Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
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Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
50 citation events across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson (flsd, 1988-08-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(f)(1) cited 4× in this case · 6 total citations of statute #3 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(1)(A) cited 1× in this case · 11 total citations of statute #1 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(a) cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson
S.D. Fla. · 1988 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Action Alliance, 789 F.2d at 939 (interests as promotion of knowledge, enjoyment, and protection of rights created by a statute are in the zone of interests); Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002 , 1010 (D.C.Cir.1977) (environmental group’s participation in passage of the statute); Consumers Union v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 575, 576-77 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (en banc) (consumer groups may challenge FTC rules that withhold used car information from consumers).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Center for Auto Safety (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Sec. 2004 (a) (1982) (emphasis added) 30 See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 , 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608 , 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) 31 See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576-77 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (car purchasers deprived of disclosures), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 40 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1457 (1983); Public Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969 , 974 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1980) (bacon purchasers subjected to nitrate additions); Federation of Homemakers v. Butz, 466 F.2d 462 (D.C.Cir.1972) (consumers challenging adequacy of meat labeling); Environmental Defense F…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California Association of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, Metromedia, Inc., Intervenor (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
This court relied on Duke Power to find standing for consumer organizations challenging the legislative veto of the Federal Trade Commission's proposed used car rule, finding that " 'but for' the veto's intervention, the FTC's used car rule would have secured significant assistance and protection for the used car buyers [that the organizations] represent." Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 577 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc), aff'd mem. 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Covelo Indian Community v. Watt
D.D.C. · 1982 · confidence medium
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 575, 577, n. 9 , No. 82-1737, slip op. at 5, n. 9 (D.C.Cir.
cited Cited "see" Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. Margaret Heckler
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc), aff’d sub nom.
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Kuphal (2×)
Pa. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd sub nom.
cited Cited "see" American Financial Services Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir.1982). .
discussed Cited "see" American Financial Services Association v. Federal Trade Commission, Silas Brown, American Conference of Uniform Consumer Credit Code States, Intervenors. The South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs v. Federal Trade Commission, American Conference of Uniform Consumer Credit Code States, American Financial Services Association, Department of Commerce of the State of Montana, Intervenors
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir.1982). 13 See Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Unfairness: Views on Unfair Acts and Practices in Violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Comm. Print 1980) (collection of public comments); Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Reauthorization of the Federal Trade Commission, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportatio…
cited Cited "see" Capital Legal Foundation v. Commodity Credit Corporation
D.C. Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 575 , 577 n. 9 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (en banc); Control Data Corp. v. Bal-drige, 655 F.2d 283 , 288 (D.C.Cir.1981).
cited Cited "see" Legal Authorities Available to the President to Respond to a Severe Energy Supply Interruption or Other Substantial Reduction in Available Petroleum Products
OLC · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See C onsum ers U n io n c f U .S ., Inc v Federal T rade C o m m 'n , 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." State Ex Rel. Tomasic v. UNIFIED GOV. OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS CITY
Kan. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. F.T.C., 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mike Espy, in His Official Capacity as Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576 (D.C.Cir.1982) (same), aff'd mem. sub. nom.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Liquid Carbonic Industries Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Polk Power Partners, Limited Partnership, Lavair Cogeneration Limited Partnership, Intervenors. Liquid Carbonic Industries Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Lavair Cogeneration Limited Partnership, Intervenor. Liquid Carbonic Industries Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Lavair Cogeneration Limited Partnership, Aes Wr Limited Partnership, Intervenors
D.C. Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C.Cir.1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Center For Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 , 93 S.Ct. 364, 367 , 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972); see also Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111-14 , 99 S.Ct. at 1613 -15 85 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. at 373 , 102 S.Ct. at 1121 86 See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam) (Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 authorizes "[a]ny interested party" to challenge the legislative veto provisions of the statute, 15 U.S.C.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam) (Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 authorizes "[a]ny interested party" to challenge the legislative veto provisions of the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(f)(1) (1982); "It is undisputed that Congress, through the ‘[a]ny interested party’ specification, intended to permit standing to seek judicial.review to the full extent permitted by Article III."), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 -03 (1983); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C.Cir.1976) (Althou…
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. City of Yonkers
S.D.N.Y. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ingersoll Johnson Steel Co.
S.D. Ind. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir.1982), aff'd without opinion, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1983); Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C.Cir.1982), aff'd without opinion, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Motor Coach Industries, Inc. v. Dole
4th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Consumers Union of the United States v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Motor Coach Industries, Inc., Hausman Bus Sales & Parts Co. v. Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Department of Transportation, J. Lynn Helms, Administrator of Federal Aviation, First & Merchants National Bank, and Eagle International Inc., American Coach Sales, Inc., Motor Coach Industries, Inc. Hausman Bus Sales & Parts Co. v. Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Department of Transportation J. Lynn Helms, Administrator of Federal Aviation and First Merchants National Bank Eagle International Inc. American Coach Sales, Inc. Motor Coach Industries, Inc. Hausman Bus Sales & Parts Co. v. First & Merchants National Bank, and Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Department of Transportation J. Lynn Helms, Administrator of Federal Aviation Eagle International, Inc. American Coach Sales, Inc.
1st Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Consumers Union of the United States v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam). 14 We are concerned with article III standing in this appeal.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Community Nutrition Institute v. John R. Block, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Consumers Union v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 575 , 577 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CONSUMERS UNION OF U. S., INC.
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
No. 82-1737.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Oct 22, 1982.
691 F.2d 575
J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Stanley S. Harris, U. S. Atty., Anthony J. Steinmeyer and Douglas Letter, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for F.T.C., Ellen Broadman, Washington, D. C., with whom Mark Silbergeld and Alan B. Morrison, Washington, D. G., were on the brief for Consumers Union of United States, Inc., et al., Stanley M. Brand, Gen. Counsel to the Clerk, U. S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., with whom Steven R. Ross, Deputy Counsel to the Clerk, U. S. House of Representatives and Eugene Gressman, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for U. S. House of Representatives., Charles Tiefer,* Asst. Senate Legal Counsel, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C., with whom Michael Davidson, Senate Legal Counsel, M. Elizabeth Culbreth, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for U. S. Senate., Robert C. Eckhardt and Herman Schwartz, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for Waxman, et al., amici curiae urging unconstitutionality of the veto., William H. Mellor, III, and Maxwell A. Miller, Denver, Colo., were on the brief for Mountain States Legal Foundation, et al., amici curiae urging constitutionality of the veto., Walter E. Huizenga, Oakton, Va., was on the brief for National Auto. Dealers Ass’n, amicus curiae ■ urging constitutionality of the veto.
Bork, Edwards, Ginsburg, Key, MacKinnon, Robinson, Tamm, Wil, Wright.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This case involves three questions certified to us by the District Court pursuant to Section 21(f)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 (FTCIA).[1] All three questions concern the constitutionality of Section 21(a) of that Act, which requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), after promulgating any final rule, to submit such rule to Congress for review. The rule becomes effective after ninety days of continuous session following submission unless both Houses of Congress adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the final rule.

