SELYA, Circuit Judge. A writer is free to assume a nom de plume. That is why Mark Twain and Bob Dylan are better known than Samuel Clemens and Robert Zimmerman. But, as a rule, litigants in federal court must publicly reveal their true names. In this appeal, we tackle a question of first impression in this circuit: when is it appropriate for a party to a civil suit in federal court to appear under a pseudonym? This important question pits the individual's desire for privacy against the public's need to access judicial proceedings. After determining the appropriate standard for adjudicating motions for leave to proceed under pseudonyms, we vacate the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion and remand to the district court for application of the discerned standard.

I

Drawing upon the complaint, we briefly rehearse the facts (largely undisputed for present purposes) and travel of the case. In 2013 — during his first year of college at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) — plaintiff-appellant John Doe formed a relationship with a classmate whom we shall call "Jane Roe." This relationship included episodic sexual intercourse and lasted until the summer of 2014. But even after the couple broke up, they occasionally had consensual sex during the fall 2014 semester.

- 3 - On the evening of February 26, 2015, Jane went to John's residence for help repairing her computer and agreed to spend the night in his bed. The pair fell asleep. At some point in the early morning hours on February 27, they had sexual intercourse. John says that he observed Jane "fully conscious, alert, and with wide open eyes" and that she provided a variety of nonverbal cues throughout the interaction, thus signaling her effective consent. Afterward, though, Jane asked John what had happened. John replied that sexual intercourse had taken place. A few months later, Jane told John that "the sex they had when she was asleep was not okay." In January of 2016, Jane filed a formal complaint with MIT's Title IX office alleging nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse occurring on February 27, 2015. That office launched an investigation, which involved interviewing both John and Jane (as well as other students) and reviewing documents. On their own initiative, the MIT investigators added a second charge against John for sexual harassment arising from conduct during the 2013- 2014 school year (when John and Jane were still in a relationship). In a written report, the investigators found John responsible for both charges. Following its receipt of the investigators' report, MIT designated a panel of three faculty members drawn from its Committee on Discipline (the Committee) to consider the matter. On April 25, 2016, the panel held a hearing. John denied responsibility, but two days later the chair of the Committee - 4 - informed John by letter that MIT had found him responsible for nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse on February 27, 2015 and sexual harassment during the earlier period. The Committee's letter also informed John that he would be expelled. John appealed the Committee's findings and sanction. He argued that, given Jane's nonverbal signals throughout the encounter — which, he said, fit the pattern established in their history of consensual intimacy — he reasonably believed that Jane was awake and had effectively consented to sexual intercourse on February 27, 2015. He also argued that expulsion was unwarranted because, although he maintained that he reasonably "thought [he] had effective consent" from Jane, he took "responsibility for making a terrible judgement call." MIT denied the appeal a few weeks later and expelled John just prior to his anticipated graduation. On December 16, 2021, John — by then married and working as a software engineer in New Jersey — filed suit against MIT in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. His suit invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 The complaint alleged breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and denial of basic fairness. Its gist was that MIT's investigation We begin by clarifying the source of the presumption against the use of pseudonyms in federal civil litigation.2 The courts of appeals have endorsed this presumption without fully explicating its legal foundation. We think it important to fill this gap.

To begin, the presumption has no footing in the United States Code. No federal statute prohibits litigants from filing

2This opinion addresses only the use of pseudonyms in federal civil litigation. It does not purport to address the possible use of pseudonyms in criminal cases, which may present a different mix of considerations.

- 11 - civil actions under fictitious names. By the same token, such a presumption is not perfectly traceable to any federal constitutional provision or rule.

Withal, the Civil Rules do offer some comfort for this presumption. They provide that "[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties," Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), and that "[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," id. 17(a)(1). These provisions afford a toehold for the presumption against the use of pseudonyms (as we observed in Does 1-3, 39 F.4th at 25). But it is less than obvious that a party's "name" in this context means his true name, to the exclusion of a pseudonym. Cf. Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (rejecting "highly mechanical interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" that would preclude using pseudonym). And if the Civil Rules should be read to mandate that a complaint state the parties' true names, it would be odd that courts have converted this command into a rebuttable presumption. Cf. United States v. Tsarnaev, 142

S. Ct. 1024, 1036 (2022) (explaining that "supervisory rules" made by federal courts cannot "conflict with or circumvent a Federal Rule" (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996))).

