Lewis v. Matteo, 679 A.2d 366 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). · Go Syfert
Search
Lewis v. Matteo, 679 A.2d 366 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Keller v. Keller CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(Ibid.; see also Lewis v. Matteo (Conn.App. 1996) 679 A.2d 366, 367 [plaintiff‟s first unsuccessful action to quiet title by claiming title by deed barred second action claiming title by adverse possession on res judicata grounds]; Hangman v. Bruening (1995) 247 Neb. 769, 772 [ 530 N.W.2d 247, 249 ] [“present quiet title action, although based upon the theory of adverse possession, involved the same rights between the same parties as did the [prior] quiet title action,” and because the “theory of adverse possession could have been raised in the earlier quiet title litigation,” all �…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DEWITT LEWIS
v.
MICHAEL MATTEO
14029.
Connecticut Appellate Court.
Jun 18, 1996.
679 A.2d 366
Margaret J. Slez, with whom, on the brief, was Anthony F. Slez, for the appellants (plaintiffs)., Rita Steinberger, pro se, the appellee (defendant), with whom, on the brief was Mary E. Wexler.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiffs to prove ownership by adverse possession of a parcel of land that abuts the property on which they reside. The adverse possession action was the plaintiffs’ second attempt to establish ownership of the parcel. The first attempt was a quiet title action alleging title to the parcel by warranty deed.

In the quiet title action, the defendants filed a special defense that the plaintiffs could not acquire the parcel by adverse possession. The plaintiffs responded to the special defense that they were not claiming ownership by adverse possession. The action was tried to an attorney trial referee, who concluded that the plaintiffs had not claimed title by adverse possession and that they had failed to prove ownership by deed.[1] The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants in accordance with the referee’s findings.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed the adverse possession action that is the subject of this appeal. Before rendering judgment, the trial court asked the parties to submit posttrial briefs addressing the defendants’ special defense that the adverse possession action was barred by res judicata. After briefs were submitted, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants.

The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly (1) held that the decision in the prior quiet title action had res judicata effect on the plaintiffs’ subsequent adverse possession claim, and (2) rendered judgment[*686] for the defendants in conflict with default judgments rendered against other defendants.[2]

We are persuaded by our examination of the record, briefs and arguments of the parties, that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. In a thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision, the trial court analyzed the law in a manner consistent with our statutes and case precedents. Lewis v. Matteo, 44 Conn. Sup. 189, 679 A.2d 426 (1995). Because that memorandum addresses the arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt the trial court’s well reasoned decision as a statement of the applicable law on these issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Bardinelli, 39 Conn. App. 786, 667 A.2d 806 (1995); State v. Mobley, 33 Conn. App. 103, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994).

The judgment is affirmed.

1

The attorney trial referee, however, recommended judgment for the plaintiffs on land lying beneath a building that they already owned.

2

In their second claim, the plaintiffs raise issues concerning the effect of default judgments against nonappealing defendants. The parties who were defaulted were not part of the trial court’s judgment on the merits and were not involved in this appeal. We therefore do not address the propriety or effect of default judgments against the nonappealing defendants.