2022 IL 127126

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Docket No. 127126) ILLINOIS ROAD AND TRANSPORTATION BUILDERS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK, Appellee. Opinion filed April 21, 2022. JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Neville, Michael J. Burke, Overstreet, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Theis dissented, with opinion. OPINION ¶1 In 2016, an amendment shielding transportation funding from other uses was added to the state revenue article of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(a)), commonly known as the transportation taxes and fees lockbox amendment or safe roads amendment (Amendment). The Amendment safeguards proceeds from transportation-related bond proceeds, taxes, fees, excises, and license taxes to ensure that such proceeds are only used for transportation-related purposes. See id. In 2018, plaintiffs, a coalition of contracting firms in the public transportation construction and design industry, 1 filed suit in the circuit court of Cook County for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County of Cook (County), asserting that the County was impermissibly diverting revenues generated from six transportation-related ordinances that, pursuant to the Amendment, should have been used only toward certain delineated transportation- related purposes. Following the County’s filing of a combined motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)), the circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the complaint failed to state a violation of the Amendment. The appellate court reversed on the issue of standing but affirmed the circuit court’s determination that no violation of the Amendment had been stated, albeit for different reasons. 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 4. We allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. ^[1], 2020). ¶2 BACKGROUND ¶3 In 2016, nearly 80% of Illinois voters voted to amend the Illinois Constitution of 1970. As a result, section 11, titled “Transportation funds,” was added to the state revenue article. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11. In essence, the Amendment provides that money generated from taxes, fees, excises, and license taxes on transportation infrastructure or operations shall only be spent on transportation purposes. Id. § 11(a). ¶4 On March 6, 2018, plaintiffs, self-described contracting firms in the public transportation construction and design industry, filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County. All parties agree that the County is a home- rule unit pursuant to article VII, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Id. art. VII, § 6(a). Plaintiffs alleged that the County was violating the Amendment by diverting “revenue from transportation-related taxes and fees to the County’s Public Safety Fund” and impermissibly spending the revenue on non-transportation-

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related purposes. Six sources of revenue allegedly being unconstitutionally diverted away from transportation uses were identified: (1) the Cook County Home Rule County Use Tax Ordinance (see Cook County Code of Ordinances § 74-270 et seq. (adopted Feb. 16, 2011); (2) the Cook County Retail Sale of Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Tax Ordinance (see id. § 74-470 et seq.); (3) the Cook County New Motor Vehicle and Trailer Excise Tax Ordinance (see id. § 74-230 et seq.); (4) the Cook County Home Rule Use Tax Ordinance for Non-Retailer Transfers of Motor Vehicles (see Cook County Code of Ordinances § 74-595 et seq. (adopted Nov. 15, 2011)); (5) the Cook County Wheel Tax on Vehicles Ordinance (see Cook County Code of Ordinances § 74-550 et seq. (adopted May 21, 2020)); and (6) the Cook County Parking Lot and Garage Operations Tax Ordinance (see Cook County Code of Ordinances § 74-510 et seq. (adopted July 17, 2013)). These taxes will be referred to collectively as the “Cook County Transportation Taxes.” See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 8.

¶5 Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks the following: entry of declaratory judgment that the County’s diversion of revenue from the Cook County Transportation Revenue Ordinances to undifferentiated costs within the Public Safety Fund is unconstitutional; that plaintiffs be awarded preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the County from diverting revenue derived from the Cook County Transportation Revenue Ordinances to any purpose other than those provided in subsection (b) and (c) of the Amendment; to mandate that the County restore all such diverted revenue; to order the County to provide plaintiffs a line-item accounting of how the County allocates or appropriates revenue derived from the Cook County Transportation Revenue Ordinances; the award of reasonable attorney fees to plaintiffs; and any such other award and further relief as deemed proper.

¶6 The County filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018). Specifically, the County asserted that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to section 2-619 because plaintiffs lack standing and because, pursuant to section 2-615, “allocation of revenue to the Public Safety Fund is proper under the Amendment’s legislative history and ballot summary.” See id. §§ 2-615, 2-619. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the complaint failed to state a constitutional violation.

