Clinton v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 655 A.2d 814 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). · Go Syfert
Search
Clinton v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 655 A.2d 814 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 2001 · 2 courts · …the principal purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits. ✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2002 · …the principle purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits. ✓
36 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Lantz v. Coleman (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270 , 655 A.2d 814 (1995).
discussed Cited "see" Lantz v. Coleman (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn. App. 269, 270 , 655 A.2d 814 (1995).
cited Cited "see" Wentworth Laboratories v. Probe 2000, No. Cv02-034 68 92s (Nov. 19, 2002)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. , 37 Conn. App. 269 , 270 (1995).
cited Cited "see" Bolton v. Temple, No. Cv02 39 03 95 S (May 30, 2002)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co ., 37 Conn. App. 269 , 270 (1995).
cited Cited "see" Hildonen v. Kaspar, No. Cv01-0066107s (Jan. 10, 2002)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. 37 Conn. App. 269 (1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Judith Clinton
v.
Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company
14203.
Connecticut Appellate Court.
Mar 21, 1995.
655 A.2d 814
Frank F. Coulom, Jr., in support of the motion., Judith Clinton, pro se, and Edward Clinton, pro se, in opposition to the motion.
Lavery.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
Lavery, J.

The plaintiffs, Judith and Edward Clinton, appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider the trial court’s denial of their motion for a temporary injunction. The defendant moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. We agree that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final judgment.

The plaintiffs are the insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by the defendant. They brought an action against the defendant based on allegations[*270] that the defendant had refused to settle the plaintiffs’ insurance claims, which they submitted after a fire destroyed their home. After the commencement of the action, the defendant informed the plaintiffs of its decision to terminate their homeowner’s insurance coverage. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary injunction seeking to enjoin the defendant from terminating the policy. After a full hearing on the motion for a temporary injunction, the trial court denied the request. The plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider its decision. The court, however, denied reconsideration. This appeal followed.

The principal purpose of a temporary injunction “is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits.” Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 295, 22 A.2d 633 (1941). Our Supreme Court has consistently held that absent an applicable statutory rule to the contrary, a ruling granting, denying or dissolving a temporary injunction is not a judgment from which an appeal may be taken.[1] See, e.g., Stamford v. Kovac, 228 Conn. 95, 99, 634 A.2d 897 (1993); Board of Education v. Shelton Education Assn., 173 Conn. 81, 88, 376 A.2d 1080 (1977); Olcott v. Pendleton, supra, 294-95. In this case, therefore, had the plaintiffs appealed from the denial of their motion for a temporary injunction, their appeal would have been dismissed.

“We can hear appeals only from final judgments; General Statutes §§ 51-197a, 52-263; Practice Book § 4000; and neither the parties nor the trial court can[*271] confer jurisdiction upon us. Ebenstein & Ebenstein, P.C. v. Smith Thibault Corporation, 20 Conn. App. 23, 25, 563 A.2d 1044 (1989).” Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Trust, 25 Conn. App. 28, 32, 592 A.2d 417, cert. granted, 220 Conn. 904, 593 A.2d 970 (1991) (appeal withdrawn). In this case, the plaintiffs appealed from the denial of their motion to reconsider the denial of their motion for a temporary injunction. If we were to consider the plaintiffs’ appeal, we, in effect, would be allowing the plaintiffs to confer jurisdiction on this court through the filing of a motion to reconsider an underlying order that was not itself appealable. Consideration of such an appeal would encourage those parties who do not have a final judgment from which to appeal, to create for themselves a final judgment by filing a motion to reconsider.

Because the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction is not an appealable final judgment, the denial of the motion to reconsider that order is likewise a nonfinal judgment. As a result, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

“Immediate review of temporary injunctions is authorized for appeals arising out of labor disputes; General Statutes § 31-118; French v. Amalgamated Local Union 376, 203 Conn. 624, 628 n.6, 526 A.2d 861 (1987); or for appeals involving matters of substantial public interest. General Statutes § 52-265a; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, 194 Conn. 677, 678 n.1, 485 A.2d 1272 (1984).” Stamford v. Kovac, 29 Conn. App. 105, 109 n.4, 612 A.2d 1229 (1992), rev’d on other grounds, 228 Conn. 95, 634 A.2d 897 (1993).