34 C.F.R. § 106.71

Retaliation

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(a) Retaliation prohibited. No recipient or other person may intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by title IX or this part, or because the individual has made a report or complaint, testified, assisted, or participated or refused to participate in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this part. Intimidation, threats, coercion, or discrimination, including charges against an individual for code of conduct violations that do not involve sex discrimination or sexual harassment, but arise out of the same facts or circumstances as a report or complaint of sex discrimination, or a report or formal complaint of sexual harassment, for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by title IX or this part, constitutes retaliation. The recipient must keep confidential the identity of any individual who has made a report or complaint of sex discrimination, including any individual who has made a report or filed a formal complaint of sexual harassment, any complainant, any individual who has been reported to be the perpetrator of sex discrimination, any respondent, and any witness, except as may be permitted by the FERPA statute, 20 U.S.C. 1232g, or FERPA regulations, 34 CFR part 99, or as required by law, or to carry out the purposes of 34 CFR part 106, including the conduct of any investigation, hearing, or judicial proceeding arising thereunder. Complaints alleging retaliation may be filed according to the grievance procedures for sex discrimination required to be adopted under § 106.8(c).

(b) Specific circumstances. (1) The exercise of rights protected under the First Amendment does not constitute retaliation prohibited under paragraph (a) of this section.

(2) Charging an individual with a code of conduct violation for making a materially false statement in bad faith in the course of a grievance proceeding under this part does not constitute retaliation prohibited under paragraph (a) of this section, provided, however, that a determination regarding responsibility, alone, is not sufficient to conclude that any party made a materially false statement in bad faith.

[91 FR 61322, Sept. 29, 2026]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 34 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case: North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). · cites it 2× “See §§ 902, 903; 34 CFR §§ 106.71 , 100.6-100.11, pt. 101 (1980).”
Doe v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 46 F.4th 61 (1st Cir. 2022). · cites it 2× “§ 1232g(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 . This argument misses the mark.”
Ruth Ann Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989). · cites it 2× “34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1988). 4 Title VI regulations, in turn, provide that “[a] complaint must be filed not later than 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination.”
Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 167 Cal. App. 4th 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). “13; 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2008), which refers to 34 C.”
Bd. of Educ. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016). “34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (incorporating, among other provisions, 34 C.”
Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994). · cites it 2× “The plaintiff notes that this provision, along with the other Title VI procedural guarantees, are incorporated by reference into Title IX by 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 . Even assuming that 34 C.”
Wilkerson v. Univ. of North Texas ex rel. Bd. of Regents, 223 F. Supp. 3d 592 (E.D. Tex. 2016). “34 C.F.R. § 106.71 . Therefore, this provision is applicable to Plaintiff’s Title IX claim.”
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002). “7 (e) was originally promulgated by the Department of Justice to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI”), 78 Stat.”
Johnson v. Galen Health Institutes, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Ky. 2003). “252 , as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. The Department of Education has incorporated by reference § 100.”
Jane Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 111 F.4th 705 (6th Cir. 2024). ““No recipient or other person may intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by [T]itle IX or this part, or because the individual has made a report or complaint, testified, assisted, or…”
Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa. 1989). “34 C.F.R. § 106.71 . Title IX prevents gender discrimination in a federal program’s distribution of benefits.”
Holt v. Lewis, 955 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ala. 1995). · cites it 2× “The Fourth Circuit reached its matter-of-fact conclusion that such a retaliation claims exists after finding its authorization in the Department of Education (“the DOE”) regulations found at 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1995). 2 Id. at n. 2 .”
34 C.F.R. § 106.71(a): 1 case
Campbell v. Coppell Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:23-cv-00771 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2024).
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