In August of 1981 the FTC, after several years of rulemaking proceedings announced a final FTC rule covering representations of warranty coverage and disclosures of accurate information in connection with the sale of used cars.[2] The used car rule was submitted to each House of Congress on 9 September 1981.[3] Congress, by means of Senate Concurrent Resolution 60, proceeded to veto the rule.[4]

Following Congress’ veto, plaintiffs, two consumer groups, filed this suit, naming as defendants the FTC, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The plaintiffs alleged that their members would be directly harmed by the legislative veto and the consequent failure of the FTC to make the used car rule effective. As required by the Act, the District Court immediately certified the constitutionality of the congressional action to this court for expeditious en banc consideration.

We are obliged at the outset to consider whether the matter before us meets the standing requirements of Article III. We hold that it does.

FTCIA authorizes “[a]ny interested party” to file an action challenging the statute’s congressional veto provisions.[5] It is undisputed that Congress, through the “[a]ny interested party” specification, intended to permit standing to seek judicial review to the full extent permitted by Article III. One of the two plaintiff organizations, Consumers Union, participated in the FTC’s used car rulemaking proceedings,[6] and both speak on behalf of consumers, in this instance, used car purchasers, who seek[*388] disclosures that would assist them in making informed purchasing decisions. Both organizations assert that, “but for” the veto’s intervention, the FTC’s used car rule would have secured significant assistance and protection for the used car buyers they represent.[7] Guided most clearly by the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo,[8] we conclude that the injury described in the consumer organizations’ complaint satisfies the Article III threshold standing requirement.[9]

