At page 1288 District court authority to impose concurrent federal sentence13 citing casesholding that "a district court does have the authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges.
- United States v. Bonny Lee Lewis, 626 F. App'x 896 (11th Cir. 2015).unpublished([A] district court does have the authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges[.])
- United States v. Marquis Vonterre Jones, 581 F. App'x 807 (11th Cir. 2014).unpublishedUnited States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003).
- United States v. Wilkins, 341 F. App'x 404 (10th Cir. 2009).unpublished([A] district court [has] the authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges.)
- Stephens v. Sabol, 539 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D. Mass. 2008).publishedThe federal court could have ordered a concurrent sentence, even though no state sentence had yet been imposed: under Eleventh Circuit law, “a district court does have the authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence…
- United States v. Mahendra Pratap Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2006).publishedUnited States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003).
- Aguilar v. Peterson, No. 04-6376 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 2006).unpublishedOn September 1, 1998, Aguilar was paroled on his Texas sentence and released to 2 Because Aguilar is a federal prisoner bringing a § 2241 petition, a certificate of appealability is not necessary. 3 Ordinarily, “a district court [has] the…
- United States v. Grimon, 440 F. App'x 830 (11th Cir. 2011).unpublishedSee United States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam).
- United States v. Albert Legette, III, 371 F. App'x 30 (11th Cir. 2010).unpublishedSee United States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003).
- United States v. Joseph Lee Williams, 361 F. App'x 45 (11th Cir. 2010).unpublishedSee United States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.1993).
- United States v. Roy David Queen, 159 F. App'x 81 (11th Cir. 2005).unpublished(holding that "a district court does have the authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges.)
Show 2 more citing cases
- United States v. Imran Mandhai, 140 F. App'x 54 (11th Cir. 2005).unpublishedSee United States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003).
- United States v. Crawford, 217 F. App'x 774 (10th Cir. 2007).unpublishedBr. at 5; see also United States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003).
v.
Phillip Wayne McDANIEL, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
Phillip Wayne McDaniel, Jr., appeals his 33 month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, McDaniel argues that the district court erred by ruling that it did not have the authority to order McDaniel’s sentence to run concurrently with an unimposed sentence on pending state charges. McDaniel maintains that if, at the time of his federal sentencing, he had already been sentenced in state court, his federal sentence would fall under the provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (b) or (c), which would mandate or at least allow for concurrent sentencing. He states that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3584, which governs the imposition of multiple sentences, indicates that a district court may order terms of imprisonment imposed at different times to run concurrently. He further contends that this Court’s decision in United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502 (11th Cir.1993), “specifically noted that both [18 U.S.C. § 3584] and the [Guidelines were silent ... on this situation” and that Ballard “directed that the lower courts consider the policy of § 5G1.3 as if the state sentence had been imposed and then consider the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 in order to determine if a consecutive or concurrent sentence is warranted.”
[*1288] The issue presented, whether a district court is authorized to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges, is one of first impression. It raises a pure question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 586 (11th Cir.1995) (articulating that pure questions of law are subject to de novo review).
Upon careful review of the record and our precedent, and upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, we find reversible error. Our opinion in United States v. Andrews, 330 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.2003), clarifies that under United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502 (11th Cir.1993), a district court does have the authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges, (“Ballard clearly concludes that a district court need not concern itself with whether a state sentence has already been imposed when determining whether to make the federal sentence consecutive or concurrent with the state sentence.” Id. (citing Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1504-10)). Because the district court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to impose a concurrent sentence, we vacate McDaniel’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED.