Roger C. FISHER, Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Appellee, 41 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
Roger C. FISHER, Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Appellee, 41 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ward v. Commissioner of Social Security (iand, 2022-08-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ward v. Commissioner of Social Security
N.D. Iowa · 2022 · confidence medium
(Id. at 575.) Dr. Johnson also noted that “[n]o permanent restrictions have been implemented.” (Id.) Before addressing the ALJ’s consideration and discussion of Dr. Johnson’s opinions, I point out that, while the ALJ should consider Dr. Johnson’s workers’ compensation impairment rating, the ALJ “is not bound by the disability rating of another agency when he is evaluating whether the claimant is disabled for purposes of social security benefits.” Pelkey, 433 F.3d at 579 (citing Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504 , 416.904 (p…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCall v. Berryhill
E.D. Mo. · 2020 · confidence medium
However, “the ALJ is not bound by the disability rating of another agency when he is evaluating whether the claimant is disabled for purposes of social security benefits[.]” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ; Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“There is no support for [the claimant's] contention that his sixty-percent service-connected disability rating equates with an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity under social security standards.”)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christian v. Berryhill
D. Minnesota · 2018 · confidence medium
See Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ; Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“There is no support for [the claimant]’s contention that his sixty-percent service-connected disability rating equates with an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity under social security standards.”)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank v. Colvin
E.D. Mo. · 2015 · confidence medium
Eighth, to the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of Dr. Spencer who opined that Plaintiff was disabled for purposes .of proceedings before the Missouri Department of Social Services (MDSS) (Tr. 278-81), and to the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider the determination of the MDSS that Plaintiff was disabled (Tr. 192-201), - an “ALJ is not bound by the disability rating of another agency when he is evaluating whether the claimant is disabled for purposes of social security benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 .” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 579 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. Colvin
E.D. Mo. · 2015 · confidence medium
First, as plaintiff admits, “a disability determination by the Veterans Administration is not binding on the ALJ.” Jenkins v. Chater, 76 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir.1994), and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Curtis v. Michael J. Astrue
8th Cir. · 2009 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Third, the determination of disability by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was not binding on the ALJ when evaluating whether Curtis was disabled for purposes of DIB, see Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir.2006); cf. Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (finding no support for contention that claimant’s 60% service-connected disability rating equated with inability to engage in substantial gainful activity under social security standards); and the ALJ specifically acknowledged the VA decision, which was based on records not before the ALJ and …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lafferty v. Astrue
W.D. Mo. · 2008 · confidence medium
Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir.2006), citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ; Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir.1994) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Norman R. Pelkey v. Jo Anne Barnhart
8th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
The ALJ should consider the VA’s finding of disability, Morrison v. Apfel, 146 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1998), but the ALJ is not bound by the disability rating of another agency when he is evaluating whether the claimant is disabled for purposes of social security benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ; Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“There is no support for [the claimant]’s contention that his sixty-percent service-connected disability rating equates with an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity under social security standards.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Norman P. Pelkey v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration
8th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
The ALJ should consider the VA’s finding of disability, Morrison v. Apfel, 146 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir.1998), but the ALJ is not bound by the disability rating of another agency when he is evaluating whether the. claimant is disabled for purposes of social security benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ; Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (“There is no support for [the claimant’s contention that his sixty-percent service-connected disability rating equates with an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity under social security standards.”)..
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth Lacewell v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart
8th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Further, the VA was apparently persuaded Lacewell was unemployable because the VA believed Lacewell had been terminated, but Lace-well testified before the ALJ that he had retired due to a merger, declining his employer’s offer to transfer him to a job with more responsibility; and the VA’s final letter indicated Lacewell’s actual disability rating was 50%, although he had been found 100% “unemployable.” Cf Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (finding no support for contention that claimant’s sixty percent service-connected disability rating equated wi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael J. Mack v. Shirley Chater
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
We reject Mack’s contention that the ALJ was required to give the VA disability rating “great weight.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ; Jenkins v. Chater, 76 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996); Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marvin G. JENKINS, Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Appellee
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir.1994); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marvin G. Jenkins v. Shirley S. Chater
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994); see -4- also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 .
discussed Cited "see" Keneth Cleo Sanders v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261 , 1262 n.3 (8th Cir.1994) (per curiam); Metcalf v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir.1986) (test to determine whether claimant's alcoholism is disabling). 7 As to Sanders's other claims on appeal, we conclude that the ALJ made sufficiently explicit findings; that the ALJ's decision reflects he considered the combined effects of Sanders's impairments he found credible and supported by evidence; that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination Sanders retained the residual functional capacity to perform work; and that the Secretary-through the test…
cited Cited "see" Mildred Williams v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 8 The judgment is affirmed. 1 The Honorable Elmo B.
discussed Cited "see" Margaret A. Hague v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261 , 1262 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (claimant bears burden to prove inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of medically determinable impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last not less than twelve months). 7 Hague's final argument on appeal addresses the hypothetical question the ALJ posed to the vocational expert.
cited Cited "see" Evonna Westbrook v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fisher v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 6 On appeal, Westbrook argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider her alleged mental impairment.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
46 soc.sec.rep.ser. 189, unempl.ins.rep. (Cch) P 14290b Roger C. Fisher
v.
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
94-1536.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Dec 7, 1994.
41 F.3d 1261
Mark A. Roeder, Manchester, IA, for appellant., John E. Beamer, Des Moines, IA, Frank V. Smith and Michael R. Fry, Kansas City, MO, for appellee.
Beam, Campbell, Arnold.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
[*1262] PER CURIAM.

