State v. Carnegie, 850 P.2d 690 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). · Go Syfert
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State v. Carnegie, 850 P.2d 690 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“e hold that a court must award a defendant presentence incarceration credit for the day on which he was booked into a detention facility, regardless of the time of day the booking occurred.”
60 citation events (58 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Mitchell (arizctapp, 2014-12-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Mitchell (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e hold that a court must award a defendant presentence incarceration credit for the day on which he was booked into a detention facility, regardless of the time of day the booking occurred.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Saldana
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
A.R.S. § 13-712(B); State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993) (holding that a defendant gets a full day of credit even if incarcerated for part of the day); State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 246 (App. 2 The record before us does not include a presentence report, but it appears all parties had access to it.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wade
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
A.R.S. § 13-712(B). “[F]or purposes of presentence incarceration credit, ‘custody’ begins when a defendant is booked into a detention facility.” State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 453-54 (App. 1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Mendivil
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
A.R.S. § 13-712(B). “[F]or purposes of presentence incarceration credit, ‘custody’ begins when a defendant is booked into a detention facility.” State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bartels
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
For the purposes of the statute, “’custody’ begins when a defendant is booked into a detention facility.” See State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Douglas
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Finally, when calculating presentence incarceration credit, a defendant is entitled to a full day of credit for any partial day in custody, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993), but no credit for the day of sentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Fears
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
A defendant must receive credit for every day or part of a day served, including the day of arrest, see State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993), but not the day of sentencing, see State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244 , 245- 46 (App. 1987). ¶7 The record shows that before he was sentenced on April 13, 2017, Fears was in custody for this case and thus eligible for pre-sentence incarceration credit from and including April 9, 2016, though April 20, 2016 (12 days), and from and including September 8, 2016, through April 12, 2017 (217 days) – a total of 229 days.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bsi v. Adot
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Corp. of Ariz., 161 Ariz. 557, 562 (App. 1989); see also Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 985, 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting a statute requiring aliens to be “physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years” to include any portion of a day, noting that, “[i]n the space of a day all the twenty four hours are usually reckoned; the law generally rejecting all fractions of a day, in order to avoid disputes”); Talbott v. Caudill, 58 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Ky. 1933) (“It is the common-law rule that judicially a day is the whole or any part o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BSI Holdings, LLC v. Arizona Department of Transportation
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Corp. of Ariz., 161 Ariz. 557, 562 , 779 P.2d 1296, 1301 (App. 1989); see also Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 985, 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting a statute requiring aliens to be “physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years” to include any portion of a day, noting that, “[i]n the space of a day all the twenty four hours are usually reckoned; the law generally rejecting all fractions of a day, in order to avoid disputes”); Talbott v. Caudill, 248 Ky. 146 , 58 S.W.2d 385, 386 (1933) (“It is the common-law rule that judicially …
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cryer
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cunningham
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 453-54 , 850 P.2d 690, 691-92 (App. 1993) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jorgensen
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Presentence incarceration credit is given for time spent in custody beginning on the day of booking, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 453-54 (App. 1993) (citation omitted), and ending on the day before sentencing, State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245 (App. 1987). ¶14 However, we will not correct an “illegally lenient sentence in the absence of proper appeals or cross-appeals by the state.” State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 281-82 (1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Whitlock
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
A defendant is entitled to a full day of credit for any partial day in custody, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993), but no credit for the day of sentencing.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Dickenson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Drew
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Galaviz
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The State concedes Appellant was incarcerated during this period, with the exception of April 14.9 The record regarding this issue is not a model of clarity, and the available documents could reasonably be read to support 8 Custody commences when a defendant is booked into a detention facility, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 453-54 , 850 P.2d 690, 691-92 (App. 1993), but does not include the date sentence is imposed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ludwig