More to the point is the right of public access to judicial proceedings and documents. The courts of appeals have recognized a qualified First Amendment right of public access to

- 12 - certain documents filed in civil litigation. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Quinlan, 32 F.4th 15, 20 n.8 (1st Cir. 2022) (collecting cases). So, too, the Supreme Court has recognized "a common-law right of access to judicial records," with the caveat that such a right "is not absolute." Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); see Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir. 2011); In re Providence J. Co., 293 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2002). But we have never held that the right of public access (whether derived from the First Amendment or from the common law) forbids the use of a pseudonym in civil litigation.

It is true, of course, that in Does 1-3 we noted the "tension" between that common law right and the use of pseudonyms.

39 F.4th at 25. However, that opinion cannot fairly be read as formally grounding the presumption against pseudonymous litigation in the common law right of public access to judicial documents. Instead, the right of public access to judicial documents is of a piece with, but does not directly produce, the judicial stance against litigants' use of pseudonyms. See Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est. (Kamehameha Schs. I), 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing presumption against pseudonymity as "loosely related to the public's right to open courts").

In our view, federal courts enforce the presumption against party pseudonyms in civil litigation under their inherent

- 13 - power to "formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress." Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 426 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)). This inherent power applies foursquare to the presumption against pseudonymity, which is a "polic[y] intrinsic to the litigation process." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 n.5 (1985) (citation omitted). Courts have distilled such a presumption from a brew of custom and principle, including the values underlying the right of public access to judicial proceedings and documents under the common law and First Amendment. See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185 (describing presumption against pseudonyms as "a procedural custom fraught with constitutional overtones"); In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (discussing "deeply rooted tradition" against party pseudonymity); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 Va. L. Rev. 813, 823 n.23 (2008) ("[J]udges fashion much federal common law, including procedural common law, by drawing from norms generally accepted by the legal community.").

Judicial hostility to a party's use of a pseudonym springs from our Nation's tradition of doing justice out in the open, neither "in a corner nor in any covert manner." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New

- 14 - Jersey, reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties 188 (Richard L. Perry ed. 1959)). In defending that tradition, we have explained that "[p]ublic access to judicial records and documents allows the citizenry to 'monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal system.'" Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 410 (quoting In re Cont'l Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984)). "Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness." Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). That is because — to a certain degree — letting a party hide behind a pseudonym dims the public's perception of the matter and frustrates its oversight of judicial performance.

Lacking knowledge of the parties' names, the public could learn virtually nothing about a case outside the facts and arguments in the record. The record, though, is not the alpha and omega of public concern. To take one example of important extra- record data, the real-world aftermath of a suit will sometimes bear upon the assessment of whether justice was done. Another example is the kind of institutional rot that is scrubbed from the record: judicial conflicts of interest, ex parte contacts, and the like. Anonymizing the parties lowers the odds that journalists, activists, or other interested members of the public would catch wind of such mischief. See Globe Newspaper Co. v.

- 15 - Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 503-04 (1st Cir. 1989) (acknowledging "the contribution to governance of investigative reporting" regarding such matters).

An even thornier issue involves protecting the appearance of fairness in judicial proceedings. "Litigating behind a curtain creates a shroud of mystery, giving the impression that something secret is going on." In re Boeing 737 MAX Pilots Litig., No. 19-5008, 2020 WL 247404, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2020). Secrecy breeds suspicion. Some may believe that a party's name was masked as a means of suppressing inconvenient facts and that the court was either asleep at the wheel or complicit in the cover up. It is no answer to dismiss such beliefs as conspiracy theories because "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). Distrust is toxic to the judiciary's authority, which "depends in large measure on the public's willingness to respect and follow its decisions." Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 445-46 (2015). A judicial system replete with Does and Roes invites cynicism and undermines public confidence in the courts' work.

The short of it is that the strong presumption against the use of pseudonyms in civil litigation rests on a sturdy foundation. With this assurance in hand, we proceed to address the standard for determining when a party may litigate under a pseudonym.

- 16 -

IV

In deciding when the use of a pseudonym in civil litigation may be warranted, several of our sister circuits have devised elaborate multi-factor tests. These various tests pit the movant's quest for anonymity against an array of countervailing interests. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). The Second Circuit, for example, has held that "the plaintiff's interest in anonymity must be balanced against both the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant." Id.

Many of these suggested tests involve non-exhaustive lists of up to ten factors. See In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97 (citing cases). "Some factors are 'specific aspects of a plaintiff's potential privacy interests' or the weight to be given those interests, but others 'go more to the weight of the countervailing interest in open judicial proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).

