Vining v. New York & New England R.R., 46 N.E. 117 (Mass. 1897). · Go Syfert
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Vining v. New York & New England R.R., 46 N.E. 117 (Mass. 1897). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
88 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 37 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Collision Communications, Inc. v. P Nokia Solutions and Networks OY (nhd, 2025-01-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1902 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1902 1964 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Collision Communications, Inc. v. P Nokia Solutions and Networks OY
D.N.H. · 2025 · confidence medium
However, “[i]t has been repeatedly held that, if an agreement whose performance would otherwise extend beyond a year may be completely performed within a year on the happening of some contingency, it is not within the statute of frauds.” Williston, supra § 24:3 (quoting Carnig v. Carr, 46 N.E. 117, 118 (Mass. 1897)); see, e.g., Loan Modification Grp., Inc. v. Reed, 694 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying Massachusetts law).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Collision Communications, Inc. v. Nokia Corporation
D.N.H. · 2025 · confidence medium
However, “[i]t has been repeatedly held that, if an agreement whose performance would otherwise extend beyond a year may be completely performed within a year on the happening of some contingency, it is not within the statute of frauds.” Williston, supra § 24:3 (quoting Carnig v. Carr, 46 N.E. 117, 118 (Mass. 1897)); see, e.g., Loan Modification Grp., Inc. v. Reed, 694 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying Massachusetts law).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loan Modification Group, Inc. v. Reed
1st Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Under Massachusetts law, “if an agreement whose performance would otherwise extend beyond a year may be completely performed within a year on the happening of some contingency, it is not within the statute of frauds.” See Coughlin, 4 N.E.2d at 323 (quoting Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544 , 46 N.E. 117, 118 (1897)); see also Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 414 Mass. 468 , 608 N.E.2d 1028, 1036 (1993) (“Because [the plaintiffs] contract was for permanent employment, it could have been performed within one year: ... [the defendant] could have discontinued its business, at which point its obligation t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moody v. Bogue
Iowa Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 53 App.D.C. 311 , 290 F. 286, 289 (1923), and where an employee agreed to give up a government job in exchange for other employment, Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 547 , 46 N.E. 117, 118 (1897).
cited Cited "see" Stauter v. Walnut Grove Products
Iowa · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544 , 46 N.E. 117 .
cited Cited "see" Toni v. Kingan & Co.
Ind. · 1938 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carnig v. Carr (1897), 167 Mass. 544 , 46 N. E. 117 , 35 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Samuel Vining
v.
New York and New England Railroad Company
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Feb 24, 1897.
46 N.E. 117
F. A. Farnham, for the defendant., F. S. Hesseltine, for the plaintiff.
Allen.
he testified that seven feet or six feet between rails for a man that exercised due precaution was a distance in which an express freight train with a side ladder
Allen, J.

The present case is to be distinguished from those chiefly relied on by the plaintiff. In Ferren v. Old Colony Railroad, 143 Mass. 197, the plaintiff was taken from his regular work, and was asked to help do something which was outside of the work which he was employed to do, and in an unusual place, and it was accordingly held that the danger to which he was exposed was something which he was not bound to anticipate, or to look out for. In Scanlon v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 147 Mass. 484, a brake man was hurt by coming in collision with a signal post by the side of the track. It was his first trip. He was unfamiliar with the road. He was not informed or cautioned as to the danger, and had no reason to suppose that there were permanent structures so near the track. On these grounds a distinction in his favor was made from Lovejoy v. Boston § Lowell Railroad, 125 Mass. 79, where the plaintiff was familiar with the road, and was held to have assumed the risk.

The present plaintiff was in the course of his regular and[*543] usual employment. He knew of the existence of the spur track, and of its purpose and use. He was an experienced brakeman, and had been employed on the same road for a year, and had a general familiarity with it. The time of the accident was in daylight. The two cars in question did not differ in width or otherwise from ordinary box freight cars. The car on the spur track could have been seen, but the plaintiff testified that he did not think of looking. There was nothing unusual in the conditions existing at the time of the accident. Under these circumstances, if there had been no change in the position of either track since the plaintiff’s employment, the defendant was not guilty of any breach of duty towards him. The case falls within the recent decisions of Content v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 165 Mass. 267; Thain v. Old Colony Railroad, 161 Mass. 353; Fisk v. Fitchburg Railroad, 158 Mass. 238; and Lovejoy v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 125 Mass. 79, already cited. Exceptions sustained.