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¶7 The appellate court disagreed as to the issue of standing, concluding that plaintiffs had established associational standing. 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 56. The court thus did not reach plaintiffs’ alternative contention that they had standing as taxpayers. Id. However, the court affirmed the circuit court’s section 2-615 dismissal. Id. ¶ 167. After finding the language of the Amendment ambiguous, the court looked to extrinsic aids, namely, legislative debates, the Secretary of State’s published explanations of the Amendment that were sent to Illinois voters (ballot summary) (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 2(b)), and the Transportation Funding Protection Act (see Pub. Act 101-32 (eff. June 28, 2019) (adding 30 ILCS 178/5- 10)). 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶¶ 156-57. The legislative debates, according to the court, demonstrated that “[t]he Amendment restricts the spending of transportation-related tax revenues when the spending of that revenue is dictated by state law, but it does not impact a home-rule unit’s spending of revenue pursuant to its constitutional home-rule spending power.” Id. ¶ 143. Further, the language contained in the ballot summary better comported with the County’s position because, according to the court, plaintiffs’ interpretation would result in alteration of home-rule powers. Id. ¶¶ 149-50.

¶8 We allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. ^[1], 2020). We also allowed the following parties to file amicus curiae briefs: Representatives Jim Durkin and Ryan Spain; Representative Jay Hoffman; the Illinois Chamber of Commerce; the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO, et al.; the Indiana, Illinois, Iowa Foundation for Fair Contracting, et al.; and the City of Chicago, City of Berwyn, and Village of Bridgeview. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 This appeal comes to this court following the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018). “Section 2-619.1 allows a party to file a combined section 2-619 and 2-615 motion to dismiss.” Carr v. Koch, 2012 IL 113414, ¶ 27. “A section 2-615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of a complaint [citation], while a section 2- 619 motion to dismiss admits the sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or defeats that claim [citation].” Id.

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Though plaintiffs only seek review of the section 2-615 issue, i.e., whether they have asserted a claim for a constitutional violation of the Amendment, the County’s request for cross-relief requires our consideration of the section 2-619 issue, which is whether plaintiffs have standing. We review a motion to dismiss under either section 2-615 or section 2-619 de novo. Id. We turn first to the issue of standing.

¶ 11 I. Standing

¶ 12 Because it is an affirmative defense, it is defendant’s burden to plead and prove lack of standing. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 45 (2005) (citing Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000)). Lack of standing avoids the legal effect of or defeats the plaintiff’s claim. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018); Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999). “Where standing is challenged in a motion to dismiss under section 2-619, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff’s complaint and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn in plaintiff’s favor.” In re Estate of Schlenker, 209 Ill. 2d 456, 461 (2004).

¶ 13 A plaintiff has standing where there has been some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest, i.e., “the claimed injury, whether ‘actual or threatened’ [citation] must be: (1) ‘distinct and palpable’ [citation]; (2) ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s actions [citation]; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief [citations].” Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492-93 (1988). Furthermore, where the cause of action seeks declaratory relief, “there must be an actual controversy between adverse parties, with the party requesting the declaration possessing some personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected by the grant of such relief.” Id. at 493.

¶ 14 The County maintains that plaintiffs lack associational standing. An association may have standing to sue on behalf of its members where “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”

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Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1997); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148, 215 Ill. 2d at 46.

¶ 15 According to the County, plaintiffs have not identified any “distinct and palpable” injury. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492-93. Thus, the County contends that the first requirement for associational standing—that an association’s members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right—is not met. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148, 215 Ill. 2d at 46. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the County’s diversion of the subject funds “is depriving the plaintiffs’ members of opportunities to work to improve the County’s failing transportation infrastructure.” Per the County, this is insufficient to show that any of plaintiffs’ members “ ‘are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action.’ ” See id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). To determine whether the County has shown that plaintiffs’ members are not suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action requires consideration of whether plaintiffs’ members have suffered (1) a distinct and palpable injury that (2) is fairly traceable to defendant’s actions and (3) is substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the relief sought. See Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004).

¶ 16 Plaintiffs are a coalition of nonprofit associations representing businesses in every sector of the transportation infrastructure construction and design industry. As noted by the appellate court, many individual members of the plaintiff associations are based in Cook County; conduct business with Cook County; and/or produce or supply material, equipment, or services to Cook County or to those working in Cook County. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶¶ 24-36.