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Presentence Incarceration Credit ¶17 Presentence incarceration credit is given for time spent in custody beginning on the day of booking, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993), and ending on the day before sentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cortez
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Presentence Incarceration Credit ¶17 Presentence incarceration credit is given for time spent in custody beginning on the day of booking, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993), and ending on the day before sentencing, State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 246 , 735 P.2d 854, 856 (App. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gonzalez
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
A trial court’s failure to credit a defendant with the appropriate length of presentence custody constitutes fundamental error, State v. Ritch, 160 Ariz. 495, 498 , 774 P.2d 234, 237 (App. 1989), and this Court reviews de novo a grant of presentence incarceration credit, see State v. Bomar, 199 Ariz. 472 , 475 ¶ 5, 19 P.3d 613 , 616 (App. 2001). ¶7 Under A.R.S. § 13–712(B), a defendant is entitled to credit for all time that is “actually spent in custody.” For the purposes of that statute, a defendant is in custody beginning at the time of “actual incarceration in a prison or jail…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Verdugo-Manriquez
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The trial court found 757 days of presentence incarceration credit. ¶4 Presentence incarceration credit is given for time spent in custody beginning the day of booking, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993), and ending the day before sentencing, State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 246 , 735 P.2d 854, 856 (App. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Maestas
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Presentence Incarceration Credit ¶15 Presentence incarceration credit is given for time spent in custody beginning on the day of booking, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993), and ending on the day before sentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Eskivel
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Thus, we have stated, “for purposes of presentence incarceration credit, ‘custody’ begins when a defendant is booked into a detention facility.” State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 453-54 , 850 P.2d 690, 691-92 (App. 1993). 4 STATE v. ESKIVEL Decision of the Court ¶9 As described above, the record reflects that the earliest Eskivel’s interview was complete was after 11:00 p.m. on March 29.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Maldonado
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Maldonado pled guilty to illegally re- entering the United States after he had been deported, in violation of the terms of his probation. ¶6 Presentence incarceration credit is given for time spent in custody beginning on the day of booking, State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993), and ending on the day before sentencing, State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 246 , 735 P.2d 854, 856 (App. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. LYCHWICK
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Corp. of Ariz., 161 Ariz. 557, 562 , 779 P.2d 1296, 1301 (App.1989) (counting the day plaintiff gave notice as a whole day toward minimum twenty-day notice requirement); State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App.1993) (pre-incarceration credit based on “time actually spent” does not require full twenty-four hour period to receive full-day credit). ¶ 12 At trial, the State objected to defendant’s Rule 20 motion under a different theory — arguing that the day the injunction was served should be excluded under general principles governing computation of time.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Zamora
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993) (holding a court must award a defendant presentence incarceration credit “from and including the day of booking”).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Porter (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (1993) (holding that presentence incarceration credit includes the day of booking). 5 STATE v. PORTER Decision of the Court ANALYSIS ¶12 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and find none.
cited Cited "see" State v. Wright
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993); State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 246 (App. 1987).
cited Cited "see" State v. Jude
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 (App. 1993); State v. Lopez, 153 Ariz. 285, 285 (1987).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Navarrete (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Cardenas-Salcido (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 454 , 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1993); State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 246 , 735 P.2d 854, 856 (App. 1987).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Headrick
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Seay, 232 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 7 ; see also 4 STATE v. HEADRICK Decision of the Court State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 453 (App. 1993) (for purposes of presentence incarceration credit, custody begins upon a defendant’s booking). ¶17 The superior court thus erred by crediting Headrick with time served unrelated to the Maricopa Case.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Cofield (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
“Arizona court decisions have consistently interpreted the ‘in custody' requirement of this statute to mean actual or constructive control of prison or jail authorities.” State v. Reynolds, 170 Ariz. 233, 235 , 823 P.2d 681, 683 (1992); see also State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz. 452, 453 , 850 P.2d 690, 691 (App.1993); State v. Cereceres, 166 Ariz. 14, 15-16 , 800 P.2d 1, 2-3 (App.1990).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Arizona
v.
Michael Alan CARNEGIE
No. 1 CA-CR 92-710.
Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Apr 13, 1993.
850 P.2d 690
Grant Woods, Atty. Gen. by Paul J. McMurdie, Chief Counsel, Crim. Appeals Section, Mona S. Peugh-Baskin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee., Dean W. Trebesch, Maricopa County Public Defender by Spencer D. Heffel, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.
Garbarino, McGregor, Noyes.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

