green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
28.2 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2005 ·
…in earlier versions of the fca, the statute was abused by qui tam suits brought by private plaintiffs who had no independent knowledge of fraud.
at p. 1158
⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2001 ·
…we review mixed questions of law and fact de novo, particularly when they involve constitutional rights.
at p. 1154
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Allergan, Inc.
the compensation available to relators, however, encourages parasitic lawsuits in which those with no independent knowledge of fraud use information already available to the government to reap rewards for themselves without exposing any previously unknown fraud.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jevarien Z. Dunlap v. Bay Area Rapid Transit
In a qui tam suit, the relator asserts the FCA claim “on behalf of the government, which may 15 choose to intervene in the action” and “[i]f the relator is successful, she is entitled to a share of the 16 recovery, whether or not the government intervenes.” Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th 17 Cir. 2001) (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730 (d)(1), (2)). 18 The FCA provides that any person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a 19 false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” or who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to 20 be made or used, a false record or st…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Wagda v. Bank of America, National Association
Cal. July 1, 2022) (quoting 15 Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wagda v. AT&T Corp.
In a qui tam suit, the relator 13 asserts the FCA claim “on behalf of the government, which may 14 choose to intervene in the action” and “[i]f the relator is 15 successful, [they are] entitled to a share of the recovery, 16 whether or not the government intervenes.” Seal 1 v. Seal A, 17 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 31 U.S.C. 18 §§ 3730(d)(1),(2)). 19 The United States declined to intervene.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA
To rule that a district court cannot award attorneys’ fees even when it determines that a Relator brought a frivolous suit just because the jurisdictional bar applies would undermine one of the key purposes of the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act—“to discourage ‘parasitic’ suits brought by individuals with no information of their own to contribute to the suit.” 15 United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., *711 457 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Paramjeet Malhotra v. Robert Steinberg
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
All that Seal 1 requires is that the recipient of the disclosure be “an outsider to the investigation who now seeks to profit from it as an FCA relator.” Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States ex rel. Fryberger v. Kiewit Pacific Co.
This test comports with the underlying purpose of the public disclosure bar, which is to discourage “parasitic lawsuits in which those with no independent knowledge of fraud use information already available to the government to reap rewards for themselves without exposing any previously unknown fraud.” Seal 1 v. Seal A 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States ex rel. Schubert v. All Children's Health System, Inc.
See § 3730(e)(4)(A)(ii); Dkt. 22-1 ¶ 3 (averring that the documents were produced in response to a subpoena served as part of a joint federal-Florida investigation between the Florida Office of the Attorney General, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, and the United States Department of Justice); Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1157, 1161-62 (9th Cir.2001) (disclosure of documents obtained by the United States Attorneys Office to the relator as part of a federal investigation constitutes “public disclosure”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas Berg v. Honeywell International, Inc.
In Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th Cir.2001), the court employed Schumer’s reasoning to hold that information was publicly disclosed because the government disclosed it to an “outsider to the [ ] investigation” with a “significant incentive (and no disincentive) to use the allegations” to his own advantage.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States ex rel. Banigan v. Organon USA Inc.
Defendants’ reliance on Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th Cir.2001), is misplaced.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Law Project for Psychiatric Rights Ex Rel. United States v. Matsutani
In light of our case law’s broad construction of “investigation” in this statute, see Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.2001), the Utah Attorney General’s correspondence qualifies as an enumerated source. 2.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
P. Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L. A.
Cf. Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
P. Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L. A.
Cf. Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Campbell v. Redding Medical Center
We have previously noted that, “[i]n earlier versions of the FCA, the statute was abused by qui tam suits brought by private plaintiffs who had no independent knowledge of fraud.” Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Campbell v. Redding Medical Center
We have previously noted that, "[i]n earlier versions of the FCA, the statute was abused by qui tam suits brought by private plaintiffs who had no independent knowledge of fraud." Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cambell v. United States
We have pre- viously noted that, “[i]n earlier versions of the FCA, the stat- ute was abused by qui tam suits brought by private plaintiffs who had no independent knowledge of fraud.” Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States ex rel. Schwartz v. Trw, Inc.
DISCUSSION III This discovery dispute focuses on relator’s qui tarn cause of action under the False Claims Act, which “is a tool to fight fraud on the government.” Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 122 S.Ct. 1605 , 152 L.Ed.2d 620 (2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States Ex Rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc.