We further conclude that the case meets the Article III adversary contest requirement. The House and Senate, as named defendants, have vigorously aired their position on the constitutionality of the congressional veto, and have not sought dismissal of the complaint against them. The Resolution authorizing the Senate Legal Counsel to defend this case underscores the extraordinary character of the proceeding.[10] As the Senate Resolution points out, “ordinarily [a chamber of Congress] may not be named as a party defendant in litigation.”[11] In this exceptional situation, however, the Senate and House, in enacting 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(f)(1), and participating here as parties, have supplied the requisite adverseness and have effectively invited our expeditious resolution of the constitutional questions at issue.[12]

We are called upon then to decide whether Section 21(a) of FTCIA and Senate Concurrent Resolution 60 (a) violate the principles of separation of powers established in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution; (b) violate the procedures established by Article I for the exercise of legislative powers; and (c) improperly delegate administrative power to Congress without any standards for the exercise of that power.

We note that all three of these questions have been thoroughly considered and disposed of by a panel of this court in Consumers Energy Council of America v. FERC.13 We adhere to the analysis of that opinion. Accordingly, we hold:

1. For the reasons given in Consumers Energy Council, section V(E), Section 21(a) of the FTCIA and Senate Concurrent Resolution 60 violate the principles of separation of powers established in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution.
[*389] 2. For the reasons given in Consumers Energy Council, section V(D), Section 21(a) of the FTCIA and Senate Concurrent Resolution 60 violate the procedures established by Article I for the exercise of legislative powers.
3. For the reasons stated in Consumers Energy Council, section V, note 82, we decline to express an opinion as to whether Section 21(a) of the FTCIA and Senate Concurrent Resolution 60 improperly delegate administrative power to Congress without any standards for the exercise of that power.

For further proceedings in light of these holdings, the case is

Remanded.

1

15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(a) (Supp. IV 1980).

2

46 Fed.Reg. 41328-78 (1981).

3

Because of the technicalities of the continuous session requirement, the rule was resubmitted on 28 January 1982.

4

The Senate passed the veto resolution on 18 May 1982. 128 Cong.Rec. S 5402 (daily ed.). The House of Representatives followed suit on 26 May 1982. 128 Cong.Rec. H 2883 (daily ed.).

5

15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(1)(A) (1976) (“any interested person (including a consumer or consumer organization)” may file a petition for judicial review of an FTC rule).

6

See H.Conf.Rep.No. 917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1980), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 1073 (“interested party” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(f)(1) includes, inter alia, “all persons who participated in the particular rule-making that is the subject of the suit”).

7

See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-78, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2629-33, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).

8

424 U.S. 1, 11-12, 109-43, 96 S.Ct. 612, 630-31, 677-693, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). In Buckley, under 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1976), a judicial review provision similar to 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(f)(1), voters and candidates successfully challenged as inconsonant with the Appointments Clause statutory provisions concerning House and Senate appointment of members of the Federal Elections Commission. The “injury” supporting standing was less apparent in that case than in this one.

9

Last term, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), the Supreme Court explained that Article III requires, “at an irreducible minimum,” that the claimed injury not only be sufficient in itself, but also sufficiently connected to plaintiff, to defendant’s actions, and to the action requested of the court. That is, there must be injury in fact, a connection between the injury claimed and the plaintiff. Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to defendant’s actions, a connection between the injury and defendant’s actions. And third, there must be a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, a connection between the injury and the action requested of the court. All three requirements are met here. Members of the two consumer organizations are handicapped in their efforts to make informed used car purchases by the lack of a disclosure rule. Congress’ veto, and the FTC’s decision to abide by it, prevented the used car rule from taking effect. Finally, this court’s decision, that the veto was unconstitutional, will clear the way for the rule to become effective.

10

S. Res. 421, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), adopted, 128 Cong.Rec. S 7613 (daily ed. 29 June 1982).

11

Id.

12

Cf. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1980), restored to calendar for reargument, 454 U.S. 812, 102 S.Ct. 87, 70 L.Ed.2d 80 (1982).

13

673 F.2d 425 (D.C.Cir.1982), appeal docketed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3099 (U.S. 2 Aug. 1982) (No. 82-177).