Roger C. Fisher appeals the district court’s [1] judgment affirming the Secretary’s denial of social security benefits. He asserts that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that the Secretary erroneously refused to credit an earlier disability finding by the Veteran’s Administration. We affirm.

This action has a long procedural history which need not be fully recounted here. The action has been remanded twice to the Secretary for further proceedings: first, in response to an unresisted motion to remand, and second, for a more complete analysis of Fisher’s subjective complaints under Pola-ski [2] and for further consideration of whether Fisher suffered from mental impairments. Fisher, who was 55 at the time of his most recent administrative hearing, alleges disability due to arthritis, post-polio syndrome, and learning problems.

In order to have insured status under the Social Security Act, an individual is required to have twenty quarters of coverage in each forty-quarter period ending with the first quarter of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(3)(B). Fisher last met this requirement on December 31, 1984. To be entitled to benefits, Fisher is required to show the existence of a disability [3] on or before December 31, 1984, the date that his insured status expired. Trenary v. Bowen, 898 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.1990).

Accordingly, the ALJ’s analysis focused on Fisher’s condition on or before December 31, 1984. After the most recent administrative hearing, the ALJ found that although Fisher suffered from arthritis, a learning disability and other subjective complaints, he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. He found that Fisher had the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertional and nonexer-tional requirements of work with some limited restrictions on lifting and squatting. The ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to find that there were jobs that Fisher could perform existing in significant numbers in the national economy. We agree with the district court that substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s decision. See Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir.1992) (standard of review).

Contrary to Fisher’s assertion, the ALJ, in a thorough 32-page opinion, detailed legitimate reasons for discrediting Fisher’s subjective complaints of pain. The ALJ expressly considered inconsistencies between Fisher’s subjective complaints and the objective medical evidence combined with Fisher’s daily activities, medical treatment and medications. Moreover, the ALJ properly discounted medical and vocational evidence that related to Fisher’s condition in 1992.

Under the applicable regulations, the ALJ was not bound by the Veteran’s Administration assessment of Fisher’s disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. There is no support for Fisher’s contention that his sixty-percent service-connected disability rating equates with an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity under social security standards.

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s decision. We thus affirm.

1

. The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

2

. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984).

3

.To show a disability, Fisher must prove that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).