McGREGOR, Judge.

This case presents the basic but recurring issue whether a defendant should receive one day’s presentence incarceration credit for the first day in custody regardless of the actual number of hours spent in custody on that date.

I.

Michael Alan Carnegie (appellant) was arrested and booked into jail on December 12, 1991, based upon an indictment charging him with three counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices. Appellant subsequently plead guilty to two counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices, both class 2 felonies. On April 13, 1992, the trial court sentenced appellant and credited him with 121 days presentence incarceration on each count. Appellant timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz.Rev. StatAnn. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-120.21, 13-4031 and -4033.

II.

Appellant argues that the court erred in failing to credit him with presentence incarceration credit for the day of booking. We agree.

The statute defining the circumstances under which a defendant receives presentence incarceration credit provides:

All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against the term of imprisonment otherwise provided for by this chapter.

A.R.S. § 13-709.B.

Prior Arizona decisions establish, and the state does not contest, that appellant spent time in custody on the day of booking. “Time actually spent in custody” refers to actual incarceration in a prison or jail, not simply a restraint on one’s freedom. State v. Reynolds, 170 Ariz. 233, 235, 823 P.2d 681, 683 (1992). Moreover, for purposes of[*454] presentence incarceration credit, “custody” begins when a defendant is booked into a detention facility. State v. Cereceres, 166 Ariz. 14, 16, 800 P.2d 1, 3 (App.1990).

Appellant was booked into jail and actually incarcerated on December 12, 1991, and therefore was “in custody” on that date. The state argues, however, that because appellant was not in custody for a full twenty-four hours on December 12, 1991, he cannot receive credit for that day. We do not believe the state’s argument reflects the legislature’s intent in enacting section 13-709.B.

Section 13-709.B does not expressly state whether a defendant should receive a day’s credit for the day of booking. We therefore determine its meaning by applying established rules of statutory interpretation. The primary principle of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute. To determine legislative intent, this court considers the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, the effects and consequences and the spirit and purpose of the law. Cereceres, 166 Ariz. at 15, 800 P.2d at 2. Finally, because section 13-709.B is part of Arizona’s criminal sentencing scheme, we attempt to harmonize this statute with other related criminal statutes. See State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245, 735 P.2d 854, 855 (App. 1987).

Other portions of Arizona’s sentencing statutes measure time by whole, rather than partial, days. Arizona prison sentences are calculated in minimum time periods of whole days. See A.R.S. §§ 13-701 and -707. A sentence begins on the day the court imposes sentence or on the day the defendant surrenders to custody, regardless of whether that “day” consists of a full twenty-four hours. See A.R.S. § 13-709.A; Hamilton, 153 Ariz. at 245, 735 P.2d at 855. Therefore, to harmonize section 13-709.B with the whole-day configuration of prison sentences, the court must award a defendant either a full day of presentence incarceration credit or no credit; the statutes make no provision for affording a defendant a partial day’s credit.

Our consideration of the policies advanced by section 13-709.B leads us to conclude that a defendant cannot be denied credit for a partial day spent in custody. Section 13-709.B requires a court to award presentence incarceration credit against the sentence imposed so that “[djefendants financially unable to make bail should not serve longer in custody through presen-tence incarceration than similarly sentenced defendants able to post bail.” Hamilton, 153 Ariz. at 245, 735 P.2d at 855 (citing State v. Sutton, 21 Ariz.App. 550, 521 P.2d 1008 (1974)). If we were to agree with the state that a defendant should receive no credit for a partial first day of incarceration, a defendant unable to make bail would serve one more day of post-sentence incarceration than would a similarly-sentenced defendant who is able to make bail. This result would violate the purpose of the section.

Moreover, requiring credit for the day of booking is more consistent with the language of section 13-709.B. The statute refers to credit for “time actually spent in custody,” not to “full days actually spent in custody”; the statute does not require that a defendant spend twenty-four hours in custody to receive credit for “time actually spent in custody.” A defendant who received no credit for the first day would spend time in custody, but would not receive any credit for that time, as section 13-709.B requires. Because the court cannot give a partial day’s credit against a whole-day sentence, we must grant a defendant one day of credit for a partial day of presentence incarceration.

Because certainty in the sentencing process is desirable, State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 550, 683 P.2d 744, 749 (App.1983), approved, 140 Ariz. 544, 683 P.2d 743 (1984), we hold that a court must award a defendant presentence incarceration credit for the day on which he was booked into a detention facility, regardless of the time of day the booking occurred.

Applying this rule, we conclude appellant should receive presentence incarceration credit from and including the day of booking, December 12, 1991, through April 12,[*455] 1992. Appellant, therefore, spent 123 days in presentence incarceration.[1] Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4037, we modify the trial court’s sentence to include presentence incarceration credit of 123 days rather than the 121 days originally ordered.

III.

We have reviewed the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035, and have found none. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence as modified.

GARBARINO, P.J., and NOYES, J., concur.
1

All parties agree that the trial court erred in calculating the period between December 13, 1991 and April 12, 1992 as 121 days rather than 122 days.