United States v. Jose Esparza, Also Known as Franciso Zapata, 162 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 1998). · Go Syfert
United States v. Jose Esparza, Also Known as Franciso Zapata, 162 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
27 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Evans v. Commonwealth (va, 2015-09-17)
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Evans v. Commonwealth
Va. · 2015 · confidence medium
App. 2006); State v. Rodriguez, 945 A.2d 676, 681-83 (N.H. 2008); State v. Luong, 977 N.E.2d 1075 , 1081-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Wis. 2000); Rideout v. State, 122 P.3d 201, 207-08 (Wyo. 2005); cf. United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 531-32 (2d Cir. 1980). 5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has twice addressed this exact scenario.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Duran
D. Minnesota · 2015 · confidence medium
“The Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against warrantless searches does not apply when officers obtain voluntary consent from the person whose property is searched or from a third party with common authority over the property.” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 , 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Munoz
8th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
An officer cannot “rely on a third party’s consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search.” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998), citing United States v. Brokaw, 985 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Marcos Munoz
8th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
An officer cannot “rely on a third party’s consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search.” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998), citing United States v. Brokaw, 985 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goings v. Chickasaw County, IA
N.D. Iowa · 2007 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against warrantless searches does not apply when officers obtain voluntary consent from the person whose property is searched or from a third party with common authority over the property.” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert W. Elam, Jr.
8th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
As the district court noted, we have acknowledged (but never invoked) intentional bypass as a narrow exception to the Supreme Court’s third party consent principles, explaining that “police may not rely on a third party’s consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search.” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998) (emphasis added), citing United States v. Brokaw, 985 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 249 (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Antonio Rodriguez
8th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Antonio Rodriguez, United States of America v. Antonio Rodriguez
8th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Timothy W. Hines
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
“The Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against warrantless searches does not apply when officers obtain voluntary consent from the person whose property is searched or from a third party with common authority over the property.” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 , 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gerald Dean Janis
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Officers are allowed to conduct a warrantless search “when faced with certain urgent circumstances[.]” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Timothy W. Hines
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
“The Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against warrantless searches does not apply when officers obtain voluntary consent from the person whose property is searched or from a third party with common authority over the property.” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gerald Dean Janis
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Officers are allowed to conduct a warrantless search “when faced with certain urgent circumstances[.]” United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, — v. OSVALDO HERNANDEZ LEON JESUS GARCIA IBARRA, —
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
The government argues that the warrantless search was permissible because Lehner believed that the hat concealed evidence which was threatened with imminent removal or destruction if he did not retrieve it immediately. 2 See United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998) (warrantless search of bath *1029 room lawful where it appeared occupant might dispose of drugs); Blake, 484 F.2d at 54 (8th Cir.1973) (officers could search basement for purse believed to contain drugs given the probability that it would be removed by defendant or some third party).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Osvaldo Leon
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
The government argues that the warrantless search was permissible because Lehner believed that the hat concealed evidence which was threatened with imminent removal or destruction if he did not retrieve it immediately.2 See United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998) (warrantless search of bathroom lawful where it appeared occupant might dispose of drugs); Blake, 484 F.2d at 54 (8th Cir. 1973) (officers could search basement for purse believed to contain drugs given the probability that it would be removed by defendant or some third party).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Antonio Rodriguez, United States of America v. Antonio Rodriguez
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Antonio Rodriguez
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited "see" State of Minnesota v. Stuart Donald Luhm (2×)
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1970).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Williams
8th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Jarvis Williams
8th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Lonnie Maurice Hill
8th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Lonnie Hill
8th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ayoub
6th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Jones, 335 F.3d at 531 (stating that handyman’s authority to consent “would have ceased at the point that [defendant] denied consent”); see also United States v. Elam, 441 F.3d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have acknowledged (but never invoked) intentional bypass as a narrow exception to the Supreme Court’s third party consent principles, explaining that ‘police may not rely on a third party’s consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search.’”) (quoting United States v. Esparza,…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ayoub
6th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Jones, 335 F.3d at 531 (stating that handyman’s authority to consent “would have ceased at the point that [defendant] denied consent”); see also United States v. Elam, 441 F.3d 601, 604 (8th Cir.2006) (“[W]e have acknowledged (but never invoked) intentional bypass as a narrow exception to the Supreme Court’s third party consent principles, explaining that ‘police may not rely on a third party’s consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Esparza,…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Jose ESPARZA, Also Known as Franciso Zapata, Appellant
98-2178.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Oct 28, 1998.
162 F.3d 978
Mary M. Mateer, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for Appellant., Alison E. Yander Vort, Asst. U.S. Atty., Minneapolis, MN, argued, for Appellee.
McMillian, Fagg, Beam.
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published
FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Jose Esparza appeals his convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Esparza challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of a common bathroom in his apartment building conducted with his landlord’s consent. Esparza contends that without the evidence found in the bathroom, the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. Because we conclude the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we affirm.

