City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). · Go Syfert
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City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs”
15 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Treminio v. Crowley Maritime Corporation (flmd, 2023-12-13)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Treminio v. Crowley Maritime Corporation
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doe 1 v. Crowley Maritime Corporation
M.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
Under Florida law, “a statute of limitations period runs from the time the cause of action accrues” and a “cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Treminio v. Crowley Maritime Corporation (2×) also: Cited "see"
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
Under Florida law, “a statute of limitations period runs from the time the cause of action accrues. ‘A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’ Put another way, the limitations period begins to run when the action ‘may be brought.’” City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (1); Lewis v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 305 F. App’x 623 , 626–27 (11th Cir. 2008); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d 1514, 1518 (11th Ci…
cited Cited as authority (rule) EDWARD SCHNEIDERMAN, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE of LENORE TEPPER v. DANIELLE BAER, MERRITT BAER, and EAVLYN BAER
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Garofalo v. Proskauer Rose LLP, 253 So. 3d 2, 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
cited Cited as authority (rule) STEPHEN GAROFALO v. PROSKAUER ROSE, LLP
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) VICTORVILLE WEST LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. THE INVERRARY ASSOCIATION, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Owners Ass’n, 135 So.3d 365, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hummer v. Adams Homes of Northwest Florida, Inc. (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
I fully recognize that dismissal of a complaint under the statute of limitations should be reserved for “extraordinary circumstances,” Wishnatzki, 884 So.2d at 285, “where it is ‘inescapably clear from the face of the complaint that the suit was filed beyond the statutory period,’ ” City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Roehner v. Atl.
cited Cited as authority (rule) CCM Pathfinder Palm Harbor Management, LLC v. Unknown Heirs, Devisees, Grantees, Assignees, Lienors, Creditors, Trustees, or other of Norman W. Gendron
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Travis Co. v. Mayes, 36 So. 2d 264, 265 (Fla. 1948); City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CCM Pathfinder Palm Harbor Management, LLC v. Unknown Heirs
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Travis Co. v. Mayes, 160 Fla. 375 , 36 So.2d 264, 265 (1948); City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Deutsche Bank v. Beauvais
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
A. The Statute of Limitations and a Contractual Acceleration Clause Under the relevant statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes, “[a]n action to foreclose a mortgage” “shall be commenced. . . within five years.” The statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues, and “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. Aberdeen Property Owners Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
As this court has noted, “[p]ut another way, the limitations period begins to run when the action 'may be brought.’ ” City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing State Farm Mut.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, a political subdivision of the State of Florida
v.
Gladys J. REED, George S. Johnson and Bobbie Johnson, his wife, their heirs, successors, and/or assigns and any other parties claiming by, through or under them, State of Florida, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Seibels Bruce Insurance Co., and Lawrence Shuler, Jr.
No. 4D07-3102.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jul 16, 2008.
987 So. 2d 168
Karen E. Roselli and Thomas J. Baird of Baird & Roselli, North Palm Beach, for appellant., Gwendolyn S. Tuggle of Gwendolyn Key Tuggle, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appel-lees Gladys J. Reed, George S. Johnson and Bobbie Johnson, his wife.
Gross, Stevenson.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
STEVENSON, J.

In this lawsuit initiated by the City of Riviera Beach to foreclose certain utility and special assessment liens, the trial court dismissed the amended complaint on the ground that the action was filed outside of the statute of limitations period. Because the latest of these liens were recorded on September 17, 1996, and the foreclosure action was filed on July 1, 2005, we agree that the five-year limitations period has run and the amended complaint was properly dismissed.

By city council resolution dated May 3, 1995, the City of Riviera Beach acquired liens against property owned by the appel-lees for the non-payment of various water, sewer, lot cleaning and demolition special assessments billed from 1985-95. The City recorded the liens in the Palm Beach County official records books on July 7, 1995, and September 17, 1996. The City initiated this foreclosure action on July 1, 2005, and filed its amended complaint on December 6, 2006. On the appellees’ motion, the trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, ruling that the present suit is time-barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations.

In its amended complaint, the City requests relief under sections 153.67 and 159.17, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 153.67 establishes liens for the nonpayment of water or sewer charges. Section 159.17 establishes liens for unpaid water, sewer, or gas service charges. Both statutes instruct that the respective liens are[*170] enforceable in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. See §§ 158.67, 159.17, Fla. Stat. (2005).

Section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), establishes a five-year limitations period for an action to foreclose a mortgage. The City maintains that the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the City filed the instant foreclosure action, and that it had twenty years to foreclose on the liens under the statute of repose pertaining to mortgage liens with no ascertainable maturity date. See § 95.281(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995).[1] The City also raises the procedural issue that the statute of limitations bar was not a proper ground for dismissal.

Section 95.081, Florida Statutes, instructs that a statute of limitations period runs from the time the cause of action accrues. § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2005); Margolis v. Andromides, 732 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). Put another way, the limitations period begins to run when the action “may be brought.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 678 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla.1996). The City had the legal ability to foreclose on the liens in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property as early as 1995, when it acquired the liens. Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling that the recording of the liens triggered the five-year statute of limitations. Cf. County Collection Servs., Inc. v. Allen, 650 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that code enforcement hens had accrued on the date they were recorded). The City acquired its liens in 1995 and recorded them in 1995 and 1996. Based on the recording dates of the liens, the limitations period ended in 2000 and 2001, several years before the City filed the instant foreclosure action.

The City also argues that the statute of limitations was an improper ground for dismissing its amended complaint. We find that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds because the facts in support thereof “ ‘affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and establish conclusively that the statute of limitations bars the action as a matter of law.’ ” Aquatic Plant Mgmt., Inc. v. Paramount Eng’g, Inc., 977 So.2d 600, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Bott v. City of Marathon, 949 So.2d 295, 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citation omitted)); Roehner v. Atl. Coast Dev. Corp., 356 So.2d 1296, 1297 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (holding that dismissal is appropriate where it is “inescapably clear from the face of the complaint that the suit was filed beyond the statutory period”); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b) (“Any exhibit attached to a pleading shall be considered a part thereof for all purposes.”).

Affirmed.

GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.
1

The City correctly acknowledges that a lien’s duration under the statute of repose is subject to the running of the five-year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Houck Corp. v. New River, Ltd., Pasco, 900 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that the twenty-year statute of repose was not a statute of limitations and did not alter the unequivocal five-year limitations period enunciated in section 95.11, Florida Statutes).