¶ 17 First, we find that the County has failed to show that plaintiffs have not suffered a “distinct and palpable injury.” “A distinct and palpable injury refers to an injury that cannot be characterized as ‘a generalized grievance common to all members of the public.’ ” Alliance for the Great Lakes v. Department of Natural Resources, 2020 IL App (1st) 182587, ¶ 32 (quoting Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494). Where plaintiffs have hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of job opportunities they stand to benefit from, plaintiffs cannot be said to have a mere curiosity or concern for the outcome of the instant controversy. See Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 171 (1993). By way of contrast, in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, the plaintiffs

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challenged the “constitutionality of section 2-3.25g of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/2-3.25g (West 1996)), which allows school districts to petition the State Board of Education for waiver or modification of the School Code’s mandates.” 189 Ill. 2d at 202. Relevant here, this court considered whether two plaintiffs— physical education teachers—had standing to challenge the statute. Id. at 205. Because the statute would allow eleventh and twelfth grade students the choice of whether to take physical education courses, the two plaintiffs alleged that the law diminished the need for physical education teachers, which in turn would diminish their job security and career opportunities. Id. at 207. This court declined to find that the teachers had sustained or were in immediate danger of sustaining a direct and palpable injury. Id. at 208. Even if the size or number of physical education classes were reduced, the change would not necessarily harm the two teachers. Id. The two teachers both had tenure, and thus, “[i]f their services were not needed to teach eleventh and twelfth grade pupils, they would still have the opportunity to provide instruction to ninth and tenth grade students, for whom there has been no waiver of the daily physical education course requirement.” Id.

¶ 18 Here, plaintiffs assert that the County’s yearly diversion of revenue from the Cook County Transportation Taxes has already decreased the number of projects that are available to bid on in Cook County, which results in loss of business opportunities. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 36. Unlike in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, where the plaintiff teachers’ tenure afforded them protection against diminution of job security despite the real potential of physical education classes being reduced or eliminated, here, the diversion of more than $200 million2 worth of funds per year that are earmarked for transportation purposes certainly would negatively affect the pool of jobs and contracts available to plaintiffs’ members. As plaintiffs state in their complaint, its members would be “suffering economic harm due to the County’s ongoing violations of [the Amendment].” “Economic injuries have long been recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for standing ***.” Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. Accordingly, we find that the claimed injury is one that is distinct and palpable.

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¶ 19 Next, the County disputes that plaintiffs satisfy the next two prongs, i.e., that the injury is fairly traceable to its actions and is substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the requested relief. See id. We agree with the appellate court’s characterization of the County’s arguments as “interweav[ing] the traceability and judicial-redress prongs in a manner that we could summarize in one word— speculation.” 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 38. Essentially, the County contends that, even if plaintiffs were to prevail, it is not necessarily a given that any one member will receive additional business. For example, the County notes that home- rule units could react by proportionally reducing their transportation-related revenues to keep transportation spending flat or spending transportation-related revenues on activities that do not involve construction or, if discretionary spending on transportation-related construction does increase, the spending may nevertheless flow to nonplaintiffs. The County’s brief details numerous ways in which a home- rule unit would avoid spending transportation funds in a way that financially benefits plaintiffs’ members.

¶ 20 We are not persuaded by the County’s argument that there are too many steps of attenuation between plaintiffs’ success in this case and a given member being able to show that they would receive business. For example, the County asserts that it would “reconfigure” its revenue sources to allow it to fund government according to its “predetermined priorities,” e.g., public safety, public health, public housing, waste management, water and sewer infrastructure, and parks and recreational opportunities for residents. In an explanation of how, the County vaguely provides that it “would alter its mix of revenue, perhaps even adding new sources of revenue, in order to maintain funding for its predetermined priorities.” Simply, we decline to speculate that the County would or could so radically change its revenue sources in a way that would prevent any increase in transportation infrastructure projects.

¶ 21 Further, we are likewise unimpressed by the County’s suggestion that it would from here on out manage to spend the funds on only transportation-related projects that do not even incidentally involve infrastructure or require the types of products or services plaintiffs’ members provide. The County represents that it could, for example, choose to only spend the money on “the costs of administering laws related to vehicles and transportations,” “payment of highway obligations,” and “costs for *** betterment of *** mass transit *** or other forms of transportation,”

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which might involve “purchasing a new fleet of buses, train cars, or even bicycles and scooters.” See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(b), (c).

¶ 22 The County contends the above distinguishes the instant case from U.S. Women’s Chamber of Commerce v. (RBW) U.S. Small Business Administration, No. 1:04-CV-01889, 2005 WL 3244182 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2005) (SBA), where the plaintiffs had submitted unsuccessful bids and thus lost certain contracts. The County stresses that, unlike in SBA, plaintiffs do not claim that they lost any contracts during bidding.

