green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
37.4 score
G Cite
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2006–2022 · 3 courts ·
…the question of whether an employee's conduct was within the scope of his employment is governed by the law of the state where the incident occurred.
at p. 390
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Walker v. JC Lewis Primary Health Care Center
under 28 u.s.c. 2679 (d)(1), upon the attorney general's certification of scope of employment, the pending action 'shall be deemed an action against the united states . . . , and the united states shall be substituted as the party defendant.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Clark v. United States
the question of whether an employee's conduct was within the scope of his employment is governed by the law of the state where the incident occurred.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
MCCOMBS v. 3M COMPANY
the feres doctrine . . . concerns only an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the federal tort claims act . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The Estate of Anthony Lezurro Miller v. United States of America, et al.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“The question of whether an employee’s conduct was within the scope of [her] employment is governed by the law of the state where the incident occurred.” Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Benjamin Watson, Jr. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(2×)
See, e.g., Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 142 S. Ct. 1502, 1508 (2022) (stating that under the FSIA, the “substantive law applying to [a USCA11 Case: 24-11310 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2025 Page: 28 of 71 28 Opinion of the Court 24-11310 private party] also applies to [a foreign state]”); cf. Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying state-law definition of “scope of employment” in sovereign immunity analysis under the FTCA).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
A.B. v. United States
Flohr v. Mackovjack, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Bunyan v. United States of America, Department of Veteran Affairs
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Significantly, the “burden of altering the status quo by proving that the employee acted outside the scope of employment is . . . on the plaintiff.” Flohr, 84 F.3d at 390 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Acadia Insurance Co. v. United States
Flohr v. Mackovjak, *942 84 F.3d 386, 390-92 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying California law to hold United States vicariously liable for car accident an Army engineer on temporary-duty assignment caused while driving to a restaurant in a rental car paid for by the government); Singleton v. Burchfield, 362 F.Supp.2d 1291, 1293-95 (M.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joyce Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Company
(2×)
In Flohr v. Mackov jak, 84 F.3d 386, 392 (11th Cir.1996), this court reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to substitute the United States as the party-defendant in a negligence action, a denial that led to remand to state court.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Osborn v. Haley
(2×)
See Woodruff v. Covington, 389 F. 3d 1117, 1124 (CA10 2004); Mathis v. Henderson, 243 F. 3d 446, 448 (CA8 2001); Borne-man, 213 F. 3d, at 826 (CA4); Lyons v. Brown, 158 F. 3d 605, 607 (CA1 1998); Taboos v. Mlynczak, 149 F. 3d 576, 579 (CA7 1998); Coleman v. United States, 91 F. 3d 820, 823 (CA6 1996); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F. 3d 386, 390 (CA11 1996); Kimbro, 30 F. 3d, at 1503 (CADC); Aliota, 984 F. 2d, at 1354 (CA3); Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F. 2d 865, 873 (CA9 1992); McHugh, 966 F. 2d, at 69 (CA2); Carlson, 896 F. 2d, at 133 (CA5).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sarah E. Hendrix v. John W. Snow
“The burden of altering the status quo by proving that the employee acted outside the scope of employment is ... on the plaintiff.” Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (quotation and marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Woodruff v. United States
See e.g., Mathis v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 446, 448 (8th Cir.2001) (“[A] district court's refusal to accept an FTCA certification is the equivalent of a denial of qualified immunity and therefore is immediately appealable.”); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir.2000) (denial of FTCA immunity is immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine); Lyons v. Brown, 158 F.3d 605, 607 (1st Cir.1998) (denial of FTCA immunity is appeal-able under collateral order doctrine); Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir.1997) (same); Coleman v. United States, 91 F.3d 820, 823 (6th …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Daugherty v. United States
See Singleton v. United States, 277 F.3d 864, 871 (6th Cir.2002); Maron v. United States, 126 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir.1997); Rogers v. Management Technology, 123 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1997); Lawson v. United States, 103 F.3d 59, 60 (8th Cir.1996); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996); see also Clamor v. United States, 240 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir.2001) (Tallman, J., dissenting); Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 376, 379 (3rd Cir.2000); RMI Titanium Co., v. Westinghouse Elec.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Del Valle v. Sanchez
Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (explaining effect of FTCA) (citations omitted). 14 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.
In Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 392 (11th Cir.1996), this court reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to substitute the United States as the party defendant in a negligence action, a denial that led to remand to state court.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh
In Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 392 (11th Cir. 1996), this court reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to substitute the United States as the party defendant in a negligence action, a denial that led to remand to state court.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Barry J. Maron, Dr. v. United States of America Stephen E. Epstein, Dr. Lameh Fananapazir, Dr. Edward Korn, Dr. Neil Epstein, Dr.
See Heuton v. Anderson, 75 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir.1996); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rogers v. Management Technolog
See Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812 n.15; Flohr v. ___ ______ _____ Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 389 (11th Cir. 1996); Kimbro v. _________ ______ Velten, 30 F.3d 1501, 1503 (D.C.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rogers v. Management Technology, Inc.
See Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812 n. 15; Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 389 (11th Cir.1996); Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F.3d 1501, 1503 (D.C.Cir.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1145 , 115 S.Ct. 2584 , 132 L.Ed.2d 833 (1995); Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 233 (4th cir.1994); Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1353 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 817 , 114 S.Ct. 68 , 126 L.Ed.2d 37 (1993); Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 132-33 (5th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DeMartinez v. DEA
See Palmer v. Flaggman, 93 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that "the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to show that the Attorney General's initial decision was incorrect" (footnote omitted)); Coleman, 91 F.3d at 823 (stating that "the Attorney General's certification provides prima facie evi- dence that an employee's conduct is within the scope of employ- ment"); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that "the Attorney General's certification is prima facie evi- dence that the employee acted within the scope of his employment"); Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Drug Enforcement Administration
See Palmer v. Flaggman, 93 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that “the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to show that the Attorney General’s initial decision was incorrect” (footnote omitted)); Coleman, 91 F.3d at 823 (stating that “the Attorney General’s certification provides prima facie evidence that an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment”); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that “the Attorney General’s certification is prima facie evidence that the employee acted within the scope of his employment”); Anthony v. R…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Katia Gutierrez De Martinez v. Drug Enforcement Administration
See Palmer v. Flaggman, 93 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that "the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to show that the Attorney General's initial decision was incorrect" (footnote omitted)); Coleman, 91 F.3d at 823 (stating that "the Attorney General's certification provides prima facie evidence that an employee's conduct is within the scope of employment"); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that "the Attorney General's certification is prima facie evidence that the employee acted within the scope of his employment"); Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210 ,…
discussed
Cited "see"
Hicks v. Middleton
(2×)
Ports America argues that Defendant Middleton was not acting within the scope of his employment because he was commuting to work at the time of the Accident and that, even if he was working within the scope of his employment when he left the union hall, he departed from “such course and scope at the time of the Accident.” (Doc. 60-1, pp. 10–15; see id. at p. 16.) Plaintiffs respond that Defendant Middleton was acting within the scope of his employment when 4 “The question of whether an employee’s conduct was within the scope of his employment is governed by the law of the state where…
cited
Cited "see"
Bunyan v. United States of America, Department of Veteran Affairs
See Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
W.R. Huff Asset Management Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.
See Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (addressing a § 1447(d) issue, and after holding that Waco was satisfied, holding: “We may thus take jurisdiction over Mackovjak’s appeal, provided that the denial of his motion to substitute is a ‘final order’ within the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .”); 5 see also Aguamar, 179 F.3d at 1287 (holding that appealability of the district court’s order that led to, but was separate from the remand order had to satisfy both the Waco doctrine and the finality rule (collateral order doctrine)); accord Price v. J & H Marsh & McLennan,…
discussed
Cited "see"
James H. Schiefer v. United States
See Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Attorney General’s certification is prima facie evidence that the employee acted within the scope of the AJ’s decision on the merits. 5 his employment . . . and [t]he burden of . . . proving that the employee acted outside the scope of employment is . . . on the plaintiff.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Singleton v. Burchfield
See Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (“the Attorney General’s certification is reviewable by the district court .... the district court [is] to decide the issue de novo.”); see also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 , 115 S.Ct. 2227 , 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995); S.J. & W.
discussed
Cited "see"
Anibal L. Taboas v. Bernard J. Mlynczak
See Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996); Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F.3d 1501, 1503 (D.C.Cir.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1145 , 115 S.Ct. 2584 , 132 L.Ed.2d 833 (1995); Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222 , 230-31 & n. 10 (4th Cir.1994); Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 817 , 114 S.Ct. 68 , 126 L.Ed.2d 37 (1993); Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 873 (9th Cir.1992); McHugh v. University of Vermont, 966 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mullane v. Moreno
“Upon the Attorney General’s certification, the employee is dismissed from the action, and the United States is substituted as defendant in place of the employee.” Id. at 230; see also Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 389 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d)(1)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Shawn Burns v. United States
See, e.g., Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386 , 388–89 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing a challenge to the scope-of- employment determination through a motion to strike the U.S. Attorney’s certificate).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Dean Seneca v. United South and Eastern Tribes
Gutierrez, 515 U.S. at 420 , 115 S.Ct. 2227 ; see also Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996). 3 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Larry Grant Lonchar
v.
Tony Turpin, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center
v.
Tony Turpin, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center
95-8821.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
May 16, 1996.
Published
Citer courts: N.D. Florida (1)
Larry Grant LONCHAR, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Tony TURPIN, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification
Center, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 95-8821.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
May 16, 1996.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, State of Georgia, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Asst. Atty. General, Atlanta, GA, for Appellant.
John Matteson, Office of John Matteson, Atlanta, Georgia, Clive Stafford Smith, Office of Clive Stafford Smith, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (No. 1:95-CV-1656-JTC), Jack T. Camp, Judge.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
May 16, 1996.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and COX and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
[*~392]2
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court following a ruling and judgment vacating the judgment of this court. It is ordered that the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.