GAC Props., Inc. v. Colding, 308 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). · Go Syfert
GAC Props., Inc. v. Colding, 308 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
1 citation event across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: LEE CTY. ELEC. CO-OPERATIVE, INC. v. Lowe (fladistctapp, 1977-04-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see" LEE CTY. ELEC. CO-OPERATIVE, INC. v. Lowe
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See GAC Properties, Inc. v. Colding, 308 So.2d 646 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GAC PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida Corporation
v.
Samuel J. COLDING, Tax Assessor of Collier County, Florida
No. 74-988.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb 28, 1975.
308 So. 2d 646
William K. Chester, Miami, for appellant., Donald A. Pickworth, Naples, for appel-lees.
Grimes, Hobson, McNulty.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
GRIMES, Judge.

The Tax Assessor of Collier County assessed a parcel of appellant’s property for the year 1973 at $8,601,700. After unsuccessfully exhausting the administrative remedies, the appellant brought suit contending that the amount of the assessment was arbitrary and discriminatory and grossly in excess of its fair market value. At the non-jury trial, appellant’s expert witness gave his opinion of the value to be $4,544,000. There was also evidence that in March of 1973 appellant gave an option for the sale of the property at a price of $5,300,000. At the conclusion of the appellant’s case, the court granted the appellees’ motion for involuntary dismissal and entered judgment against the appellant.

Assessors are accorded wide discretion in the valuation of property for taxation purposes. Harbond, Inc. v. Anderson, Fla.App.2d, 1961, 134 So.2d 816. Though their assessments are presumed to be correct, the presumption is rebuttable. See Dean v. Palm Beach Mall, Inc., Fla. 1974, 297 So.2d 298.

The appellant made a prima facie case sufficient to overcome the presumption. At that point in the trial, there had been no evidence introduced in support of the assessment. Hence, the motion for dismissal should not have been granted.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

McNULTY, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.