Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (2025)

Reckless driving.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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316.192 Reckless driving.—

(1)(a) Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.

(b) Fleeing a law enforcement officer in a motor vehicle is reckless driving per se.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), any person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished:

(a) Upon a first conviction, by imprisonment for a period of not more than 90 days or by fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(b) On a second or subsequent conviction, by imprisonment for not more than 6 months or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(3) Any person:

(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);

(b) Who operates a vehicle; and

1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

2. Serious bodily injury to another commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. The term “serious bodily injury” means an injury to another person, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, $5 shall be added to a fine imposed pursuant to this section. The clerk shall remit the $5 to the Department of Revenue for deposit in the Emergency Medical Services Trust Fund.

(5) In addition to any other penalty provided under this section, if the court has reasonable cause to believe that the use of alcohol, chemical substances set forth in s. 877.111, or substances controlled under chapter 893 contributed to a violation of this section, the court shall direct the person so convicted to complete a DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation as provided in s. 316.193(5) within a reasonable period of time specified by the court. If the DUI program conducting such course and evaluation refers the person to an authorized substance abuse treatment provider for substance abuse evaluation and treatment, the directive of the court requiring completion of such course, evaluation, and treatment shall be enforced as provided in s. 322.245. The referral to treatment resulting from the DUI program evaluation may not be waived without a supporting independent psychosocial evaluation conducted by an authorized substance abuse treatment provider, appointed by the court, which shall have access to the DUI program psychosocial evaluation before the independent psychosocial evaluation is conducted. The court shall review the results and recommendations of both evaluations before determining the request for waiver. The offender shall bear the full cost of this procedure. If a person directed to a DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation or referred to treatment under this subsection fails to report for or complete such course, evaluation, or treatment, the DUI program shall notify the court and the department of the failure. Upon receipt of such notice, the department shall cancel the person’s driving privilege, notwithstanding the terms of the court order or any suspension or revocation of the driving privilege. The department may reinstate the driving privilege upon verification from the DUI program that the education, evaluation, and treatment are completed. The department may temporarily reinstate the driving privilege on a restricted basis upon verification that the offender is currently participating in treatment and has completed the DUI education course and evaluation requirement. If the DUI program notifies the department of the second failure to complete treatment, the department shall reinstate the driving privilege only after notice of successful completion of treatment from the DUI program.

History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 1, ch. 76-31; s. 23, ch. 85-167; s. 1, ch. 85-337; s. 1, ch. 88-5; s. 17, ch. 91-255; s. 31, ch. 92-78; s. 10, ch. 94-306; s. 4, ch. 99-234; s. 9, ch. 2001-122; s. 1, ch. 2001-147; s. 9, ch. 2006-290.

Note.—Former s. 316.029.

Arrestable Offenses under F.S. 316.192

M = misdemeanor · F = felony · degree: F=1st S=2nd T=3rd

§316.192(1a)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVING 1ST OFFM · 2nd

§316.192(1a)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLREMOVEDM · 2nd

§316.192(2a)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVING 1ST OFFM · 2nd

§316.192(2b)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVING SUBSQ OFFM · 2nd

§316.192(3a1)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVE DAMAGE PERSON OR PROPERTYM · 1st

§316.192(3a2)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVE CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURYF · 3rd

§316.192(3b1)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVE DAMAGE PERSON OR PROPERTYM · 1st

§316.192(3b2)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVE CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURYF · 3rd

§316.192(3c1)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVE DAMAGE PERSON OR PROPERTYM · 1st

§316.192(3c2)MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLRECKLESS DRIVE CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURYF · 3rd

Civil Citations under F.S. 316.192

Driver's license points · R = revocation · S = suspension

§316.192(1)aRECKLESS DRIVING4 pts

§316.192(1)aReckless Driving - When reduced from D.U.I.4 pts

§316.192(3)(a)(b)(c)1Reckless Driving - Property damage/personal injury4 pts

§316.192(3)(a)(b)(c)2Reckless Driving-SBI [See 322.26(3)]R

§316.192(3)(c)1Reckless Driving - Property damage/personal injury4 pts

§316.192(3)(c)2Reckless Driving-SBI [See 322.26(3)] (use if offense prior to 10/1/2010)R

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 88 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: In re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Rreport No. 2012-08, 131 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2013).

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In re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Rreport No. 2012-08, 131 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2013). · cites it 13× “Give if Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (l)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.”

Leon F. Harrigan v. Ernesto Rodriguez, 977 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2020). “1935 (3)(a); (2) reckless driving, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (1); (3) leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage, in violation of Fla.”

Jackson v. State, 456 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). · cites it 4× “" § 316.192, Fla. Stat. (1982 Supp.); McCreary v.”

State v. Barritt, 531 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1988). · cites it 4× “§ 316.192, Fla. Stat. (1985). Each offense contains a statutory element not present in the other which by statutory definition means they are separate offenses subject to separate convictions and punishment.”