Regrettably, these multi-factor tests do not establish a clear standard. See, e.g., Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est. (Kamehameha Schs. II), 625 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (observing that "[f]ive part or seven part or other multi- part tests are often subject to subjective and inconsistent application" and, in some instances, make "appellate review

- 17 - extremely difficult, and precedent of little value"); Doe v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. 19-1584, 2019 WL 5683437, at *2 & n.10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. ^[1], 2019) (noting judicial opinions involving this subject matter "frequently read as a rote recitation of factors with a conclusion tacked on the end"). That amorphous quality hampers their utility. One distinguished academic — who appears as an amicus here — has commented that "the factors are often so vague or ambiguous that, by themselves, they provide relatively little guidance." Eugene Volokh, The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation, 73 Hastings L.J. 1353, 1426 (2022). Professor Volokh's amicus brief invites us to eschew a multi-factor balancing test in favor of identifying "narrow categorical limitations or exceptions . . ., tailored to unusual categories of cases that sufficiently distinguish themselves from the norm." In support, he notes (among other things) that the Civil Rules already provide a categorical exception with respect to minors. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with the court that contains . . . the name of an individual known to be a minor, . . . a party or nonparty making the filing may include only . . . the minor's initials.").

We decline to accept this invitation to try our hand at crafting sharp, categorical exceptions to the strong presumption against pseudonymity in civil litigation. Because the problem is complex and the cases are not all cut from the same cloth, some

- 18 - effort to balance a gallimaufry of relevant factors is inevitable. But assembling a compendium of relevant factors is a tricky enterprise and — in our judgment — the appropriate test must center on the totality of the circumstances. See In re Chiquita Brands Int'l Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1247 n.5 (11th Cir. 2020); see also In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97 (explaining that precise list of factors matters less than whether court took proper account of "the factors relevant to the case before it" that "inform the ultimate balancing of the public and private interests at stake"). Because we see little upside in endorsing one multi-factor test or another, and still less in inventing a new one, we think it unnecessary to festoon the easily understood "totality of the circumstances" standard with any multi-factor trappings. In the last analysis, district courts enjoy broad discretion to identify the relevant circumstances in each case and to strike the appropriate balance between the public and private interests.

Even so, our skepticism about the wisdom of hard-and- fast rules in this domain does not blind us to the need for greater clarity and predictability with respect to pseudonym decisions. Thus, we appreciate that some general guidelines may be helpful to the district courts.

For a start, we are committed to the proposition that courts — in balancing the relevant interests — must not lose sight of the big picture. Litigation by pseudonym should occur only in

- 19 - "exceptional cases." Megless, 654 F.3d at 408; see Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185. Lawsuits in federal courts frequently invade customary notions of privacy and — in the bargain — threaten parties' reputations. The allegations are often serious (at least to the parties) and motivated adversaries do not lack for procedural weapons. Facing the court of public opinion under these conditions is sometimes stressful — but that is the nature of adversarial litigation. If commonplace lawsuit-induced distress were enough to justify the use of a pseudonym, anonymity would be the order of the day: Does and Roes would predominate. We think it follows that a well-calibrated inquiry needs some workable methodology for sorting out the (relatively few) "exceptional cases" in which pseudonymity should be allowed.

In another area of procedural common law — the doctrines of abstention — the Supreme Court has given form to a broad "exceptional circumstances" standard by delineating a few "general categories" of cases that fill the bill. Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-18 (1976); see Barrett, Procedural Common Law, supra, at 824-26 (describing abstention doctrines as "procedural common law"). Taking our cue from this model, we think it useful to sketch four general categories of exceptional cases in which party anonymity ordinarily will be warranted.

- 20 - • The first paradigm involves a would-be Doe who reasonably fears that coming out of the shadows will cause him unusually severe harm (either physical or psychological). See, e.g., Doe v. Ayers, 789 F.3d 944, 945 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing use of pseudonym premised upon evidence that disclosure of plaintiff-inmate's history of being

sexually abused "would create a significant risk of severe harm at the hands of other inmates");

Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1071 (allowing use of pseudonym for plaintiffs who "fear[ed]

extraordinary retaliation, such as deportation, arrest, and imprisonment"); Lauren B. v. Baxter

Int'l Inc. & Subsidiaries Welfare Benefit Plan for Active Emps., 298 F.R.D. 571, 573 (N.D. Ill. 2014)

(allowing anonymity when public disclosure would threaten plaintiff's recovery from longstanding

eating disorder); see generally Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 190 (listing, as factor favoring

anonymity, "whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm" (quoting

James, 6 F.3d at 238)). • The second paradigm involves cases in which identifying the would-be Doe would harm "innocent

- 21 - non-parties." Id. (quoting James, 6 F.3d at 238); see Doe v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., No. 18-040, 2018 WL 2048385, at *6 (D.N.H. May 2, 2018)

(explaining that nonparty "has a stronger case for anonymity" than party); see also Doe v. Eason, No.

