Gerald Dwight Fonville v. United States, 73 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
Gerald Dwight Fonville v. United States, 73 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the modified work program was temporary only. moreover, there is no evidence of any permanent reassignment policy in this case.”
42 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bryant v. Secretary U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Agency (ohnd, 2025-10-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Bryant v. Secretary U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Agency
N.D. Ohio · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
with regard to common-law tort claims against the united states, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies under the ftca.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Adair v. Hunter
E.D. Tenn. · 2017 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
even if delduco, walker and elsey made those comments, isolated threats and verbal abuse are not violations of constitutional magnitude.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Nighswander v. Henderson
N.D. Ohio · 2001 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
in the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the modified work program was temporary only. moreover, there is no evidence of any permanent reassignment policy in this case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leppek v. Ford Motor Company
E.D. Mich. · 2021 · confidence medium
In Clark v. Central Cartage Co., where the “evidence indicate[d] that the [defendant-employer] treated [the plaintiff] as an employee on temporary assignment,” rather than “as an employee in a permanent position,” the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his “job in question” was the job he was working when he was terminated, instead of the job he was hired for. 73 F.3d 361 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995).
discussed Cited "see" Century Surety Company v. Herald
W.D. Ky. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Blazo, 73 F.3d 361 , 1995 WL 764130, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 1995) (“Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909 , 916 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)))). initio and Century owes no duty under Policy No. CCP1021739 to defend or indemnify Defendants in the underlying state court action. 2.
discussed Cited "see" Economan v. Cockrell
N.D. Ind. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Ellis v. Ficano, 73 F.3d 361 , 1995 WL 764127 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing § 1983 claim against all defendants who were state and federal law enforcement agents on a joint task force); see also Adams v. Springmeyer, 17 F.Supp.3d 478, 506 (W.D.
discussed Cited "see" Pike v. United States
M.D. Tenn. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ellis v. Ficano, 73 F.3d 361 , 1995 WL 764127 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 1995) (table opinion) (where Wayne County law enforcement officers were deputized as DEA Task Force agents, § 1983 did not apply, but “plaintiffs were left with an appropriate avenue of recovery against them under Bivens”); Turk v. Comerford, No. 09-cv-868, 2011 WL 127147 , at *7 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 14, 2011) (holding that local law enforcement officers who were deputized as federal officers within an FBI-administered task force could be held liable under Bivens, but not § 1983), reconsidered on other grounds, 2011 WL 189920…
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. Box USA Group, Inc.
W.D. Ky. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grauer v. Federal Express Corp., 1996 WL 5558, at *1 , 73 F.3d 361 (6th Cir.1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jason Laible v. Timothy Lanter
6th Cir. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Petty v. United States, 80 F. App’x 986, 987, 989 (6th Cir. 2003) (Detroit police officer assigned to FBI-operated task force); see also Ellis v. Ficano, 73 F.3d 361, at *2, *6 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (noting the district court’s conclusion that Wayne County police officers deputized to a DEA-led task force satisfied § 3374(c)(2)’s “on detail” criterion).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gerald Dwight Fonville
v.
United States
95-1532.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Oct 25, 1995.
73 F.3d 361

73 F.3d 361
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.

Gerald Dwight FONVILLE, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 95-1532.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 1995.

Before: BROWN, BOGGS and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

1

Gerald Dwight Fonville appeals a district court order denying his motion to vacate sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. The case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).

2

In 1989, Fonville pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d) and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c). The district court sentenced Fonville to 337 months of imprisonment. This court affirmed Fonville's conviction and sentence on appeal. United States v. Fonville, No. 90-1377, 914 F.2d 1495, 1990 WL 142399 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 1990).

3

Fonville filed a motion to vacate sentence, which the district court denied as meritless. Fonville's subsequent appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.

4

Fonville then filed the present motion to vacate sentence, alleging that: 1) the government did not prove that it had jurisdiction over his crimes, and 2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In reliance on the government's response, the district court summarily denied Fonville's motion as meritless. Fonville has filed a timely appeal, in which he repeats the arguments raised in his motion to vacate. Fonville also argues that the district court should not have summarily dismissed his motion.

5

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly denied Fonville's motion to vacate sentence. In order to obtain habeas relief under Sec. 2255 on the basis of non-constitutional error, the record must reflect a fundamental defect in the proceedings that inherently results in a "complete miscarriage of justice" or an omission inconsistent with the "rudimentary demands of fair procedure". United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (applying the "complete miscarriage of justice" and "rudimentary demands of fair procedure" test of Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), to a Section 2255 case involving a guilty plea); United States v. Ferguson, 918 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (same).

6

While Fonville asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his crimes, he actually argues that the government did not prove that the banks he robbed were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Consequently, Fonville is not challenging the district court's jurisdiction over his crimes; rather, he is arguing that the government did not prove one of the elements necessary for his conviction. See United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 318 (6th Cir.1988) (federally insured status is essential element for violation of Sec. 2113). At his guilty plea, Fonville admitted that the government could prove that the banks were insured by the FDIC. Since Fonville's guilty plea serves as an admission of each element of the crime charged, he cannot now challenge the government's alleged failure to prove an element. United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1316-17 (6th Cir.1994). As this claim is without merit, Fonville was not prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to raise the issue. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

7

Fonville is also barred from seeking relief on his "jurisdictional" claims because he did not raise them in his direct criminal appeal. Claims that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal may not be reviewed under Sec. 2255 unless Fonville demonstrates cause and actual prejudice to excuse his failure to do so. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69 (1982); Ratliff v. United States, 999 F.2d 1023, 1025 (6th Cir.1993). The failure to raise an issue at an earlier opportunity constitutes a waiver of the claim. See United States v. Walsh, 733 F.2d 31, 34-35 (6th Cir.1984). While ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal, Fonville could have raised his ineffective assistance claim at that time because the record was adequate to permit review of the claim. See United States v. Seymour, 38 F.3d 261, 263 (6th Cir.1994). Therefore, this claim is also subject to the cause and prejudice analysis. While Fonville submits that cause exists because he only recently discovered the alleged violations, the facts underlying these alleged violations were clearly present in the record at the time of his direct criminal appeal. Further, Fonville suffered no prejudice because his claims are without merit.

8

Lastly, as the record conclusively shows that Fonville is not entitled to relief, the district court did not err in summarily denying his motion. United States v. Counts, 691 F.2d 348, 349 (7th Cir.1982) (per curiam).

9

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. Rule 9(b)(3), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.