Michael Roy Smith v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 983 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2020). · cites it 3× “” [ Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (1)(a) (2012))]. “Willful” means “intentional, knowing and purposeful” and “wanton” means “with a conscious and intentional indifference to consequences and with the knowledge that damage is likely to be done to persons or property.”

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). · cites it 7× “Give if Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (1)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.”

Damoah v. State, 189 So. 3d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). · cites it 4× “4th DCA 2011) (quoting § 316.192(1)(a), Fla. Stat.). “ ‘Willful’ means ‘intentional, knowing, and purposeful,’ and ‘wanton’ means with a ‘conscious and intentional indifference to consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to persons or property.”

State v. Harbaugh, 754 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2000). · cites it 2× “§ 316.192(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Given, therefore, that every element of felony DUI must be proven to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury, unless waived by the defendant, must decide the issue regarding the three prior convictions.”

Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2008). · cites it 2× “(citing § 316.192(2)(b), Fla. Stat.; State v. Woodruff, 676 So.”

Santisteban v. State, 72 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). · cites it 2× “2d DCA 2003); § 316.192(1), Fla. Stat. In determining whether a defendant was driving recklessly, the essential inquiry is whether the defendant knowingly drove the vehicle in such a manner and under such conditions as was likely to cause death or great bodily harm.”

Collins v. State, 605 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). · cites it 5× “[4] § 316.192, Fla. Stat. (1989). [5] § 316.193(3)(a), (b), (c)2, Fla.”

Smith v. State, 218 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). · cites it 3× “This court has explained that “[mjerely proving careless driving is insufficient to sustain a conviction [under section 316.192].” State v. Del Rio, 854 So.”

Show all 88 citing cases →

— 316.192(1) — 23 cases

Santisteban v. State, 72 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). “2d DCA 2003); § 316.192(1), Fla. Stat. In determining whether a defendant was driving recklessly, the essential inquiry is whether the defendant knowingly drove the vehicle in such a manner and under such conditions as was likely to cause death or great bodily harm.”

Miller v. State, 636 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

State v. Lebron, 954 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Daniel v. Vill. of Royal Palm Beach, 889 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

State v. Esposito, 642 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

— 316.192(1)(a) — 8 cases

State v. Abbey, 28 So. 3d 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Damoah v. State, 189 So. 3d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). “4th DCA 2011) (quoting § 316.192(1)(a), Fla. Stat.). “ ‘Willful’ means ‘intentional, knowing, and purposeful,’ and ‘wanton’ means with a ‘conscious and intentional indifference to consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to persons or property.”

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). “Give if Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (1)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.”

Timothy Anderson v. State of Florida, 247 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

Timothy Anderson v. State of Florida (Fla. 2020).

— 316.192(1)(f) — 1 case

State v. Mehl, 602 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

— 316.192(2) — 3 cases

Barr v. State, 655 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Cantlon v. State, 98 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

Carroll v. State, 742 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 316.192(2)(a) — 5 cases

Barr v. State, 674 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1996).

Fonteyne v. State, 855 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Whitehead v. State, 685 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

Pruitt v. State, 682 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

Cantlon v. State, 98 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

— 316.192(2)(b) — 4 cases

State v. Harbaugh, 754 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2000). “§ 316.192(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Given, therefore, that every element of felony DUI must be proven to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury, unless waived by the defendant, must decide the issue regarding the three prior convictions.”

Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2008). “(citing § 316.192(2)(b), Fla. Stat.; State v. Woodruff, 676 So.”

State v. Woodruff, 676 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1996).

Wilson v. State, 749 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

— 316.192(3) — 3 cases

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). “Give if Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (1)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.”

Cantlon v. State, 98 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

State v. Barnette, 9 Fla. Supp. 2d 64 (Fla. Cty. Ct. 1985).

— 316.192(3)(c) — 2 cases

Lott v. State, 74 So. 3d 556 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). “Give if Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (1)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.”

— 316.192(3)(c)(2) — 1 case

Cantlon v. State, 98 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

— 316.192(3)(c)(l) — 1 case

Cantlon v. State, 98 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

— 316.192(b)(c) — 1 case

State v. Lopez-Ona, 32 Fla. Supp. 2d 157 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989).

— 316.192(l)(a) — 8 cases

In re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Rreport No. 2012-08, 131 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2013). “Give if Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (l)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.”

Smith v. State, 218 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). “This court has explained that “[mjerely proving careless driving is insufficient to sustain a conviction [under section 316.192].” State v. Del Rio, 854 So.”

Piggott v. State, 140 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

Luzardo v. State, 147 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

— 316.192(l)(b) — 1 case

In re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Rreport No. 2012-08, 131 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2013). “Give if Fla. Stat. § 316.192 (l)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged.”

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