Whitehead v. State, 685 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). · Go Syfert
Whitehead v. State, 685 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Fane Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida (ca11, 2013-04-01)
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fane Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 685 So.2d 894, 895 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (finding “Agreed Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment” insufficient for collateral estoppel because the issues were never “actually litigated” and also not a final judgment); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. e (“In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actually litigated.”).
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Christopher WHITEHEAD
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 96-473.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov 15, 1996.
685 So. 2d 894
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and M.A. Lucas, Assistant Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for Appellant., Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and E. Paul Stanley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.
Cobb, Sharp, Thompson.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
W. SHARP, Judge.

Whitehead appeals from his sentence imposed after entering into a plea agreement with the state. The state concedes that the sentence he received of six months probation for reckless driving[1] was illegal. Section 316.192(2)(a) provides:

Any person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished: (a) upon a first conviction, by imprisonment for a period of not more than 90 days or by fine of not less than $25.00 nor more than $500.00, or by both such fines and imprisonment.

The record does not show that Whitehead had previously been convicted of reckless driving. Thus the probationary term could not have exceeded 90 .days. Nor could Whitehead have agreed to an illegal sentence, one that exceeds the maximum statutory term. Cheney v. State, 640 So.2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Dyer v. State, 629 So.2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Conrey v. State, 624 So.2d 793 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

Sentence VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing.

COBB and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
1

§ 316.192, Fla. Stat. (1995).