98-2454, 1999 WL 33942103, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. ^[4], 1999) (granting pseudonym status to parents in litigation involving their minor child). • The third paradigm involves cases in which anonymity is necessary to forestall a chilling effect on future litigants who may be similarly situated. See Megless, 654 F.3d at 410

(emphasizing need to ascertain whether "other similarly situated litigants [will] be deterred from litigating claims that the public would like to have litigated"). Because "courts provide the mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes that might otherwise give rise to attempts at self-

help," they must be wary of "deter[ring] the legitimate exercise of the right to seek a peaceful redress of grievances through judicial means."

Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-

71 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); see BE&K

Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). A

- 22 - deterrence concern typically arises in cases involving "intimate issues such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors." In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 327. Also typical are cases in which a potential party may be implicated in "illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution," Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185, and those in which "the injury litigated against

would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the [party's] identity," Frank, 951 F.2d at 324. • The fourth paradigm involves suits that are bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law. This concern manifests itself when denying anonymity in the new suit would significantly undermine the interests served by that confidentiality. See, e.g., R.F.M. v. Nielsen, 365

F. Supp. 3d 350, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting pseudonymity to non-minor plaintiffs challenging immigration authorities' denial of "special immigrant juvenile" status due to family court adjudications, in part because "related records from the New York Family Courts are protected by law"); Doe v. Bates, 18-1250, 2018 WL 4539034, at

- 23 -

*1 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2018) (granting pseudonym status to plaintiff bringing excessive force claim arising from juvenile detention because "revealing

his identity would, in effect, unravel the protections afforded to his juvenile record"). These paradigms are rough cuts, and it is possible that a party whose case for pseudonymity appears weak when each paradigm is analyzed separately may nonetheless make a persuasive showing when multiple paradigms are implicated. Cf. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. ^[1], 11 n.9 (1987) ("The various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases."). There may also be rare cases in which — although they fall within one or more of these paradigms — either the need for openness or the prospect of serious prejudice to other parties from a grant of pseudonymity overwhelms the movant's privacy concerns.

We add a coda. Civil actions come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes, and we are not so sanguine as to believe that these four paradigms capture the entire universe of cases in which pseudonymity may be appropriate. We are confident, however, that the paradigms capture the vast majority of affected cases and, as such, we deem them useful tools for inquiring courts.

- 24 - V We take stock. A district court adjudicating a motion to proceed under a pseudonym should balance the interests asserted by the movant in favor of privacy against the public interest in transparency, taking all relevant circumstances into account. In most cases, the inquiry should focus upon the extent to which the facts align with one or more of the following paradigms: whether the case is one in which the movant reasonably fears that coming out of the shadows will cause him unusually severe physical or mental harm; whether the case is one in which compelled disclosure of the movant's name will likely lead to disclosure of a nonparty's identity, causing the latter substantial harm; whether the case is one in which compelled disclosure would likely deter, to an unacceptable degree, similarly situated individuals from litigating; or whether the federal suit is bound up with a prior proceeding subject by law to confidentiality protections and forcing disclosure of the party's identity would significantly impinge upon the interests served by keeping the prior proceeding confidential. Because these paradigms are framed in generalities, a court enjoys broad discretion to quantify the need for anonymity in the case before it. This broad discretion extends to the - 25 - court's ultimate determination as to whether that need outweighs the public's transparency interest.^[3] The party seeking pseudonymity bears the burden of rebutting the strong presumption against it. In most cases, the district court should require a declaration or affidavit either by the moving party or by someone with special knowledge who can speak to the need for anonymity in that case. See, e.g., Ayers, 789 F.3d at 945 (relying on opinion of person familiar with prison system); Doe v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., No. 12-1593, 2013 WL 3353944, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 3, 2013) (relying on affidavit from plaintiff's psychiatrist). District courts must be mindful that "the balance between a party's need for anonymity and the interests weighing in favor of open judicial proceedings may change as the litigation progresses." Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1069. Consequently, an order granting pseudonymity should be periodically reevaluated if and when circumstances change. See, e.g., Lawson v. Rubin, No. 17-6404, 2019 WL 5291205, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019) (explaining why pseudonymity was appropriate in pretrial stages of