s review of different critical issues in the case.” One of the agreed exhibits was Respondent’s Exhibit No. 35 (RX-35). RX-35, the agreed summary, shows Kimberly Investment Company, LLC as 99% Michael’s separate property and 1% Robyn’s separate property. RX-35 is conclusive evidence of the separate property character of Kimberly Investment Company, LLC, and the trial court erred in awarding Michael and Robyn “a one-half (50%) interest in [Kimberly Investment Company, LLC].” However, as we explained in addressing Robyn’s first issue, we are already remanding “the entire case to the trial court for a just and right division based upon the correct characterization of the property” because the mischaracterization of the two tracts is one “of such magnitude that it affects the just and right division of the community estate.” See Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 617; see also Monroe v. Monroe, 358 S.W.3d 711, 718 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); Garza v. - 27 - 04-19-00736-CV Garza, 217 S.W.3d 538, 549 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Thus, in making a new division, the trial court must use the correct characterizations, including Michael’s and Robyn’s separate property interests in Kimberly Investment Company, LLC. See Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 617; see also Garza, 217 S.W.3d at 549. We sustain Michael’s fifth issue. MICHAEL’S SIXTH ISSUE: SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE In his sixth and final issue, Michael argues the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Robyn spousal maintenance. A. Parties’ Arguments Michael contends that the “[trial] court did not make findings in either the Decree or its Findings of Fact . . . which support the award of court-ordered maintenance, as required by Texas Family Code Section 8.052.” He insists that, given the decree’s award to Robyn of “millions of dollars’ worth of assets,” the trial court could not have found that Robyn did not have the financial resources to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. Robyn responds by reciting the trial court’s express findings supporting the award of spousal maintenance and the evidence supporting both express and implied findings, and she contends Michael failed to show that the trial court’s award of spousal maintenance was an abuse of discretion. B. Applicable Law A trial court may order spousal maintenance if “the spouse seeking maintenance . . . has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051; accord Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 130, n.4 (Tex. 2018). - 28 - 04-19-00736-CV If the requesting spouse is eligible, the trial court determines whether to order maintenance “by considering all relevant factors, including . . . each spouse’s ability to provide for that spouse’s minimum reasonable needs independently, considering that spouse’s financial resources on dissolution of the marriage.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.052; see Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 130. C. Discussion Because we are remanding the cause for a new just and right division based on the correct characterization of the properties, Robyn’s financial resources on dissolution of the marriage may change. Thus, we must reverse the present spousal maintenance award so that the trial court may consider, based on its new just and right division, whether Robyn meets the statutory requirements for it to order spousal maintenance. See Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“We therefore reverse the award of spousal maintenance to [Wife] and instruct the trial court to consider, after dividing the parties’ marital estate on remand, whether [Wife] will lack sufficient property, including her separate property, on dissolution of the marriage to provide for her minimum reasonable needs, such that an award of spousal maintenance is appropriate.”); Roberts v. Roberts, 402 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). Michael’s sixth issue is moot. CONCLUSION We affirm the parties’ divorce, but because the trial court mischaracterized some of the community property, and that mischaracterization was of sufficient magnitude to affect the just and right division, we reverse the trial court’s division of the community estate and its award of spousal maintenance. - 29 - 04-19-00736-CV We remand the cause to the trial court for a new just and right division of the community estate—based on the correct characterization of the properties—and a corresponding reevaluation of any award for spousal maintenance. Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice - 30 -