Public Disclosure Bar Jurisdiction over qui tam actions is limited by § 3730(e)(4)(A) of the FCA which provides that: “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over [a FCA action] ... based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing ... unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(A). 6 The purpose of this provision is to discourage opportunistic FCA suits by individuals “with no independent knowledge of [the] fraud [who] …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. JAVIER M.
(2×)
United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 255 F.3d 1154, 1154 (9th Cir.2001). "[W]e review mixed questions of law and fact de novo, particularly when they involve constitutional rights." State v. Hernandez, 1997-NMCA-006 , ¶ 18, 122 N.M. 809 , 932 P.2d 499 . {18} An individual is subject to custodial interrogation when he or she lacks the freedom to leave to an extent equal to formal arrest.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Munoz-Perez
See United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728 , 730–32 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Apr. 25, 2001), amended, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) (suspect who was caught and returned to a larger group of suspects after fleeing was not in custody); Cabrera, 83 F.4th at 735 (holding that suspect detained between border fences was not in custody without reference to whether members of the public were present).
cited
Cited "see"
ARAMBULA-BRAVO
See United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Matter of Ruiz-Romero, 22 I&N Dec. 486, 492 (BIA 1999).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Mario Gonzalez-Corn
See United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 732 (9th Cir.2001) (“A defendant’s admissions that he is an alien, together with a deportation order, suffice to establish alienage.”), amended on other grounds, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority
See Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th Cir.2001); cf. United States ex rel.
cited
Cited "see"
Oppedisano v. Holder
See United States v. Galindo‐Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 734 , amended, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).
cited
Cited "see"
Oppedisano v. Holder
See United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 734 , amended, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited "see"
United States ex rel. Lancaster v. Boeing Co.
See Seal, 255 F.3d at 1161 ; Schumer, 63 F.3d at 1518 .
cited
Cited "see"
US EX REL. LANCASTER v. Boeing Company
See Seal, 255 F.3d at 1161; Schumer, 63 F.3d at 1518 .
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
See Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.2001).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Louis Joseph Bahamonde
See Guam v. Palomo, 35 F.3d 368 , 374 (9th Cir.1994), overrated on other grounds by United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Lewis, 979 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Bahamonde
See Guam v. Palomo, 35 F.3d 368 , 374 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lewis, 979 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1992).
cited
Cited "see"
United States Ex Rel. Longstaffe v. Litton Industries, Inc.
See Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154,1159 (9th Cir.2001).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Julian Galindo-Gallegos, AKA Jose Reyes-Olague, AKA Aurelio Garcia-Chairez, AKA Jose Olague Reyes
No. 99-50585 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Argued and Submitted July 12, 2000 Filed March 27, 2001 NOTE: SEE AMENDED OPINION AT 255 F.3d 1154 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Mendez-Argueta
See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 732 (9th Cir.), amended by 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Quintana-Torres, 235 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir.2000).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Julian GALINDO-GALLEGOS, AKA Jose Reyes-Olague, AKA Aurelio Garcia-Chairez, AKA Jose Olague Reyes, Defendant-Appellant
v.
Julian GALINDO-GALLEGOS, AKA Jose Reyes-Olague, AKA Aurelio Garcia-Chairez, AKA Jose Olague Reyes, Defendant-Appellant
99-50585.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jul 12, 2001.
Debra A. Dilorio, Dilorio & Hall, San Diego, California, for the appellant., Kevin J. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, San Diego, California, for the appellee.
Rymer, Kleinfeld, Paez.
Cited by 11 opinions | Published
ORDER
The slip opinion filed March 27, 2001 and amended April 25, 2001, is amended as follows:
At slip opinion 5225, lines 4-6 of the text, delete the sentence, “Whether a person is ‘in custody’ for purposes of Miranda is essentially a question of fact reviewed for clear error.” Replace with: Whether a person is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda is a mixed question of law and fact warranting de novo review. Before Thompson v. Keohane, we reviewed whether a suspect was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda as a question of fact, for clear error, under People of the Territory of Guam v. Palomo. We have, since Thompson, reviewed de novo, as Thompson requires, without mentioning Palomo. A panel may overrule the decision of a prior panel when “an intervening Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit, and both cases are closely on point.” To avoid future confusion, we expressly recognize that Palomo’s clear error standard of review has been overruled.