Based on information received from a confidential reliable informant, police surveillance, and controlled drug buys, Minneapolis police suspected Esparza of drug trafficking and obtained a warrant to search his apartment. When the police executed the search, however, they rammed open the wrong apartment door, within earshot of Esparza’s apartment. The officers realized their mistake and entered Esparza’s apartment, but found only one of Esparza’s fellow drug traffickers, who said Esparza had left. To prevent Esparza’s escape, police officers were placed at the building’s exits. About forty-five minutes later, after finding several rounds of ammunition and some marijuana in Esparza’s apartment, the officers discovered a locked room down the hall. The landlord[*980] told police the room was a bathroom containing a single toilet for all the tenants’ use, and the room was probably occupied because it locked only with an inside latch. The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves as police at least three times in Spanish, and directed the occupant to open the door. The officers received no type of response and heard no noise coming from the room. They concluded Esparza was probably hiding inside and might have a gun and drugs with him because the search of his apartment had yielded bullets but no gun and no significant amount of drugs despite a controlled drug buy earlier that day. The landlord gave the police a crowbar and told them they could force the door open. After doing so, the police found Esparza sitting on the toilet and arrested him. In a nearby hole in the bathroom wall they saw a large plastic bag and the handle of a gun. Inside the hole, the officers found cocaine, heroin, and a handgun.

On appeal, Esparza asserts the warrantless bathroom search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against warrant-less searches does not apply when officers obtain voluntary consent from the person whose property is searched or from a third party with common authority over the property. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). “[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared,” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), but police may not rely on a third party’s consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search, see United States v. Brokaw, 985 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir.1993).

Esparza contends the landlord’s consent was invalid because Esparza had a greater privacy interest as the occupant of the single toilet bathroom and Esparza actively objected to the search by locking the bathroom door. Although Esparza had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the single toilet bathroom, see United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir.1989), we see no clear error in the district court’s finding that Esparza waived his privacy interest by failing to object to the search. When police knocked on the door and requested entry to the bathroom, Esparza did not respond. Although the door was locked, absent any response, the police could reasonably believe the landlord had authority to consent to a search of the common room. See Brokaw, 985 F.2d at 953; see also United States v. Czeck, 105 F.3d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir.1997).

Even if the officers lacked valid consent to search the bathroom, exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. Officers may search without a warrant when faced with certain urgent circumstances, such as the imminent destruction of evidence. See United States v. Ball, 90 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir.1996). Contrary to Esparza’s assertion, the police had probable cause to believe Esparza was hiding in the bathroom. Police knew Esparza had left his apartment, he had not left the building during the search, the bathroom was located down the hall from Esparza’s apartment, the bathroom door had been continuously locked for an abnormal period of time, and the occupant of the bathroom did not respond to police knocking and demands to open the door. Under these circumstances, there was a fair probability the silent bathroom occupant was Esparza rather than a law-abiding tenant. The police also had an objectively reasonable belief that Esparza possessed drugs and could dispose of them in the locked bathroom before the officers could obtain a warrant.

Having decided the search of the bathroom was valid, we need not decide whether the evidence was sufficient to support Esparza’s convictions absent the cocaine, heroin, and gun found in the bathroom. We thus affirm the district court.