¶ 23 Like the appellate court, we are inclined to agree with plaintiffs’ position that such certainty is not required. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 40. SBA held that an association of women contractors had standing to challenge a governmental defendant’s failure to complete a congressionally mandated study and establish procedures to identify underrepresented women-owned small businesses in federal procurement contracts. 2005 WL 3244182, at *1. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing because not all women-owned small businesses would benefit, the industries that would benefit had not been identified, and even qualifying businesses might not benefit due to a competitive contract process. Id. at *4. The SBA court observed that, as to the traceability prong, “the plaintiff must only prove that if not for defendants[’] unreasonable delay ***, ‘it reasonably could be inferred that’ had the defendants conducted the study and adopted the procedures[,] *** ‘there is a substantial probability’ that one of its members would have benefitted.” Id. at *8 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 504). The plaintiffs argued, and the SBA court agreed, that the defendant’s argument imposed a “catch-22.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Essentially, the defendant was illegally refusing to implement the mandates but arguing that its refusal to do so insulated it from judicial review. Id. Accordingly, the court “decline[d] to adopt the defendants’ circular reasoning as justification for denying the plaintiff standing.” Id. Further, as to judicial redressability, the court held that “it need not be shown that the Women’s Act’s implementation would have definitely resulted in contracts being awarded to the plaintiff’s members.” Id. at *9. Instead, it need only be substantially probable that “the defendants’ failure to comply caused the plaintiff’s members to be denied the federal contracts they bid on.” Id.

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¶ 24 We are not persuaded by the County’s argument that SBA is distinguishable due to the instant plaintiffs’ members not being able to show that they bid on a contract and further that they lost contracts during bidding. Were we to adopt this position, we would be permitting parties, namely government entities, to artificially create situations where would-be plaintiffs would never have the opportunity to challenge government misconduct. This, in fact, is what plaintiffs allege has happened here:

“the County is weaponizing its unconstitutional behavior to insulate itself from judicial review: divert transportation funds, thereby fail to fund new transportation projects, and then claim that the firms that would have been eligible to bid on this work lack standing because they cannot point to any projects they lost out on. Under that circular theory, say plaintiffs, nobody could ever challenge the County’s alleged unconstitutional diversion of funds.” 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 39 (describing plaintiffs’ response to the County’s arguments as to the traceability and judicial-redress prongs).

Accordingly, we dismiss the County’s argument regarding Hunt, 432 U.S. 333, which the County contends is distinguishable for the same reasons as SBA, i.e., because the plaintiffs in Hunt alleged actual, concrete, nonspeculative injuries in that they were incurring extra costs by virtue of North Carolina’s labeling law. Here, the plaintiffs cannot show an exact injury due to the County’s conduct. We also add that Illinois law “tends to vary in the direction of greater liberality” than federal law on matters of standing. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491.

¶ 25 Again, for these same reasons, we reject the County’s reliance upon I.C.S. Illinois, Inc. v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 211 (2010). According to the County, “even assuming Cook County were to end up spending transportation-related revenues on construction projects, none of plaintiffs’ members can show that they would have won a bid on any such project.” The County argues that, unlike here, in I.C.S. there was a specific contract and the primary contractor was in place. Id. at 212-13. However, as here, the plaintiff subcontractors alleged that they were “deprived of the opportunity to bid.” Id. at 225. Nonetheless, the I.C.S. court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not allege a legally cognizable injury. Id. at 233-34. Specifically, the I.C.S. court held:

