United States v. Joanne Kwi Ye Estes, 166 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1998). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Joanne Kwi Ye Estes, 166 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the taxpayer has the burden of proving that it is entitled to a claimed deduction.”
10 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Allison (caed, 2022-02-25)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Allison
E.D. Cal. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the taxpayer has the burden of proving that it is entitled to a claimed deduction.
cited Cited "see" Hulsey v. Astrue
8th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 606 F.3d 994, 1005 (8th Cir.2010), MacKenzie v. Apfel, 166 F.3d 1218 , 1998 WL 894568 , at *3 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lowther v. Harrington
D. Haw. · 2020 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Mathis v. Ratelle, 166 F.3d 1218 (table), 1999 WL 49101 , at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]lthough the near-constant deprivation of sleep may constitute an 4 Although Lowther references a “lengthy time period,” ECF No. 15 at 6, he does not say how long he experienced the headcounts, nor does he identify how frequently they occurred. unconstitutional condition of confinement, we do not believe that a condition of confinement that occasionally makes sleeping difficult violates the Eighth Amendment.”); Goolsby v. County of San Diego, Case No. 17cv564-WQH-NLS, 2019 WL 140792 , at *2�…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Young v. General Services Administration
D.D.C. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Court’s review of the EISs led it to conclude that “the Forest Service took into account other needs and uses only to the extent that they permitted contract requirements to be met” and that they could not know “to what extent other alternatives, eliminated from the EISs because they did not meet volume requirements, might have been considered in detail.” Id.; see also Narrows Conservation Coalition v. Grantham, No. 98-35625, 166 F.3d 1218 , 1999 WL 49100 , at *3 (9th Cir. Feb.1, 1999) (“While we agree with Narrows’ assertion that reliance on either the TTRA 13 or the TLMP 14…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Joanne Kwi Ye Estes
98-15632.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Dec 17, 1998.
166 F.3d 1218
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 59%
Citer courts: E.D. California (1)

166 F.3d 1218

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joanne KWI YE ESTES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 98-15632.
D.C. Nos. CV-97-00606-ACK, CR-93-00225-ACK.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 14, 1998.[1]
Decided Dec. 17, 1998.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, Alan C. Kay, District Judge, Presiding.

Before BROWNING, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM

1

Joanne Kwi Ye Estes, a Hawaii state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging her guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crystal methamphetamine. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir.1996), and we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

2

With respect to her claim that she is entitled to a minor-role adjustment to her sentence, we conclude that Estes has waived this argument by not raising it at her sentencing hearing or on appeal. See McMullen, 98 F.3d at 1157. With respect to her claim that she is entitled to an additional adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, we reject her contention. See United States v. McClain, 30 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (holding that relevant event for "timeliness" determination is communication to prosecution of defendant's willingness to plead guilty).

3

With respect to Estes' claim that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to argue for a sentencing adjustment for a minor role in the crime and failed to file a notice of appeal, we decline to reach these issues because they were not raised below. See United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir.1992).[2]

4

Finally, Estes contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorneys' alleged failure to communicate her desire to plead guilty to prosecutors in a timely fashion. We conclude that the statements in Estes' reply to the government's response to her § 2255 motion concerning her counsel's failure to communicate her willingness to plead guilty were sufficient to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam)(pro se litigant's pleadings should be liberally construed). Accordingly, we remand so that the district court may conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

5

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

6

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

1

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4

2

We note that Estes has abandoned her claim that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to seek a continuance to wait for passage of the "safety valve" provision as part of the 1994 crime bill by not raising this contention on appeal