green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
37.8 score
“we find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.”
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 34 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Wills v. Stiles
the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Harris v. Bankers Life
(2×)
we find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jedra v. Wal-Mart Inc
Routinely faced with timeliness issues, the Second Circuit has crafted a bright-line rule: the “removal clock” starts once the defendant receives the complaint if the complaint “explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought.” Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Elliott v. Jaquez
Further, the Second Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule that the removal clock starts “when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.” Moltner, 624 F.3d at 38 (adopting In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)) (emphasis added).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rocket Mortgage, LLC v. Roth
Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vanderslice v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC
For cases removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, “the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.” In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(3) (“[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or o…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Reid v. Blair
(2×)
The Second Circuit rejected that rule, and instead, decided to follow the Eighth Circuit’s rule that the 30-day time limit begins running only when the defendant is served “with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought.” Id. at 38 (citing In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“We find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.”)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bamba v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS-FPS)
Reg. Sys., Inc., 749 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (adopting a “bright line rule” and quoting the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that “this rule promotes certainty and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire into what a particular defendant may or may not subjectively know” (quoting In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam))).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hudson v. Allstate Insurance Company
Although the parties both argue otherwise, this case as initially pled did not trigger the removal deadline because the Complaint did not “explicitly state the amount in controversy.”29 The Eighth Circuit has been adamant that § 1446(b)’s 30-day clock “begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.”30 This rule ensures that Courts will not be required “to inquire into what a particular defendant may or may not subjectively know.”31 If the initial pl…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Redfield v. Uthe
(2×)
Id. at 824 (citing Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 399 (personal injury); Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Akin v. Ashland Chem.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lee v. Werner Co.
The Eighth Circuit sets a low bar for defendants seeking removal under section 1446(b)(3), stating that “the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial 3 complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount.” In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jimenez-Castro v. Greenwich Insurance Company
The Second Circuit has expounded upon the rule in Whitaker and joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that “the removal clock does not start to run until the plaintiff serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought.” Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co. , 624 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing In re Willis , 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Almonte v. Target Corporation
However, in reaching that conclusion, Moltner relied on In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Slaughter v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Company
The thirty-day removal period of 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b) “begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.” Pirozzi, 938 F.3d at 985 (quoting In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Massage Envy Franchising v. Mark Pirozzi
The thirty-day removal period in § 1446(b)(3) “begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.” In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Gibson v. Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc.
(6×)
See Graiser, 819 F.3d at 285 (holding in CAFA case that § 1446(b)(3) time period begins to run when the plaintiff serves the defendant with a document “from which the defendant can unambiguously ascertain CAFA jurisdiction”; the defendant need not “search its own business records or perform an independent investigation” to determine removability (citation omitted)); Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 770 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding in CAFA case that § 1446(b) time periods begin to run “if plaintiff’s paper includes a clear statement of the damages sought or . . . sets forth …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Paros Properties LLC v. Colorado Casualty Insurance
Assessing the timeliness of removal should not involve a fact-intensive inquiry about what the defendant subjectively knew or should have discovered through independent investigation.”); In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“[T]he thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Portillo v. National Freight, Inc.
Judon, 773 F.3d at 509 n. 13 (citing Walker, 727 F.3d at 824 ); Romulus, 770 F.3d at 78 ; see also Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2010) (citations omitted) (“the removal clock does not start to run until the plaintiff serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought”); In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) (same); Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cutrone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. 1 period in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b) in Moltner, we joined the Eighth Circuit. 2 See 624 F.3d at 38 (citing In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) 3 (per curiam) (“We find the thirty‐day time limit of section 1446(b) 4 begins running upon the receipt of the initial complaint only when 5 the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in 6 excess of the federal jurisdictional amount[;] [t]his rule promotes 7 certainty and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire 8 into what a particular defendant may or m…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hubert Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc.
Servs., 707 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.2013) (clock begins running only when the basis for removal is “revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2010) (clock begins running only when “the plaintiff serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought”); In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) (clock begins running “only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amoun…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Valspar Corp.
However, the court finds instructive the holding in In re Willis, which interpreted the first paragraph of § 1446(b) within the context of determining the amount in controversy. 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Praisler v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.
Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196 , 206 (2d Cir.2001); In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products
Serv. at 1254, 1268 (explaining that the addition of the provision allowing removal when the initial pleading does not state a removable case was meant to codify the finding in Powers, 169 U.S. 92 , 18 S.Ct. 264 , to allow removal of an action whenever removability is disclosed). [51] See In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) ("thirty-day period begins running on receipt of complaint only when complaint explicitly discloses [basis for federal jurisdiction]"). [52] See 14C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert H. Harris v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company Kenneth L. Brown
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Accordingly, we find no error with the district court’s conclusion that removability could not be ascertained from the face of that document.”); In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) ("We find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.”); Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mendez v. Central Garden & Pet Co.
In Rowe v. Marder, 750 F.Supp. 718 (W.D.Pa.1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir.1991), the court stated that the 30-day period did not begin to run until the defendant could “ascertain easily the necessary facts to support his removal petition.” The court reasoned that “[t]o allow a document with less information to satisfy the statute would require the movant to ‘guess’ as to an action’s removability, thus encouraging premature, and often unwarranted, removal requests.” Rowe, 750 F.Supp. at 720 ; see also Whitaker v. American Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 205-6 (2nd Cir.2001) …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Entrekin v. Fisher Scientific Inc.
Recently, the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in finding that “the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.” In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 896 (8th Cir.2000).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Nguyen v. Kautz
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
The Eighth Circuit has recently adopted a bright-line rule that “the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.” In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000).
cited
Cited "see"
Baitinger v. Chippewa Properties, LLC
See Knudson v. Sys Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Midwest Surgical Center, LLC v. Overturf
See In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896 , 897 & n.1 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the notice of removal may be filed within thirty days of when the defendant first discovers the case is removable”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Tate v. Charter Communications LLC
See Knudson v. Systems Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). “[T]he issue is not whether the damages are in fact greater than $75,000.00, but whether a fact finder might legally conclude that they are.
discussed
Cited "see"
Cutrone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
See 624 F.3d at 38 (citing In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (“We find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon the receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount[;] [t]his rule promotes certainty and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire into what a particular defendant may or may not subjectively know.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted))).
discussed
Cited "see"
Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co.
See In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (“We find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.”); Quintana v. Werner Enters., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 7771, 2009 WL 3756334 (S.D.N.Y.
cited
Cited "see"
Quick v. Shell Oil Co.
See In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) ("thirty-day period begins running on receipt of complaint only when complaint explicitly discloses [basis for federal jurisdiction]”). .
cited
Cited "see"
In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (\MTBE\") Products Liability Litigation"
See In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896, 897 (8th Cir.2000) ("thirty-day period begins running on receipt of complaint only when complaint explicitly discloses [basis for federal jurisdiction]”). 47 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Curtis Bruce Willis, Petition for Writ of Mandamus
00-3134.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Oct 3, 2000.
William A. Brasher, argued, St. Louis, Missouri, for Petitioner., Christian L. Faiella, argued, Moberly, Missouri, for Respondent.
Bowman, Beam, Bye.
Cited by 41 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM.
Zachary Perry, a Missouri resident, filed this personal injury action in Missouri state court on October 7, 1999, against Virginia resident Curtis Bruce Willis. The complaint sought an unspecified amount of damages for pain and suffering, permanent disability, and wage loss. Following an initial round of discovery wherein Willis’ filed an Offer of Judgment in the amount of $75,001, Willis removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), asserting the court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Perry then moved to remand the case to state court, arguing the notice of removal was filed beyond the thirty-day time limit of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The district court agreed, reasoning that the case was removable when filed and therefore the alternative time limit [1] of section 1446(b) did not apply.
We disagree. We find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount. See Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir.1992). This rule “promotes certainty and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire into what a particular defendant may or may not subjectively know.” Id. Further, this rule prevents a plaintiff from disguising the amount of damages until after the thirty-day time limit has run to avoid removal to federal court. We therefore grant the petition for mandamus and direct the district court to reassume jurisdiction of the case and reinstate the case on its docket.
1
. Section 1446(b) provides that if the case as stated in the initial pleadings is not removable, the notice of removal may be filed within thirty days of when the defendant first discovers the case is removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).