- 10 - “a plaintiff cannot establish standing to challenge the result of a bidding competition without establishing that he would have been successful but for defendants’ conduct. Without such an allegation, a subcontractor would be hard put to claim to have suffered an injury. It is all the more difficult to recognize an injury to a legally cognizable interest that is distinct and palpable if plaintiff does not allege that he, at the very least, actively entered into the competitive fray.” Id. at 225. We also agree with the appellate court that I.C.S. is distinguishable. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶¶ 52, 59 (noting that I.C.S. did not involve a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief against the government but concerned a class action brought by private firms against a private contractor that sounded in tort and sought lost profits for failing to pick a plaintiff for a subcontracting job). Further, as noted by plaintiffs, plaintiffs are not challenging the award of any contract to a competitor or the outcome of any bidding process and they do not assert tort claims or seek the award of lost profits from a competitor. We reject the County’s citation of I.C.S. and now address the traceability and judicial-redress prongs. ¶ 26 If the County is required to exclusively spend the subject funds on transportation purposes but is instead impermissibly diverting the funds to other purposes, then there is no question that plaintiffs’ injury is “ ‘fairly traceable’ ” to the County’s conduct. See, e.g., Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494. The County does not explain how plaintiffs misidentify its control and unpermitted diversion of funds as the cause of their injury. See, e.g., Carr, 2012 IL 113414, ¶¶ 36, 51 (finding that the plaintiffs’ alleged injury—paying higher local property taxes than residents of property-rich school districts—was not fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions in enacting an education funding statute because the defendants did not have control over the amount of local property taxes that were imposed). Similarly, if plaintiffs are granted the relief sought, hundreds of millions of dollars would be diverted back to transportation purposes, which would be substantially probable to inure to plaintiffs’ economic benefit and thus remedy their alleged injury. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. ¶ 27 Lastly, we reject the County’s arguments regarding several federal cases that the appellate court cited in support of the proposition that certainty as to judicial redress is not required for standing, “[p]articularly when the injury to a plaintiff is - 11 - the loss of opportunity to obtain a benefit due to the government’s failure to perform a required act *** [because] it is rarely possible to know with any confidence what might have happened” had the government performed the act at issue or the improper conduct had been corrected. (Emphasis in original.) 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 40; see also id. ¶¶ 41-49 (discussing cases). With regard to West Virginia Ass’n of Community Health Centers, Inc. v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1984), National Ass’n of Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and American Iron & Steel Institute v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 182 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 1999), the County asserts that these cases are distinguishable because the allegedly misappropriated funds at issue were directly earmarked to fund programs to benefit organizations and/or individuals such as the plaintiffs in those cases. As plaintiffs correctly observe, the County’s argument invokes the “zones of interest” test that was rejected by this court in Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491-92 (explaining that the zones of interest test requires consideration of the goals, purposes, and objectives of a given law to determine whether plaintiffs are among its intended beneficiaries and whether plaintiffs’ asserted interest falls within that is arguably sought to be protected by such a provision). Accordingly, the County’s arguments are again off-target and do not establish the affirmative defense that plaintiffs lack standing. ¶ 28 Because we conclude that plaintiffs have associational standing, we need not address the County’s argument that plaintiffs lack standing as taxpayers. We now turn to the party’s substantive arguments. ¶ 29 II. Scope of the Amendment ¶ 30 At issue is the scope of the Amendment—whether it applies without exception to revenues generated from transportation-related taxes even where the taxing body is a home-rule unit. See Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 35 (noting that such a question presents a question of constitutional interpretation). We will first set forth the parties’ general arguments and later address their more specific assertions. ¶ 31 Plaintiffs maintain that the Amendment contains no exemption for home-rule units of government or for expenditures of transportation tax revenue pursuant to home-rule authority. According to plaintiffs, subsection (a) explains which taxes and fees fall within the Amendment’s scope. Plaintiffs note how subsection (d) - 12 - supports their characterization of subsection (a). Subsection (d) states how subsection (a) “describe[s]” the “revenues” that shall not be “diverted to any purpose” other than the purposes “described in subsections (b) and (c) of this Section.” See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(d). Specifically, plaintiffs cite the broadness of subsection (a)’s language. Subsection (a) states that “[n]o moneys, including bond proceeds, derived from taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to” certain types of transportation infrastructure or “relating to any other transportation infrastructure or transportation operation, shall be expended for purposes other than” the transportation purposes specified elsewhere in the Amendment. Id. § 11(a). Because the Cook County Transportation Taxes relate to transportation infrastructure and operations, plaintiffs contend that they fall within the ambit of the Amendment. Accordingly, plaintiffs maintain that the funds collected from the Cook County Transportation Taxes may only be spent on those purposes delineated in subsections (b) and (c). Subsection (f), which provides that “[f]ederal funds may be spent for any purposes authorized by federal law” demonstrates that, when the drafters wanted to create an exemption for certain funds, they did so expressly. See id. § 11(f). Plaintiffs stress that the drafters did not create an exemption for home-rule units, home-rule taxes, or home-rule expenditures. ¶ 32 In turn, the County’s brief states: “Plaintiffs can only get to this outcome by urging the Court to read subsection (a) of the Amendment in narrow isolation and to put blinders on against the overall picture—blinders to the Amendment’s overall import, blinders to the stated intent of the bill’s sponsors, and blinders to what Illinois voters were told about the limits of the Amendment’s impact.” The County explains that plaintiffs’ interpretation of subsection (a) fails as a matter of statutory construction because the Amendment as a whole can only be read to apply exclusively to state-imposed tax revenues, not revenues imposed by home- rule authority. The County asserts that “[a] constitutional provision must be construed, if possible, in a manner consistent with other provisions relevant to the same subject matter.” Rock v. Thompson, 85 Ill. 2d 410, 429 (1981) (citing People ex rel. Nauert v. Smith, 327 Ill. 11 (1927)). Thus, according to the County, it is appropriate to consider the various subsections of the Amendment together to - 13 - properly ascertain its meaning. By reading the Amendment’s provisions as a whole, the County contends that the lower courts have neither deleted nor inserted any language into subsection (a). Additionally, the County notes that the Amendment refers to “statutory purposes” and “laws”—not “ordinances”—thus indicating the intent to encompass only statutorily derived revenue. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(b), (c). Plaintiffs counter that subsection (a) is the sole provision that “describe[s]” which funds are restricted by the Amendment. Accordingly, the other subsections should not have been used by the appellate court to limit subsection (a)’s scope. ¶ 33 We now consider whether the Amendment is plain or ambiguous. “The construction of constitutional provisions is governed by the same general principles that apply to statutes.” Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36 (citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 526-27 (1990)). When construing a constitutional provision, our objective “is to determine and effectuate the common understanding of the citizens who adopted it [citations], and courts will look to the natural and popular meaning of the language used as it was understood when the constitution was adopted [citation].” Id. A court should “first and foremost look to the plain language.” Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 47. If the language of the provision is plain, we will give effect to the language and will not consider extrinsic aids of construction. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. Accordingly, “[o]nly if the provision is ambiguous will we ‘consult the drafting history of the provision, including the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention.’ ” Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 35 (quoting Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 16). ¶ 34 We turn first to subsection (a) of the Amendment, which the County argues is the determinative provision. Subsection (a) provides: “(a) No moneys, including bond proceeds, derived from taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, title, or operation or use of vehicles, or related to the use of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports, airports, or to fuels used for propelling vehicles, or derived from taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to any other transportation infrastructure or transportation operation, shall be expended for purposes other than as provided in subsections (b) and (c).” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(a). - 14 - ¶ 35 At the outset, it is evident that “[n]o moneys” is an extremely broad designation of the category of proceeds generated by certain bond proceeds, taxes, fees, excises, and license taxes. Subsection (a) first notes that the bond proceeds, taxes, fees, excises, and license taxes it is addressing “relat[e] to registration, title, or operation or use of vehicles, *** the use of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports, airports, or to fuels used for propelling vehicles.” Id. However, subsection (a) then goes even further, providing that the Amendment also applies to “taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to any other transportation infrastructure or transportation operation.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Again, subsection (a) clearly demonstrates an intent by the drafters to encompass the entire swath of proceeds from taxes, fees, excises, and license taxes by using the above- italicized catchall language. Specifically, “any other” means everything else not already listed. Subsection (a) effectively states that such money, i.e., “[n]o moneys [i.e., all moneys derived from transportation-related taxes, etc.] *** shall be expended for purposes other than as provided in subsections (b) and (c).” Id. Certainly, there is nothing in the language of subsection (a) to indicate that the drafters intended to exclude home-rule units, home-rule taxes, or home-rule expenditures from the scope of the Amendment. ¶ 36 Nonetheless, the County maintains that the Amendment’s various references in subsections (b) and (c) to “laws” and derivations of the word “statute” refer to acts of the General Assembly and not ordinances. See id. art. IV, §§ 8, 9; Burritt v. Commissioners of State Contracts, 120 Ill. 322 (1887); Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 162 Ill. 2d 181, 200 (1994) (stating that “as provided by law” means as prescribed or provided by the General Assembly). We reject this strained and unnatural reading. The references to “laws” and derivations of the word “statute” do not appear in subsection (a). Though subsections (b) and (c) no doubt contain these references, we fail to see how they implicitly modify the Amendment’s scope in the way proposed by the County. Furthermore, subsection (b) refers to “local governments.” See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(b). It does not distinguish between home-rule units and non- home-rule units. Unlike the County and the appellate court, which rely on this collective term to assign greater meaning to the terms “laws” and derivations of the word “statute,” we find that it supports our conclusion as to subsection (a)’s expansive reach. - 15 - ¶ 37 Subsection (b) provides: “(b) Transportation funds may be expended for the following: the costs of administering laws related to vehicles and transportation, including statutory refunds and adjustments provided in those laws; payment of highway obligations; costs for construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, and betterment of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports, airports, or other forms of transportation; and other statutory highway purposes. Transportation funds may also be expended for the State or local share of highway funds to match federal aid highway funds, and expenses of grade separation of highways and railroad crossings, including protection of at-grade highways and railroad crossings, and, with respect to local governments, other transportation purposes as authorized by law.” Id. Clearly, subsection (b) provides a list of permissible ways in which transportation funds may be expended. Subsection (b) contains two sentences. The first sentence provides four categories of permissible purposes, which are separated by semicolons. Although the first and fourth purposes contain the terms “laws” and “statutory,” the second and third categories are not modified by these terms. The County fails to explain how, for example, both home-rule units and non-home-rule units would not be able to spend funds on “costs for construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, and betterment of *** roads, streets, [or] bridges” absent statutory directive to do so. See id. For this same reason, the County’s reliance upon the word “laws” in subsection (c) is likewise unavailing. Subsection (c) simply builds upon the first category of permissible spending listed in subsection (b), i.e., “the costs of administering laws related to vehicles and transportation.” See id. § 11(b), (c). That gives us no reason to read the Amendment as the County suggests. We will not read a limitation into subsection (a) that the County and the appellate court infer from other subsections. See Gutraj v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 2013 IL App (2d) 121163, ¶¶ 14-15; see also Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 362 Ill. App. 3d 652, 660-61 (2005). ¶ 38 As to the second sentence of subsection (b), the County contends that the clause “and, with respect to local governments, other transportation purposes as authorized by law” also demonstrates that the Amendment is only referring to when state and local governments are “following the spending dictates of a statute”—not when - 16 - local governments are spending their own funds pursuant to their home-rule spending authority. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 107. As the appellate court put it: “ ‘Authorized by law,’ as we have said, means authorized by statute. The reference there to ‘local governments’ includes both home-rule and non-home- rule units, of course. The fact that this language treats home-rule and non-home- rule units the same, both requiring ‘authoriz[ation] by law,’ is telling because home-rule units do not always require authorization by law when they spend tax revenue. As noted at length above, sometimes, a statute authorizes a home- rule unit to impose a tax but does not mandate how that home-rule unit will spend the tax revenue ***. And of course, other times, a home-rule unit will impose a tax based on its own constitutional taxing power and will spend that tax revenue under its general home-rule powers, with no statute entering the picture at all. If plaintiffs are correct that revenues spent pursuant to traditional home-rule power are included within this scope, what ‘authorization by law’ should that home-rule unit consult? If no statute governs its spending, what statute could the home-rule unit possibly consult for authority? This language only makes sense one way: In allowing for ‘local governments’ to spend transportation tax revenues for ‘other transportation purposes as authorized by law,’ the Amendment can only be referring to those situations where home-rule and non-home-rule units have the same spending powers—which is when, and only when, they are following the spending dictates of a statute. It is nearly impossible to reconcile plaintiffs’ position, that all revenue spending is restricted by this Amendment, even that which is not governed by statute, with this language in the second sentence of subsection (b).” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶¶ 106-07. Again, the first sentence of subsection (b) details four categories of permissible spending—and the County does not explain how the third category does not apply to local governments even absent statutory dictate. 3 Before the last clause of the second sentence (“with respect to local governments, other transportation purposes as authorized by law”), the second sentence begins by explaining that 3 We express no opinion on whether the other categories of spending could nonetheless apply to local government units. - 17 - “[t]ransportation funds may also be expended for.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(b). The second sentence is simply setting forth another category of a yet-to-be-defined aspect that may fall under the umbrella of relating to transportation. Nothing about the phrase “may also” demonstrates the County’s or the appellate court’s hard-and-fast notion that, as to local governments—non- home-rule units and home-rule units alike—a statute always must be dictating how money is being spent. Furthermore, this phrase does not modify the third category of spending listed in the first sentence of subsection (b). Accordingly, even entertaining the County’s argument on this point, subsection (b) provides a clear category of permissible spending that is not qualified by “laws” or derivations of the word “statute.” ¶ 39 The County’s cited cases fall short of supporting its contention that “as authorized by law” can only mean that a statute is in place that specifically directs the spending of both non-home-rule units and home-rule units. Burritt held that a joint resolution by both houses did not yet constitute a law because it did not comply with certain constitutional mandates, e.g., because it was “without a title, ha[d] no enacting clause, [wa]s not signed by Speakers of both houses, or either house, [and] ha[d] not the signature and approval of the executive.” Burritt, 120 Ill. at 333. No one disputes the proper lawmaking process in this case. ¶ 40 Next, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority explained that “[t]he language ‘as provided by law’ contained in article I, section 15 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 15), means that the requirements for jury trials in eminent domain actions are within the General Assembly’s authority to determine.” 162 Ill. 2d at 191-92. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority also stated that “ ‘[a]s provided by law’ means as prescribed or provided by the General Assembly.” Id. at 200. For this proposition, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority relied on Peile v. Skelgas, Inc., 242 Ill. App. 3d 500, 518 (1993). Illinois State Toll Highway Authority also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that, relevant here, it should have been awarded attorney fees under the state constitution. 162 Ill. 2d at 199-200. This court explained that because article I, section 15, guarantees just compensation “ ‘as provided by law’ ” that “attorney fees and expenses should not be allowed unless specifically authorized by statute.” Id. at 200. Because no statute provided for the award of attorney fees and expenses in the context at issue, the court held that - 18 - “reimbursement of attorney fees is not required as part of just compensation under our constitution.” Id. ¶ 41 As mentioned, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority relied on Peile for the proposition that “ ‘[a]s provided by law’ means as prescribed or provided by the General Assembly.” Id. In support of this statement, Peile in turn relied on three cases. See Peile, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 518 (citing Quinn v. Donnewald, 107 Ill. 2d 179 (1985), County of Kane v. Carlson, 140 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1986), and Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200 (1973)). We examine these cases in turn. ¶ 42 At issue in Quinn was whether the Compensation Review Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 63, ¶ 901 et seq.), which created the Compensation Review Board (Board), unconstitutionally delegated the legislature’s power to determine the salaries of certain state officers to the Board. Quinn, 107 Ill. 2d at 183. Per the Illinois Constitution of 1970, “the salaries of legislators, judges, and executive officers shall be ‘provided’ or ‘established’ ‘by law.’ ” Id. at 186 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 11, id. art. VI, § 14, and id. art. V, § 21). The plaintiffs complained that the legislature itself was charged with setting the salaries and thus could not delegate this power to the Board. Id. This court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument because, by and large, all the Board did was make recommendations to the legislature. Id. Pursuant to the Act, the legislature still ultimately set the salaries in compliance with “the ‘law-making process’ and in the normal legislative manner.” Id. at 186-87. Accordingly, the Act did not run afoul of the constitutional directive. Id. at 187. ¶ 43 The second case relied on by Peile was County of Kane. There, the dispute ultimately concerned whether the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 48, ¶ 1601 et seq.) violated the separation of powers provision of the state constitution. County of Kane, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 815-16. Relevant here, it was argued that, because provisions of the Public Labor Relations Act required collective bargaining with respect to wages in collective bargaining agreements for deputy circuit clerks, it was an overly burdensome infringement on the powers of the judicial branch. Id. at 819. In response, the appellate court observed that, as to the wages of deputy circuit clerks, “the constitution specifically authorizes action by the General Assembly.” Id.; see also id. (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 18(c)). - 19 - The appellate court explained: “deputy circuit clerks are nonjudicial officers within the meaning of section 18 of article VI of the constitution. The requirement that the salaries be ‘as provided by law’ means that they are to be set by the General Assembly via the lawmaking process.” Id. (citing Quinn, 107 Ill. 2d at 186-87). It was, according to the appellate court, permissible for the legislature to satisfy this requirement in different ways. Id. According to the court, “[t]here would appear to be no constitutional impediment to the legislature’s providing by law that deputy circuit clerks’ salaries be determined by a process including collective bargaining.” Id. Thus, it was not a violation of separation of powers where the constitution specifically grants the legislature the authority to provide by law. Id. at 820. ¶ 44 Finally, Peile cited Oak Park Federal Saving & Loan Ass’n. There, the plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaratory judgment against the defendant, the Village of Oak Park, seeking to declare invalid several ordinances purportedly adopted pursuant to its home-rule powers under the second provision of section 6(l) 4 of article VII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 54 Ill. 2d at 201. One ordinance “defined the procedures for establishing areas for the providing of special services and provided that the president and board of trustees of the Village of Oak Park shall be the governing body of the special service area.” Id. at 202. That ordinance also “authorized the levying of taxes by the village board on the property in the special service area and the issuance of bonds to be retired by taxes levied against the property included in the area.” Id. Yet another ordinance “provided for the issuance of bonds of the special service area in the amount of $1,550,000 to be retired by the levy of taxes on the property within the district.” Id. As to all the ordinances, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant could not, “without enabling legislation adopted by the General Assembly, create a special service area or impose taxes or issue bonds to